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PREFACE 
uropean integration continues to be ‘in flux’. Since the early 1990s, 
the dynamics have been almost breathtaking: three treaty revisions 
in the EU and no fewer than three enlargements, increasing its size 
from 12 to 27 members. In 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) 
became operational, quietly extending the single market (except agriculture 
and fisheries) to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. In addition, the euro 
was introduced and the eurozone enlarged from its initial 11 to 17 
countries. The single market deepened steadily. There was and continues to 
be some turmoil in the domestic politics of some member states due to the 
financial and economic crisis and concerns about the deepening and the 
scope of the EU acquis. The dynamics are clearly not petering out: the crisis 
has prompted a rapid deepening of EMU, mostly for the eurozone but to 
some extent also for the EU as a whole, new EU members are likely to 
accede, a few EU countries want to enter the eurozone and market 
integration with a host of European countries (e.g. Andorra, San Marino, 
Monaco, Switzerland, Turkey and some European neighbourhood 
countries) may well be intensified and different approaches (including 
enlargement of the EEA) are under discussion. Last but not least, in the UK 
a major debate led by Prime Minister David Cameron has been unleashed 
about the terms of EU membership, with an option of an ‘in or out’ 
referendum in 2017.  
Given the overwhelming prominence of the EU, often mistakenly 
labelled ‘Europe’, it might have gone unnoticed that a new element in the 
European integration debate is formed by discussions about the 
functioning and future of the EEA as well as options for deep market 
integration with other non-EU European countries. In December 2012, the 
European Commission and the EEAS submitted a joint “EEA review” 
paper, after an invitation from the Council to do so two years before. In 
May 2013, the EEA Council (comprising the EU and the three non-EU EEA 
member countries) will engage in a first discussion on the EEA and 
possible alternative options for better market integration with various 
European countries. This CEPS study, requested by the Liechtenstein 
government, aims to serve as a contribution to the analysis and discussions 
E
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leading up to the high-level EEA review and decision-making. This book is 
intended to stimulate the political leadership in Liechtenstein, public 
opinion leaders and others to engage in strategic thinking about the many 
options for the Principality in the near and medium-term future. Where 
relevant, matters specifically important for Liechtenstein have been 
highlighted. However, we are convinced that the ‘EU circuit’ in Brussels 
and in all capitals in the EEA-30 as well as policy-makers in non-EEA 
countries in Europe will also find the study useful for two reasons: first, it 
is, apart from the recent Norwegian EEA review (in Norwegian mostly), 
the only in-depth study of the EEA as it functions today; second, as far as 
we know, it is the only study to systematically screen every not-too-
extreme option that is relevant (we discuss nine, with sub-options) in a 
sound, wide-ranging and strategic debate about European market 
integration.  
The first ideas for this study emerged from fascinating discussions 
between the first author and H.E. Prince Nikolaus von und zu 
Liechtenstein when the latter was still ambassador for Liechtenstein in 
Brussels. Later, the government of the Principality of Liechtenstein 
commissioned CEPS to do the study with flexible and fairly open terms of 
reference. The authors are grateful to Liechtenstein for the confidence in 
CEPS to design and elaborate this work. The study has benefited from 
many insights acquired from interviews with representatives and 
stakeholders, both in Brussels and Vaduz. We are also grateful to the 
participants of the CEPS EEA workshop held in Brussels in June 2012. The 
authors are especially indebted to Christian Frommelt, Sieglinde Gstoehl, 
Ulf Svendrup, Matthias Oesch and Marc Maresceau. Various draft texts 
have been greatly improved due to meticulous comments from and 
insightful discussions with Marius Vahl and Ambassador Kurt Jaeger.  
The authors alone are responsible for any omissions and errors 
remaining.  
Jacques Pelkmans 
& Philipp Böhler 
 Brussels 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he present study is concerned with a new element in the recent 
European integration debate: discussions about the functioning of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), modes of improving the EEA, 
its possible enlargement as well as other options to deepen and enlarge 
European market integration to more (non-EU) countries. The EEA 
includes the 27 member states of the EU and three non-EU countries: 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Focusing on the EEA means, by 
definition, concentrating on the EEA-3 countries and their position in 
today’s and a future EEA, as well as an interest in the EU and its position 
towards the EEA. However, this study has been designed as an exercise in 
strategic thinking. Therefore, it incorporates a wider spectrum of 
alternative options and sub-options than the EEA. Since the government of 
Liechtenstein has requested CEPS to make this study, it comprises some 
specifics related to Liechtenstein but these aspects are mainly found in the 
first two chapters and, otherwise, scattered throughout the text. It should 
help EU experts to better appreciate the particularities of Liechtenstein in 
the EEA and beyond, which is not easily accomplished in the frantic ‘EU 
circuit’. Nevertheless, these country-specific observations do not dominate 
the study at all and the text can be read just as well as a more general 
treatise on the functioning of the EEA today and in future as well as on a 
range of alternative options in European market integration.  
After a first introductory chapter, chapter 2 summarises three 
centuries of how Liechtenstein was finding its way in Europe. Its two 
central aspirations have always been, on the one hand, to achieve 
independence and recognition as a sovereign state, and, on the other hand, 
to allow Liechtenstein to prosper by assuming a pragmatic approach to 
commerce – and later, to economic integration. Its move into the EEA in 
1995 has undoubtedly proved a most successful strategy, notwithstanding 
the initial fears about a lack of experience and of administrative capacity.  
Chapter 3 explains the deep and wide-ranging market integration in 
Europe today and Liechtenstein’s position in it. After an excursion into the 
customs union and the currency union with the Swiss and the ingenious 
T
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compatibility of the free trade area aspects of the EEA and the customs 
union regime of Switzerland (based on the principle of ‘parallel 
marketability’), most of the chapter consists of an extensive exposition of 
the EEA and its functioning, in particular the cooperation amongst the 
EEA-3 countries in the take-over of a steady stream of new internal market 
‘legal acts’ and related questions. The EEA is institutionally explained with 
all its bodies and the ‘two-pillar structure’, including its underlying 
philosophy, made intelligible. This philosophy is based on the rejection of 
supra-nationalism by the EEA EFTA countries, in other words, an 
insistence on their sovereignty. Because the EEA-3 do want to be part of the 
EU internal market, the practical effect of the EEA is a mere ‘residual’ 
sovereignty: legally, the EEA Agreement is a normal intergovernmental 
treaty, but in actual practice the take-over of EU legal acts is hardly ever 
‘negotiated’ – most of the time, it is merely processed quasi-automatically 
via Joint Committee decisions (JCDs). The escape clause is Art. 102, also 
called the ‘nuclear option’, under which the EEA-3 (but not the EU 
countries of the EEA) might insist upon their sovereign discretion not to 
adopt a specific EU legal acts but at the price of losing market access to the 
EU in the related part of the relevant Annex. 
The substance of the EEA adds up to the ‘single market-minus’, that 
is, all of the single market-minus agriculture and fisheries. This substance 
can be summed up by the economic freedoms (free movement of goods, 
services, capital, labour and codified technology like IPRs, plus the right of 
establishment), the EU regulation necessary for these freedoms to be 
applicable without derogations from member states (e.g. for market failures 
not sufficiently addressed at EU level) and five of what the EEA Agreement 
calls ‘horizontal’ policies (consumer protection, environment, social 
policies, statistics and company law). Although one might argue about the 
rationale of having (only) five such policies, the EEA remit is extremely 
ambitious, large and ‘deep’ for non-EU countries. Since the EU extends its 
single market to the EEA EFTA states, it insisted on the ‘homogeneity’ of 
the EEA-30 market. This adds further ambition and discipline. 
The EEA Agreement is ‘static’ in the sense that its main text has never 
been amended, yet incredibly ‘dynamic’ in that all new EU acquis for the 
single-market-minus is continuously incorporated in the Annexes of the 
Agreement via JCDs. By late 2012, the incorporation of (so-called ‘EEA-
relevant’) EU legal acts in the Annexes added up to over 7,000 EU legal acts 
(starting from 1994). These EU legal acts are diverse, ranging from 
directives and regulations enacted by the European Parliament and the 
Council, via decisions and recommendations to numerous instances of EU 
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implementing acts. Moreover, the 7,000-plus turn out to be a gross 
measure, not (or hardly) taking into account the abolition of EU acts later or 
codification and recasting (etc.) – which has been done with some 
frequency in the EU since 2005 – and also including numerous trivial 
(rather than substantive) amendments of directives or regulations. On the 
whole, and despite the complicated two-pillar procedures, the EEA is 
regarded as a success story. This is due, in no small measure, to the EEA-3 
countries having organised themselves effectively in Brussels and 
domestically in ways that routinely incorporate EU laws into the 
Agreement or (especially EU legal acts with ‘direct effect’, a denial of their 
sovereignty) doing so after obtaining explicit national parliamentary 
approval.  
Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the EU have accomplished two 
instances of ‘trilateralisation’: i) enabling Liechtenstein EU market access in 
processed agricultural products via an agreement with Switzerland, and ii) 
attaching the Schengen protocol for Liechtenstein to the Swiss-EU 
Schengen Association Agreement (but in fact valid as a ‘stand-alone’ one). 
There is a host of other bilateral agreements between Liechtenstein and the 
EU and/or its member states, including a recent series of tax information 
exchange and double taxation agreements (with 11 EU countries).  
Chapter 4 discusses the dynamics of European integration in the 
wider sense, in effect Liechtenstein’s strategic environment. The following 
eight changes in this environment are considered:  
1. The EEA Review of the European Commission. For the first time since 
the EEA began, EU Council of Ministers has announced that it expects to 
have an extensive exchange in May 2013 in the EEA Council. The Review is 
different from past Council conclusions invariably comprising praise for 
the functioning of the EEA, although these are largely repeated. This time a 
more systematic inspection of EEA practices and some structural features 
will be critically discussed, to wit, the question of EEA relevance and the 
lack of any procedure ex ante, the increasing backlog of incorporating EEA-
relevant EU acts into domestic law of the EEA-3, breaking the EU’s taboo 
on using Art. 102, the participation of the EEA-3 in EU agencies and a frank 
discussion of opening up the EEA to non-EU countries other than 
Switzerland. 
2. Amending the EEA Agreement. The EEA Review from the 
Commission comprises three suggestions for substantive amendments: i) a 
‘more comprehensive approach’ by bringing some bilateral agreements 
under a single framework, possibly the EEA; ii) bringing under the EEA the 
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EU policy on trafficking in human beings, if not more judicial cooperation; 
and iii) altering Art. 128 and opening up EEA membership for non-EU 
countries other than Switzerland. 
3. Transforming Swiss-EU economic relations. The EU has signalled in 
unusually frank terms that the a-la-carte bilateral approach to EU market 
access the Swiss continue to favour is exhausted. Instead, the EU insists on 
four conditions that, together, have the effect of mimicking the EEA (except 
for some ‘holes’ in the set of bilaterals). In addition, some other concerns 
are put forward (e.g. preferential corporate taxation and backtracking on 
free movement of persons). Swiss-EU economic relations are of paramount 
importance to Liechtenstein.  
4. Iceland’s application for EU membership. If Iceland were to join the EU 
(which is far from certain given the polls and the preferences of several 
political parties), the EEA-3 would shrink to EEA-2. This raises questions 
about the viability of the EEA, as the EU would partner with only two 
countries, and about the vulnerabilities of tiny Liechtenstein in its 
relationship with Norway. 
5. Changes in sentiment in Andorra, Monaco and San Marino (AMS). All 
three entities are interested in deepening market integration with the EU, 
with San Marino wishing EU membership, and EEA membership as a 
second option, and Andorra having recently come out in favour of joining 
the EEA as well. The Commission has published an ‘options’ paper for the 
AMS, with two ‘viable’ options: participation in the EEA and a framework 
association agreement. 
6. Turkey’s EU candidacy. Turkey has been in pre-accession 
negotiations with the EU for 14 years, much longer than any other 
candidate, whilst acquis adoption has progressed very little so far. Inside 
Turkey there is clearly less interest than before and the blockage of the 
Cyprus issue does not help, to put it mildly. This is frustrating and 
unbecoming for a privilege as great as pre-accession. Sooner or later, 
Turkey will have to reconsider its options, if its retains its unwillingness. 
Possibilities might include a separate bilateral based on the EU-Turkish 
customs union, membership of the EEA or concluding its ‘own’ EEA look-
alike.  
7. EEA membership for advanced neighbourhood countries. The EEA might 
envisage extending membership to countries like Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia in the medium-run. Ukraine has already concluded a free trade 
area with the EU, but it is not signed yet.  
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8. The recent ‘inner dynamics’ of the EU. These dynamics, in particular, 
with respect to EMU and to some extent in network industries, have raised 
questions about the ability of non-EU EEA countries to participate fully, 
given the higher degree of centralisation in (say) the EU banking union in 
progress. It boils down to effective although circumscribed participation in 
EU agencies, insofar as the EEA-3 enterprises or banks are or could be 
affected directly.  
Chapter 5 analyses nine options and sub-options and, sometimes, in 
combination with one another. The chapter is drafted as a strategic 
reflection, often encouraging readers to think in terms of alternative 
options. The table below provides a summary of these options or scenarios 
(2nd column), what they mainly entail (3rd column) and some annotations 
(4th column). The table only mentions the key elements – it cannot do justice 
to the extensive analysis provided along with ample details provided in the 
chapter.  
Scenarios/options for Liechtenstein’s integration strategy 
Option/scenario Required actions Comments 
1. Status quo EEA Status quo, no change 
necessary 
Implausible 
1a Status-quo-plus 
EEA 
No change Agreement, 
better managing the EEA 
(reduce ‘backlog’), 
address specific items 
(e.g. EEA relevance) 
Feasible, attractive for 
substantive and 
political reasons 
2.  ‘More EEA’ 
(change 
agreement) 
Extension of scope/ 
substance, tighter 
procedures 
Judicial cooperation 
seems feasible, EEA-3 
desire access to EP and 
Council 
3. (non-EU) EEA 
enlargement  
Switzerland, other new 
members via amending 
EEA Agreement  
Commission breaks 
taboo, EEA-3 politically 
reticent 
4. EEA-bis, or, 
parallel EEA 
look-alikes 
For Switzerland, AMS 
countries, Turkey, 
advanced 
neighbourhood, UK 
minus Scotland 
Not very different from 
EEA, 4 conditions for 
Switzerland to be 
applied to any EEA-bis 
+ far-reaching I.M. 
acquis 
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5. Less EEA Scope of EEA reduced 
(via Art. 102 or amending 
Agreement) 
Constrained option, EU 
insists on homogeneity 
5a  EEA-2 (after Iceland’s EU 
accession)  
‘Rebuilding’ EEA EFTA 
pillar do-able; Unnat-
ural alliance in EEA-2? 
Less single-voice?  
6. Bilaterals on 
single market-
minus  
For the UK, minus 
Scotland, perhaps EEA-3 
countries, Switzerland, 
Turkey, AMS and 
neighbourhood; the key 
question is: What 
differences with 4? 
If different from option 
4, not attractive due to 
lack of legal (EEA-type) 
order; flexibility 
limited; a-la-carte for 
UK-minus means less 
access to single market 
7. More EU 
deepening 
Single market and its 
governance, including the 
banking union; Can the 
EEA-3 absorb this 
change? 
Critical to participate in 
ECB and some EU 
agencies, with vote 
when affecting EEA 
banks/enterprises 
directly 
8. Less, or 
differentiated, 
EU 
Reducing scope of 
substance (opposite of 
‘widening’) or ‘variable 
geometry (e.g. euro ‘ins’ 
vs ‘outs’) 
A divided EU (or, 
different speeds) 
problem for EEA if 
single market is 
affected (e.g. EU patent 
or banks) 
8a  EU countries exiting 
(opposite of 
‘enlargement’); corollary 
>> options 3 /4 /6 for ex-
EU country? 
Unlikely, but if yes, 
access to single market 
will remain desirable; 
three options 
9. Liechtenstein 
joining EU 
Although not current 
policy, adverse scenarios 
might prompt a U-turn; 
can the EU accommodate 
a small-sized country? 
And can Liechtenstein 
handle it? 
Might be feasible for 
the Commission in 
longer run; requires 
novel institutional 
approach; Liechtenstein 
could make pro-active 
proposals on basis of 
cost-benefit studies 
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It should be noted that the authors of this study have refrained from 
making choices. This is of course up to Liechtenstein itself. Their purpose is 
to think strategically and consider alternatives. In any event, the state of 
flux in European integration is such that some scenarios are much more 
plausible than others, at least today. Finally, we venture to say that this 
reflection can also be helpful for the discussions leading up to the official 
EEA review. 
 
8  
 
1. PLACE, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE STUDY 
he Principality of Liechtenstein has become deeply embedded in 
European integration. It is predominantly involved in European 
economic integration, flanked by a range of cooperative arrangements 
in several policy areas. On the whole, Liechtenstein’s economic integration 
with the EU1 and EFTA countries is regarded as a success. Indeed, as 
recently as 2010, the official stocktaking and assessment report by 
Liechtenstein itself2 drew this conclusion for many reasons. It begs the 
question why a new study should be undertaken.  
This study is quite different from and, to a significant degree, 
complementary to the 2010 Liechtenstein report for four reasons. First, the 
present study is made by an independent, European think-tank (CEPS) 
                                                   
1 According to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU), O.J. 2008, C 115, p. 13 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), O.J. 2008, C 115, p. 47, no distinction will be made between the 
European Communities and the European Union following the unification brought 
about. In situations where the context makes such a distinction necessary it will be 
indicated which organisation is meant. The new terminology, pursuant to Art. 19 
TEU, will be applied in the main text. The former Court of First Instance (CFI) will 
be referred to as the General Court (GC), the former European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) as the Court of Justice (CJ) and the court as an institution will be referred to 
as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the table of cases and the 
footnotes the terminology of the TEU and TEC in the version of the Treaty of Nice 
will be used when applicable. In the following all treaty articles will be numbered 
according to the Treaty of Lisbon, where a change in substance compared to the 
EU and EC Treaties has not been effected. 
2 Bericht und Antrag der Regierung an den Landtag des Fürstentums Liechtenstein 
betreffend 15 Jahre Mitgliedschaft des Fürstentums Liechtenstein im Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), No. 17/2010 (http://www.llv.li/amtsstellen/llv-sewr-
dokumente_publikationen-ewr-abkommen/llv-sewr-dokumente_publikationen-
veroeffentlichte_berichte_und_antraege.htm). 
T
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working in the ‘Brussels’ environment. CEPS appreciates the confidence 
that the Principality has shown in us. Serious and open-minded policy 
thinking is undoubtedly greatly facilitated by independent analysis. 
Second, the present study is future-oriented whereas the 2010 Liechtenstein 
report assessed the impact of 15 years of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) on the country and its economy, and the actual functioning of 
Liechtenstein in the EEA system. No country in the modern world can 
escape its strategic environment, of course, but this is a fortiori true for a 
very small country3 like Liechtenstein. Perhaps one might employ more 
forceful wording for Liechtenstein’s predicament: it is absolutely essential 
for the country to anticipate, as much as possible, how its strategic 
environment might evolve, whether it might entertain some hope to 
selectively influence thinking and activities in that environment and, not 
least, how it can adjust to such changes in ways that would yield benefits to 
the country.  
As we hope to demonstrate, the European strategic environment is 
changing in a number of ways (chapter 4) and this process will continue for 
quite some years. In some respects, it is also assuming continental 
characteristics, stretching from Iceland to the Caucasus and Turkey, if not 
beyond. A crucial aspect of this unfolding transformation is the complex set 
of changes taking place in the EU itself, in the form of an unexpected 
deepening of its economic integration in response to the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis and the complex ramifications this might have.  
Third, this study focuses on future European integration options of 
Liechtenstein, which renders it almost by definition a ‘strategic’ study of 
possible EU and EEA avenues,4 and far less a report on the internal 
capacities of Liechtenstein for participation in the EEA and the latter’s 
economic and other impact on the country until 2009, as the 2010 
Liechtenstein report did. Fourth, lest it be forgotten, the European Union 
itself has proven to be highly dynamic even before the crisis – with three 
                                                   
3 In official EU, EFTA and EEA documents and in the literature, one encounters 
altogether no less than six different terms for very small countries in Europe: 
micro-states, very small states, Kleinststaat (German for smallest possible state), 
countries with small territorial dimension, independent states with small territorial 
extension (ISSTEs) and small-sized countries. This study will either mention the 
countries by name or employ only the terms ISSTEs and small-sized countries.  
4 One can wonder whether the EEA or the EEA-3 (the EFTA countries of the EEA) 
have common ‘strategies’. For a plea in this direction, see Pelkmans & Böhler (2012).  
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successive changes of the EU treaties since Liechtenstein became an EEA 
member in 1995, and a formal initiation of the eurozone with 11 EU 
countries, meanwhile having grown to 17 members. Moreover, the EU has 
enlarged from 15 to 27 countries.  
Although our study aims at understanding actual and possible 
changes in the strategic environment of Liechtenstein, and considers 
options for addressing them when called for, it ought to be clear from the 
start that two aspects play a predominant role: the EEA and Liechtenstein’s 
profound integration with Switzerland. With Switzerland it shares a 
customs union (and Swiss regulation in related fields) and a currency 
union. There are also many personal bonds with the Swiss. For 
Liechtenstein, far more often than not, the EEA is the concrete legal and 
institutional framework of European economic integration. It is not hard to 
appreciate why. The EEA is a very ambitious arrangement of ‘deep’ and (in 
terms of scope) very ‘wide’ market integration, encompassing far-reaching 
mutual market access and common regulation, including institutional and 
other implications. It cannot be a surprise, therefore, that a strategic 
reflection on Liechtenstein’s European integration options will 
predominantly consist of thinking about options for the EEA. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the necessity and predominance as a 
theme, the EEA is not the only possible option for Liechtenstein, as we shall 
demonstrate. It all depends on whether or not one is willing to take into 
account alternative future scenarios for changes in European integration, 
which are more far-fetched. There is simply no way of knowing whether 
one should “think outside of the EEA box” and how far-fetched such 
scenarios “should” be. It is the responsibility of the authors, not an explicit 
assignment from the Liechtenstein government, to draw the options fairly 
wide. We are convinced that strategic thinking is best done by 
incorporating what today is regarded as implausible (but not completely 
unrealistic) scenarios. 
Two historical lessons from the origins of the EEA are telling in this 
respect. First, imagine that Liechtenstein had asked CEPS in 1988 to 
conduct a study on its options for European integration. Could anybody 
realistically have anticipated that the EU would offer to open up 
‘wholesale’ the participation of EFTA countries in the entire internal market 
barely one year later, not to speak of the collapse of communism, the iron 
curtain, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON by the end of 1990? Second, and 
perhaps less sensational but surely giving food for thought, would the 
founding fathers of the EEA on the EFTA side (or Liechtenstein, for that 
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matter) have realised in 19925 that the EEA risked losing all its members? 
Although this never happened, it was a razor’s edge away: once the EEA 
treaty had been signed, and Swiss voters (also in 1992) had already rejected 
EEA membership, domestic political debates in Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and Norway swung to the EU membership option. The Norwegian 
referendum split the country but the 50% yes vote was barely 2% short! 
With just 2% more in favour, from the EFTA side only Iceland would have 
entered the EEA. Half a year later Liechtenstein would have joined to 
constitute an EEA-2 with not even 300,000 people, yet having a relatively 
ambitious institutional framework, with ‘deep’ market integration 
substance on which it had little experience. These two examples show how 
important it is not to limit strategic reflection too much.  
This study is structured as follows. After a brief excursion into 
Liechtenstein’s history until its entry into the EEA, with special emphasis 
on the Principality’s two central aspirations when positioning itself in 
Europe, a lengthy chapter 3 surveys the present position of Liechtenstein in 
European economic integration and cooperation. It deals with the EEA as 
such, the ‘deep’ market integration Liechtenstein now enjoys – emanating 
from the EEA – and its legal and institutional structure, Liechtenstein’s 
profound economic bonds with Switzerland and a range of bilateral 
cooperation agreements with the EU and its member states, respectively. 
Readers knowledgeable about the EEA and related issues of economic 
cooperation and integration between the EU (or EU countries) and EFTA 
countries, in particular Liechtenstein, can skip chapter 3 and proceed 
immediately to chapter 4. Chapter 4 discusses eight actual or potential 
changes in the European strategic environment relevant for Liechtenstein. 
Some of these are not or need not be independent from each other. Chapter 
5 analyses nine scenarios, possibly ‘options’ in a strategic reflection, for 
addressing the implications of such changes, some options being 
incremental, some fairly radical, as well as plausible combinations of some 
of them. The idea is to offer ample and rich food for thought and strategy. 
Chapter 6 concludes.6 
                                                   
5 The year of signing the EEA Treaty. 
6 Several annexes provide details about how the EEA really works in substance. 
Although the EEA plays a dominant role in this study, our text is meant to support 
strategic reflections amongst the leaders of Liechtenstein and presumably for the 
‘EU and EEA circuit’ in Brussels and national capitals as well; hence, it is not a 
report on the numerous technical aspects of the EEA itself.  
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2. LIECHTENSTEIN: A SHORT HISTORY 
AND ITS MOVE INTO THE EEA 
he Principality of Liechtenstein is an independent state with small 
territorial extension. It has existed in its current dimensions since 
1719. For nearly 300 years, its strategic thinking and diplomacy have 
been driven by two aspirations: on the one hand, the quest for 
independence and recognition as a sovereign state, and, on the other hand, 
a pragmatic approach to commerce – later, to economic integration – 
allowing Liechtenstein to prosper. After some illustrations from 
Liechtenstein’s history, the country’s route into the EEA will be briefly 
chronicled. 
2.1 Liechtenstein’s aspirations before the EEA 
The primacy of recognition by other European political entities was central 
to the early history of Liechtenstein. When the Princely Family of 
Liechtenstein acquired the County of Vaduz and the Lordship of 
Schellenberg some 300 years ago, an underlying ambition was the right to 
direct participation of these two small shires in the institutions of the Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation (Reichsunmittelbarkeit).7 Schellenberg, 
as well as Vaduz provided the family of Liechtenstein with a direct political 
influence in this ancient integration project of the Germanic parts of 
Europe. Their participation consisted of a seat and full rights in the 
Imperial Diet, the German Reichsfürstentag.8 
                                                   
7 In fact, as Beattie (2012, p.  6) notes, the county of Vaduz was already subordinate 
to the Holy Roman Emperor since 1396 and the same goes for Schellenberg since 
1434. In 1495 the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was founded with 
both Vaduz and Schellenberg as ‘immediate fiefs’ entitled to have a seat in the 
Imperial Diet.  
8 See Friese (2011, p. 170); see also Angermeier (1984). 
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In the two centuries following the dissolution of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation in 1806, the problem of full recognition as a 
sovereign state assumed different forms and required distinct time-bound 
strategies, with both adverse and successful outcomes. Liechtenstein 
became part of the Rheinbund (Confederation of the Rhine), founded after 
Napoleon’s victory in the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805 as the successor of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The acceptance in the 
Rheinbund was an express recognition of the formal independence and 
sovereignty of the Principality. 
After the end of Napoleon’s reign, Liechtenstein became a member of 
the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), which consisted of 39 
sovereign states; a further renewal of the Principality’s statehood. In 1853 
Liechtenstein entered into a customs and currency agreement with Austria, 
followed by a postal agreement in 1912. However, after the Austrian-
Prussian war of 1866, causing the dissolution of the German Confederation, 
Liechtenstein became a ‘protectorate’ of Austria. Perhaps this was a mixed 
blessing, since Liechtenstein lost some of its independence. Liechtenstein 
stayed neutral throughout World War I (as it was not part of any alliance). 
Nevertheless, the war turned out to have disastrous consequences for the 
Principality: due to the devaluation of the Austrian currency 
Liechtensteiners lost all their assets. When the Austrian empire was 
terminated after World War I, Liechtenstein found a new partner and ally 
in its neighbouring country Switzerland. Here one observes the 
principality’s second trait, a pragmatic approach to economic integration. 
In 1919, Liechtenstein delegated its foreign representation to Switzerland, 
followed by a postal agreement in 1920 and finally the current customs 
treaty in 1923.9 Furthermore, Liechtenstein unilaterally adopted the Swiss 
franc as its official currency in 1924. 
In world diplomacy, it applied for membership of the League of 
Nations in 1920 but was rejected due to its delegation of some sovereign 
rights to Switzerland and the lack of an army.10 During World War II, 
Liechtenstein as well as Switzerland remained neutral. After the war, 
economic integration began to assume greater importance. Liechtenstein’s 
economy underwent a transformation from a predominantly agricultural 
                                                   
9 See Friese (2011, p. 176 ff); see also Liechtenstein, von und zu (2007).  
10 Friese (2011, pp. 218-219). 
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state to one of the most highly industrialised countries in the world.11 In 
actual practice, its participation in the Swiss customs union gave it full 
access to GATT and negotiated MFN (most-favoured nation) treatment by 
GATT partners before it joined the WTO later in 1995.12 When EFTA was 
founded in 1960 in Stockholm, Liechtenstein benefited indirectly via 
Switzerland – it was not itself a member of EFTA (until 1991). The Swiss 
role in GATT and EFTA is best characterised as ‘mediation’. Originally, 
EFTA membership for Liechtenstein was refused because Liechtenstein 
was represented in trade relations with third countries by Switzerland. 
When, in 1972, the EEC and EFTA countries concluded a series of bilateral 
industrial free trade areas (FTAs), an economically important issue for 
Liechtenstein, all that Liechtenstein was able to obtain was the right to send 
its own envoy to the mixed committee meetings of the EEC-Swiss FTA. For 
matters covered by the Swiss-Liechtenstein customs union, Liechtenstein 
authorised Switzerland bilaterally to represent it. Once the EEC and EFTA 
countries began to intensify their economic relations under the sectoral 
approach of the Luxembourg process (begun in 1984), and more 
ambitiously as from 1989 under the Oslo process, Liechtenstein initiated a 
diplomatic demarche to obtain full membership of EFTA, which was 
granted in 1991. This was one of the reasons why the 1923 Swiss-
Liechtenstein customs union treaty was amended subsequently.13 When 
negotiating what later would become the EEA Agreement, economic 
freedoms other than free movements of goods (e.g. services and capital) 
were on the table and of course these went far beyond what was covered 
by the customs union with Switzerland. 
Not surprisingly, EFTA membership not only reflected the 
importance of economic integration for Liechtenstein’s economy. It was 
also crucial for the country’s quest for recognition as an independent state. 
After its failure to maintain its former full recognition in the new 
international order after the first world war (given the rejection of 
membership in the League of Nations), Liechtenstein undertook fresh 
attempts to acquire better acceptance in the international community. It 
became a member of the International Court of Justice in 1949, one of the 
                                                   
11 Schönholzer & Eisenhut (2008). 
12 Liechtenstein joined the WTO on 1 September 1995. 
13 Vereinbarung zwischen Liechtenstein und der Schweiz zum Vertrag vom 29. 
März 1923 über den Anschluss des Fürstentums Liechtenstein an das 
schweizerische Zollgebiet, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1995 No. 77, 28 April 1995. 
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main UN bodies, followed by its participation in the Helsinki Process of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and by a 
stepwise involvement in the Council of Europe (through membership in 
some of the so-called ‘open Conventions’) leading to full membership in 
1978. Also on UN membership, Liechtenstein went its own course, even 
after the negative vote in the Swiss referendum on its possible UN 
membership in 1986. Liechtenstein became a UN member in 1990. This 
diplomatic move is explained by Liechtenstein’s strong desire to ensure, 
once and for all, full recognition as a sovereign and independent state.  
2.2 Liechtenstein’s way into the EEA 
After the signature of the EEA in Oporto, national constitutional 
requirements called for referenda in Switzerland and Liechtenstein to ratify 
the agreement. In December 1992 the Swiss population (50.3% against) and 
cantons (18 out of 26 rejected) voted against Swiss participation in the EEA 
agreement. Just one week later Liechtenstein’s population voted ‘yes’ to the 
Principality’s participation in the EEA (55.8% yes votes). Before the 
referendum, participation in the EEA without Switzerland had not been 
seriously discussed.14 This outcome was not realistically expected by any of 
the actors in Liechtenstein or Switzerland. 
The non-participation of Switzerland in the EEA triggered a major 
problem for Liechtenstein’s effective participation in the EEA. The Customs 
Treaty of 1923 did not allow Liechtenstein to participate in an international 
economic integration agreement without Swiss participation. The 1991 
amendment of the Customs Treaty resolved the issue for EFTA 
membership but did not foresee the rejection of the EEA by the Swiss 
population. Therefore, as Liechtenstein participates fully in the Swiss 
Customs area, a new, special regime had to be designed to accommodate 
Liechtenstein’s simultaneous participation in the EEA and Swiss market. 
The problem was resolved with a second amendment of the Customs 
Treaty with Switzerland, now allowing Liechtenstein to participate in 
international agreements without Switzerland, subject to a special bilateral 
understanding. This amendment emancipates Liechtenstein from 
dependence from Switzerland insofar as European integration is 
concerned. In addition, a complex market surveillance mechanism was 
                                                   
14 See Baur (2002, pp. 17-29).  
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introduced to allow for the participation in two separated markets (referred 
to as ‘principle of dual marketability’).  
A smaller problem was also quickly addressed. For Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, Norway and Iceland on the EFTA side and the 12 member states 
of the European Union, the EEA agreement had entered into force on 1 
January 1994, whilst Switzerland and Liechtenstein were finalising their 
bilateral agreement that would allow Liechtenstein to join the EEA. Hence, 
Liechtenstein was given a temporary observer status pending the 
conclusion of developments with its neighbour. Moreover, Liechtenstein 
insisted that some special provisions would need to be incorporated in the 
EEA Agreement given Liechtenstein’s unique geographic and demographic 
specificities. This was acknowledged via adaptations with regard to the free 
movement of persons. After the successful customs negotiations with 
Switzerland and a second referendum in April 1995 (55.9% yes votes), 
Liechtenstein finally became a full EEA member on 1 May 1995. 15 
However, a new issue emerged. The EEA was initially designed for 
seven EFTA countries, but by the time that the EEA was about to come into 
force, matters turned out to be quite different. Switzerland could not 
participate due to the negative referendum. Austria, Finland and Sweden 
decided to go for EU membership already before the EEA negotiations 
came to an end.16 The three countries acceded to the EU on 1 January 1995. 
This left the EEA agreement with just two EFTA countries (Norway and 
Iceland) until the entry into force of the agreement with respect to 
Liechtenstein in May 1995. However, Norway had also planned to become 
an EU member, which became impossible when, in November 1994, the 
Norwegian people voted against EU membership in a referendum (47.8% 
‘yes’ votes against 52.2 ‘no’ votes). Nevertheless, for a certain time, the 
feasibility or credibility of the EEA was at stake: it almost would have 
become an organisation for just Iceland and Liechtenstein with a 
population at the time of not even 300,000 people, and starting with a 
transitory phase (1 January 1995 until 1 May 1995) with just one EFTA 
country in the EEA, namely Iceland. It is good to see the contrast with the 
initial prospect when the EEA negotiations began: the EFTA side of the 
                                                   
15 Decision of the EEA Council No 1/95 of 10 March 1995 on the entry into force of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area for the Principality of 
Liechtenstein (OJ 1995 L 86, p. 58). 
16 Austria already submitted its application in July 1989, Sweden in July 1991, 
followed by Finland in March 1992. 
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EEA would have counted 33 million people! The migration of former EFTA 
countries also led to an unforeseen imbalance in the overall EEA: rather 
than 33 million people and seven EFTA states compared to more than 350 
million EU citizens in 12 EU countries, the EEA of mid-1995 counted 5 
million people and three EFTA states compared to some 375 million people 
and 15 countries in the EU.  
Fortunately, after this rather eventful ‘early childhood’ of the EEA, 
the EEA would experience a period of 18 years of stability in which 
Liechtenstein quickly found its place and functioned well.  
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3. LIECHTENSTEIN’S DEEP AND WIDE 
INTEGRATION INTO EUROPE TODAY 
iechtenstein’s economic integration with the EU and other partners 
on the continent is far-reaching. Moreover, the long-established 
partnership with Switzerland is highly valuable in economic and 
practical terms. Liechtenstein also engages in a wide spectrum of non-
economic forms of cooperation with the EU, individual member states of 
the EU and other European or neighbourhood countries. Any reflection on 
Liechtenstein’s strategic responses to the numerous actual or possible 
changes on the continent, not least those of the EEA and the EU itself, first 
requires a sound and comprehensive assessment of the country’s 
integrative and cooperative ‘assets’ it has been able to build up and enjoy 
over the last few decades. 
This chapter surveys the complex economic and non-economic 
integration of Liechtenstein with Europe. The authors will not attempt to 
provide the benefits and costs for Liechtenstein, as this would require a 
rigorous methodology and indeed call for a different study. Occasional 
illustrations of qualitative costs and benefits are made, however. The main 
point of the study is that any new integration strategies that Liechtenstein 
might wish to consider in response to changes in its strategic environment 
should be based on a thorough understanding of today’s status quo and its 
advantages. After a reminder of the country’s bonds with Switzerland, 
section 3.2 explains at length Liechtenstein’s EEA membership and what it 
entails for decision-making, implementation and prosperity. The EEA 
functions well and so does Liechtenstein in it, but there are still queries 
about complexity and critical mass. Sections 3.3 – 3.6 deal respectively with 
the ‘trilateralisation’ between Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the EU, 
lingering obligations in EFTA (including FTAs with third countries), non-
EEA relations between Liechtenstein and the EU, and, finally, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with EU member states. The idea is to keep the 
survey succinct, limiting the text to what is needed as a basis for strategic 
reflection in chapters 4 and 5. 
L
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3.1 The Swiss connection: A partnership with profound 
economic integration 
Although the EEA and, by implication the EU, has come to dominate 
European economic integration of Liechtenstein, the manifold economic 
and regulatory relations of Liechtenstein with its neighbour Switzerland 
have remained of utmost importance to the Principality. Moreover, there 
are a few complicated interactions between Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
the EEA. Liechtenstein is (or can be) affected, as well, by the bilateral 
relationships between Switzerland and the EU. The present short 
subsection serves as a reminder of this critical relationship.  
As noted before, the special relationship between Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland dates back to the first quarter of the last century. In 1919, 
Switzerland took over the diplomatic representation of Liechtenstein in 
countries where the Principality does not have an embassy.17 Recently, this 
cooperation has been extended to Austria: in 1979 Switzerland concluded 
an arrangement with Austria concerning consular cooperation.18 These two 
agreements provide Liechtenstein citizens with consular assistance in states 
in which the Principality is not represented, first by Swiss representation, 
and in case Switzerland has no representation, by Austrian representations. 
Economic cooperation and integration was soon to follow: agreements 
covering postal and telecommunication services in 192119 and a treaty 
establishing a customs union between Switzerland and Liechtenstein in 
1923.20 In 1924 Liechtenstein unilaterally introduced the Swiss franc as its 
official currency.21 This unilateral introduction of the Swiss franc was 
cemented by a formal agreement signed in 1980 between Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein. However, this treaty is both wider and deeper and resembles 
                                                   
17 Letter exchange between Liechtenstein and Switzerland of 21/24 October 1919, 
not published. 
18 Agreement between Austria and Switzerland signed on 3 September 1979 
concerning consular cooperation, not published. 
19 This agreement was terminated in 1999 due to the EEA membership of 
Liechtenstein, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1999, No. 63, 26 March 1999. 
20 Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1923, No. 24, 28 December 1923. 
21 Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1924, No. 8, 20 June 1924. 
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a monetary union: Swiss monetary, credit and exchange rate policies are 
also applied in Liechtenstein on the basis of the monetary treaty of 1980.22 
Other agreements between Switzerland and Liechtenstein cover 
police cooperation,23 reciprocal treatment of Swiss-Liechtenstein citizens,24 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in civil matters25 and patent 
protection.26 Against the backdrop of Swiss and Liechtenstein Schengen 
association the two countries concluded in 2008 a framework agreement on 
Schengen-relevant aspects of visa, immigration, residence and police 
cooperation.27 
Amongst all these agreements, the customs union treaty and the 
monetary union stand out. Whereas the monetary union presents no 
problems for the ‘deep’ market integration in the EEA, the customs union 
risks being incompatible with the FTA nature of the EEA because 
Liechtenstein is an integral part of the Swiss customs territory (as the WTO 
calls it). One might argue that the common tariffs with Switzerland need 
not represent a serious problem as long as certificates of origin (the 
hallmark of any FTA) are employed and verified properly. However, the 
customs treaty nowadays also covers the free movement of goods, the 
abolition of border controls, the adoption of Swiss commercial, agricultural 
and environmental policies as well as the relevant Swiss technical 
regulation. Clearly, this is potentially a source of recurrent conflict with the 
                                                   
22 Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1981, No. 52, 18 November 1981. 
23 Agreement of 27 April 1999 between the Principality of Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland and Austria on cross-border cooperation of police and customs 
authorities, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 2001, No. 122, 9 July 2001. 
24 Liechtenstein – Swiss agreement of 6 July 1874 on residency, Liechtenstein Law 
Gazette 1875, No. 1, 14 April 1875. 
25 Agreement of 25 April 1968 between the Principality of Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland on mutual recognition and enforcement of judicial and arbitration 
decisions in civil matters, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1970, No. 14, 20 March 1970. 
26 Agreement of 22 December 1978 between the Principality of Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland on the protection of patents, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1980, No. 31, 7 
May 1980; As Swiss law on patents is applicable also in Liechtenstein, the 
introduction of an EU-wide patent in the foreseeable future will have implications 
on the current legal situation in Liechtenstein. 
27 Framework agreement between the Principality of Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
on cooperation in the fields of visas, immigration, residence and police cooperation 
in border zone, Liechtenstein Law Gazette 2009, No. 217, 7 August 2009. 
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EEA – with its ‘own’ free movement and extensive technical regulation – in 
a number of ways. After the Swiss rejection of the EEA in 1992, this source 
of potential conflicts had to be addressed, for Liechtenstein to be capable of 
maintaining its Swiss connection in goods markets and enter the EEA.  
The bilateral agreement between Liechtenstein and Switzerland of 2 
November 1994 complementing the Customs Union agreement28 allows 
Liechtenstein to participate in the EEA without Switzerland and provides 
for rules dealing with the collision of EEA law with applicable Swiss law in 
Liechtenstein. Art. 3 of the agreement stipulates that Swiss law and EEA 
law are simultaneously applicable in Liechtenstein. In case the two legal 
orders deviate from each other, EEA law shall prevail over the Customs 
Union agreement with respect to Liechtenstein’s EEA partners. The 
principle of ‘parallel marketability’29 allows products to freely circulate in 
Liechtenstein fulfilling either the EEA or Swiss product requirements. At 
the same time, this system restricts access of products to other EEA 
countries marketed under diverging Swiss product requirements and vice 
versa. A ‘market surveillance system’30 was introduced to monitor the good 
functioning of the principle. The surveillance of the ‘parallel marketability’ 
was assigned to the new Liechtenstein customs authority.31 The process of 
arriving at this complex arrangement took two years of negotiations and 
detailed technical work.32 
The 1994 agreement with Switzerland lies at the basis of EEA Council 
Decision No. 1/9533 recognising that the regional union between 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein does not impair the good functioning of the 
EEA. This was a precondition for the EEA to enter into force with respect to 
Liechtenstein on 1 May 1995, after a second positive referendum on the 
EEA in Liechtenstein on 4 April 1995. 
                                                   
28 Liechtenstein Law Gazette 1995, No. 77, 28 April 1995. 
29 In German: “parallele Verkehrsfähigkeit”. 
30 In German: “Marktüberwachungssystem”. 
31 Renamed in 2007 as Authority for Commerce and Transport. The latter was in 
the meantime included into the Authority for national economy. 
32 See Nell (1996, pp. 101-124).  
33 Decision of the EEA Council No 1/95 of 10 March 1995 on the entry into force of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area for the Principality of 
Liechtenstein. 
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In the following sections covering the scope and institutional 
framework of the EEA as well as other integration instruments of 
Liechtenstein, we will refer to the special relationship of Liechtenstein with 
Switzerland where necessary. 
3.2 Liechtenstein in the EEA: Joining the ‘single market-
minus’ 
The EEA enlarges the EU’s internal market to the three EFTA states34 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland and this with great success. The EEA 
EFTA states “are in principle a true part of the EU’s internal market 
through the EEA agreement.”35 The only two excluded policy domains are 
agriculture (but not the related food safety regulation) and fisheries, even 
though even in those areas some market access issues have been addressed. 
It is therefore convenient to employ the term ‘single market-minus’ as 
shorthand. It shows immediately that, irrespective of many technicalities 
and institutional arrangements, the essence of the EEA is both simple and 
highly ambitious. Since the EU single market is very large with its 500 
million consumers, it is bound to be of overwhelming importance to the 
highly export-oriented economy of Liechtenstein. 
In the words of the preamble of the EEA agreement, the parties to the 
agreement are  
 “…considering the objective of establishing a dynamic and 
homogeneous European Economic Area, based on common rules 
and equal conditions of competition and providing for the adequate 
means of enforcement including at the judicial level, and achieved 
on the basis of equality and reciprocity and of an overall balance of 
benefits, rights and obligations for the Contracting Parties; 
 …determined to provide for the fullest possible realisation of the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the 
whole European Economic Area, as well as for strengthened and 
broadened cooperation in flanking and horizontal policies…” 
 
                                                   
34 In this study we shall refer to these three countries as the EEA-3 or the EEA 
EFTA states. 
35 See Tobler et al. (2010, p. 12).  
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EU policies not covered in EEA agreement 
 Common Agriculture and Fisheries 
Policies (although the Agreement contains 
provisions on various aspects of trade in 
agricultural and fish products) 
 Customs Union 
 Common Trade Policy 
 Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 Tax Policy 
 Justice and Home Affairs (even though the 
EFTA countries are part of the Schengen 
area); or  
 Monetary Union (EMU). 
In other words, the 
cornerstones of the internal 
market, i.e. the four freedoms 
(goods, persons, services and 
capital), plus the right of 
establishment, together with 
the (extensive) EU regulation 
that makes free movement 
possible, complemented with 
common competition policy, 
are to be fully implemented 
by the EEA EFTA countries. 
The internal market is a very 
dynamic field of law, always 
adapting to changing 
circumstances and still widening its scope to new policy areas. Apart from 
changes in legislation, the interpretation of primary and secondary law by 
the CJEU adds another dynamic element to the legal aspect of the internal 
market. Furthermore, new proposals for internal market deepening have 
been made at irregular intervals ever since the EEA went into force, for 
example, two successive internal market ‘strategies’ proposed by 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein in 1999 and 2003 (which included the 
services Directive), the internal market review of November 2007 
(emphasising implementation issues) and the two Single Market Acts of 
2011 and 2012.36 
In addition, the EU is exploring more centralised methods to regulate 
the internal market, such as the more frequent reliance on EU agencies.37 
Such new attempts of regulating the internal market not only raise 
questions within the EU but also in the context of the EEA agreement, as 
the latter’s declared end is “establishing a dynamic and homogeneous 
European Economic Area, based on common rules and equal conditions of 
competition”. For the EEA-3 the issue is whether and to what extent 
                                                   
36 For a concise history and detailed references, see Pelkmans (2010). The first 
Single Market Act is COM (2011) 206 of 13 April 2011; the second is COM(2012) 573 
of 3 October 2012.  
37 See Chamon (2011), Andoura & Timmerman (2008) and Lavrijsen & Hancher 
(2009). 
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‘decision-shaping’ is still possible for them if EU agencies decide and 
regulate about the common rules and the (equal) conditions of competition. 
Last but not least, the EU has amended its founding treaties three 
times since 1995, while the EEA Agreement did not undergo any 
substantive revision since its entry into force in 1994. The (TFEU) treaty 
provisions on the internal market were not altered by the three revisions. 
Rather, the procedures within the EU have been adapted, the role of its 
institutions developed further and the delimitation of what substantially 
forms part of internal market legislation and what can be considered as 
lying outside its purview has become increasingly blurred. These aspects 
may have a great impact on the EEA. For the EU-27, the internal market is a 
dynamic creature, evolving and deepening. It is regarded as the EU’s 
principal ‘asset’ and therefore EU countries are often prepared to accept 
far-reaching arrangements to make it work more effectively. Within the EU, 
supranational institutions and a broad consensus on the ‘pooling’ of 
national sovereignty provide for the necessary means to guarantee a level 
playing field for economic operators and the adequate protection of 
individuals. In legal terms the strongest manifestations of 
‘supranationality’ are the principles of direct effect38 and of supremacy39 of 
EU law over national law. These are exactly these unique features of the 
EU’s (constitutional) legal order that were unacceptable to the EFTA 
countries at the time.40 
Insofar as the EEA, and hence, the internal market, is concerned, 
however, the refusal of ‘supranationality’ by the three EFTA states has at 
best a residual meaning. This observation is factual and does not intend in 
any way to discredit domestic political preferences. Indeed, since refusing 
‘supranationality’ is a politically and even constitutionally overriding 
consideration for the EEA-3, these questions can only be assessed and 
decided by local politics and referenda. Nevertheless, as will be explained 
below, the practical effect of the EEA on EEA-3 countries (insofar as the 
single-market-minus is concerned, not other areas) and their market 
participants does not differ from the effects it has on EU member states. 
And judicial review, though seemingly complicated, is institutionalised in 
such a way as to arrive at similar, if not identical, results as under EU 
                                                   
38 ECJ, C-26/62, van Gend en Loos, 1963 ECR 1. 
39 ECJ, C-6/64, Costa v ENEL, 1964 ECR 585, 593. 
40 See Graver (2002, p. 75).  
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judicial review. We shall review the core characteristics of the EEA 
institutional system, the provisions of which ensure that autonomous 
decision-making remains a day-to-day activity of EEA-3 countries. But in 
substance, this is not so because the EEA is to be ‘homogeneous’ in terms of 
free movement and the related (EEA) regulation, whereas competitive 
conditions are expected to be equal. There is one ‘escape’ from this tight 
straightjacket: Art. 102, EEA. In strictly formal terms, it can be argued that 
this clause enables EEA-3 countries to retain national ‘sovereignty’, but 
only in the sense that EU members do not have this discretion: EEA-3 
countries can decide not to incorporate certain subcategories of the EEA 
(say, when a new directive is to be adopted) but at a high price, so high that 
this provision41 has so far not been used by any EEA-3 country. Indeed, it is 
known as the ‘nuclear option’ expressing both its dramatic nature and the 
preference to avoid its use! The EU and the EEA-3 have gone far in pre-
empting the use of the clause, e.g. by lengthy negotiations and some 
compromises. As we shall see later, the taboo of giving up this abstinence 
might well be broken soon. With the enormous regulatory dynamics in the 
EEA since 1995 (see further), the distinction between the EEA for EU 
members and the EEA for the three EFTA-EEA countries is infinitesimally 
small – the disparities really only matter outside the EEA remit! The EEA is 
thus very ambitious indeed.  
When it became clear during the late 1980s that the envisaged 
cooperation between the EC and EFTA was to include the whole internal 
market in contrast to a sectoral approach, the above-mentioned elements 
had to be embedded in an appropriate institutional and legal framework. 
At the time this was unexplored territory.42 No agreement up until then, 
and none since (except the EEA), has attempted to achieve the ambitious 
goal of exporting the internal market as a whole. 
One has to be aware of the inherent asymmetry in the EEA. Whereas 
the EEA-3 has to take over all EEA-relevant EU legislation, these countries 
can only help ‘shape’ EU decision-making, not co-decide in any way. To 
have a seat at the table and be able to vote, if necessary, one has to be a 
fully-fledged EU member state in Council and the citizens of that EU 
country will vote for MEPs in the European Parliament (the co-legislator in 
                                                   
41 Art. 102 EEA. 
42 See the commemorative publication by EFTA, European Economic Area 1994-2009, 
Brussels, p. 40. 
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practically all EEA-relevant matters). Also permanent derogations from the 
EU (internal market) acquis – as a non-EU country – are excluded, with only 
minimal exceptions,43 as they would have led to unacceptable discrepancies 
within the internal market. 
National political and constitutional restraints in the EFTA countries 
as well as from the EU side,44 along with the full integration of the EFTA 
countries into the EU’s Internal Market (except for agriculture and 
fisheries) called for a unique institutional and legal set-up. An agreement to 
“establish common rules without a common supranational power”45 has 
been characterised as “mixing oil and vinegar”.46 
Nonetheless, answers to these apparent paradoxes were found. As 
will be set out in the following, the EEA manages to accommodate the need 
of far-reaching economic integration with the rejection of supranationalism 
by the EEA EFTA countries. 
3.2.1 The EEA Agreement: Flexible and static at the same time 
Before providing an overview of the substantive scope of the EEA with 
special regard to Liechtenstein, a brief technical introduction to the EEA 
will be given. 
The EEA Agreement consists of 129 
articles in the main text of the agreement, 
including 22 annexes to the agreement 
and 49 protocols as they stood at the date 
of signature 2 May 1992. The 49 protocols 
and the 22 annexes are accorded the same 
legal value as the main agreement.47 The 
protocols and annexes have several purposes. They render the provisions 
of the main agreement more specific, contain derogations from the scope of 
the EEA, provide for special arrangements for certain contracting parties 
                                                   
43 Ibid, p. 30; for some derogations with regard to Liechtenstein, see below. 
44 Cf. ECJ, Opinion 1/91, (1991) ECR I-6079 rejecting the first design of the EEA, 
with the envisaged EEA Court, consisting of EU and EFTA judges, as incompatible 
with the EU legal order. Subsequently, a more complex “two-pillar” system has 
become the EEA system of today.  
45 Graver (2002, p. 75). 
46 See Borde (1997).  
47 For a more detailed overview, see Annex I. 
Elements of the EEA Agreement 
 Main text of the Agreement 
 22 Annexes to the Agreement 
 49 Protocols to the Agreement 
 Final Act 
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and define the legal quality of EEA law in the national legal orders. 
Translated in EU-terms, these norms constitute the ‘founding treaty’ or the 
EEA’s primary law. 
 
Part I of the EEA 
Agreement sets out its general 
objectives, which are stated in 
Art. 1 EEA: creating a 
homogenous European 
Economic area, in which the 
four freedoms are realised, 
undistorted competition can 
prevail and closer cooperation 
in research, education and 
social policy shall be aspired. 
Parts II and III reproduce the 
core provisions of the historical 
TEC as regards the freedom of 
movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital, plus the 
right of establishment, with 
specific adaptations to the EEA. 
Part IV reproduces the provision of the TFEU with regard to competition 
and state aid; hence, the EEA rules have the same substantial content as 
those EU rules. 
Part V of the EEA lists so-called ‘horizontal-policy’ areas. These areas 
are outside the core of the Internal Market but are nonetheless essential for 
the smooth functioning of the EEA (the Internal Market). They include 
social policy, consumer protection, environment, statistics and company 
law. In these areas the EEA EFTA states also take over the majority of EU 
legislation, when relevant for the functioning of the Internal Market. 
Part VI of the EEA lists areas of cooperation outside the Internal 
Market. The policies listed are only indirectly relevant for the good 
functioning of the Internal Market. Currently the EEA EFTA states 
participate in several EU programmes.48 These areas of cooperation include 
research and technological development, information services, the 
                                                   
48 See Annex VI. 
The EEA Agreement- Content overview 
 Preamble 
 Part I – Objectives and Principles 
 Part II – Free Movement of Goods 
 Part III – Free Movement of Persons, 
Services and Capital 
 Part IV – Competition and other 
Common Rules 
 Part V – Horizontal Provisions relevant 
to the Four Freedoms 
 Part VI - Cooperation outside the Four 
Freedoms 
 Part VII – Institutional Provisions 
 Part VIII Financial Mechanism 
 Part IX – General and Final Provisions 
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environment, education, training and youth, social policy, consumer 
protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, the audio-visual 
sector and civil protection. 
The first six parts of the EEA deal with substantial Internal Market 
and flanking policies. Part VII of the EEA, on the other hand, lays down the 
institutional provisions regulating the management of the EEA and its 
context. Part VIII introduces the EEA’s Financial Mechanism, which 
mirrors the EU’s Cohesion Funds. The EEA EFTA states are obliged to set 
up the Financial Mechanism with a view to reduce the economic and social 
disparities between the regions of the enlarged Internal Market. The EEA 
finishes with Part IX with general and final provisions. 
The EEA Agreement is commonly described as an agreement that is 
static and dynamic at the same time. These two terms relate to the nature of 
the content of the agreement. Ordinary international agreements include 
the rights and obligations of the parties as stated in the agreement at the 
date of the signature of the agreement. This essentially means that any 
change of rights and obligations can only be achieved if all parties to the 
agreement agree. An example of such agreements can be found in the 
Bilateral I package between the EU and Switzerland, which we shall 
discuss later.49 With one exception the latter are static in nature. In case of a 
failure to find an accord on amendments, the agreements cannot be 
changed and will continue to exist in the form as they stood at the date of 
signature.  
In this sense, the EEA is such a standard international agreement 
with regard to its main text, its many protocols and the 22 annexes as they 
stood at the date of signature. However, the EEA EFTA states have not just 
agreed to apply and implement the mere wording of the EEA but also to 
take over the interpretation of these provisions by the CJEU as far as their 
wording is identical to the TFEU and the acts adopted pursuant to the 
TFEU.50 This creates the highest possible level of homogeneity for the main 
agreement and the ‘pre-signature’ acquis found in the annexes of the EEA 
Agreement. 
This deep integration with regard to the ‘pre-signature’ is remarkable 
but not a unique feature of the EEA. It can also be found in the context of 
                                                   
49 Except the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation on Air Transport, OJ L 114 of 30/04/2002, p. 73. 
50 Art. 6 EEA. 
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other agreements concluded by the EU.51 The special and paradoxical 
feature of the EEA is that, its static characteristics notwithstanding, its 
working is highly dynamic. This dynamic nature is laid down in Part VII of 
the EEA. The annexes and certain protocols to the EEA are constantly 
amended, month after month, by the EEA Joint Committee as the way to 
implement any EEA-relevant additions to the EU acquis in the EEA-3 
countries. For this purpose the EEA uses what is called the ‘reference 
method’. 
It comprises a mechanism, managed by the EEA Joint Committee, 
including (new) EEA-relevant EU legislation into the respective Annexes of 
the EEA (‘mirror-legislation’) by making references to the title and the 
position of the respective EEA-relevant act in the EU’s Official Journal. This 
dynamic element of the EEA is essential for continuous homogeneity of the 
rules applicable in the EU and the EEA EFTA states. This substantive acquis 
taken-over by the EEA EFTA states after the signature of the EEA can be 
described as the ‘post-signature’ acquis. With regard to the ‘post-signature’ 
acquis, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court are 
obliged to pay due account to the principles laid down in the case law of 
the CJEU in so far as the acquis is identical in substance to the 
corresponding EU provisions.52 This contrast between the pre- and post-
signature acquis derives from the fact that the EEA EFTA countries did not 
transfer legislative powers to the institutions of the EEA. 
EEA-relevance of an EU legal act is established if the legal act is 
within the scope of the Internal Market, the horizontal or flanking policies 
(as specified) as well as competition policy as defined by the EEA. It is 
either the EU, usually the responsible Directorates of the Commission, or 
the EEA EFTA states themselves, that qualify an EU legal act as ‘EEA-
relevant’. Interestingly enough, there is neither a formal procedure, nor any 
legal criterion for establishing whether an act is EEA-relevant or not. Up 
until today this has not resulted in major difficulties in the application of 
the EEA, except for occasional frictions kept outside the public domain, but 
problems cannot be excluded in future. At the time when the EEA was 
negotiated, the EU legal framework made it easy to differentiate between 
Internal Market acquis (1st Pillar) and other policy areas. This demarcation 
                                                   
51 The bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU provide for a similar 
level of homogeneity when it comes to ‘pre-signature’ acquis. 
52 Art 3. Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA). 
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line has become blurred, not least with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty abandoning the pillar-structure and introducing the Area of 
freedom, security and justice governed by the ‘community method’.53 It 
would seem that a clear procedure for the definition of EEA-relevance 
would be helpful for the EEA. 
3.2.2 Substantive coverage of the EEA, with special regard to 
Liechtenstein 
The adoption of the EU’s Internal Market acquis is an ambitious 
undertaking for the EEA-3. The ‘pre-signature’ acquis (in 1995) comprised 
no less than 1,875 EU legal acts to be transposed into the EEA EFTA states’ 
legal orders. Aside from these legal acts, the four freedoms (goods, persons, 
establishment and capital), including their interpretation by the CJEU,54 
also had to be incorporated into domestic law. Even more impressive is the 
number of legal acts taken over by the EEA EFTA states after the signature 
of the EEA (‘post-signature’ acquis). By the end of 2011, this number 
amounted to 5,910 legal acts added by the EEA Joint Committee employing 
the ‘reference-method’.55 As of October 2012, 6761 EU legal acts were 
applicable in the EEA. 
This plethora of EU legal acts can be found in the 22 annexes to the 
EEA Agreement. These annexes are thematically structured and contain the 
references to the EEA-relevant EU legal acts.56 For Liechtenstein, two sets of 
special provisions apply. First, provisions are foreseen accommodating the 
                                                   
53 A good example of the increasing difficulty to distinguish ‘purely’ Internal 
Market (EEA)-relevant legal acts from other acts is Directive 2004/38 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the member states. This Directive employs the concept of Union 
citizenship, which is not applicable in the EEA. Furthermore, the Directive contains 
provisions applicable to third-country nationals, which are outside the scope of the 
EEA. The EEA EFTA states incorporated the Directive in Annex V and VIII of the 
EEA, although without adaptations. 
54 E.g. including the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ principle of mutual recognition. 
55 Approximately an additional 900 acts were taken over by simplified procedures. 
Note that the 7,000 acts also include (many) recommendations and EU decisions.  
56 See Annex II for an illustration, an excerpt of Annex 10 on “Services in General” 
and Annex III for a complete overview of the Annexes to the EEA; for the detailed 
content of the Annexes, see http://www.efta.int/legal-texts/eea/annexes-to-the-
agreement.aspx.  
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 31 
partnership with Switzerland (see 3.1). Second, Liechtenstein with its very 
small geographic dimension and a ratio of foreigners as high as 38.4% in 
199457 is potentially exposed far more severely to the consequences of the 
free movement of persons than other EEA member states. These two issues 
were addressed in Protocol 15 to the EEA Agreement, in Decision No. 1/95 
of the EEA Council confirming Liechtenstein’s full accession to the EEA in 
May 1995 and later also recognised again in Joint Committee Decision 
191/1999 and in the two EEA enlargement treaties.  
 
 
                                                   
57 According to Liechtenstein, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2011 (Authority for Statistics). 
Why are there (not) 7,000 plus EU-EAA-relevant acts? 
Since the EEA began in 1994, more than 7,000 EU legal acts have been inserted in 
the annexes of the EEA Agreement by JCDs, according to the EFTA website. This 
seems daunting. It makes the EU internal market, hence the EEA, look like a 
regulatory machine. However, it is little known how one should actually ‘read’ this 
overall figure and what lies behind it. We mention three aspects shedding light on 
the magnitude of the actual internal market acquis. First, the overall figure is about 
“EU legal acts” and these are not only, or not even mainly, (Council and EP) 
directives and regulations. Even larger than these two categories are the number of 
EU decisions (targeted), recommendations and implementing acts (arising out of 
comitology, usually derivatives of directives or regulations already in the annexes).  
Second, the annexes have never systematically been cleaned up as a result of 
the EU activities of ‘Better Regulation’ since 2005 (and occasionally beforehand). 
These activities include abolition, simplification, codification and recasting of 
directives and some regulations or decisions. The latest Commission report on these 
activities [COM (2012)746 of 12 Dec. 2012 on EU Regulatory Fitness, p. 9] 
mentions that no less than 4,450 EU legal acts have been repealed, of which 1,750 
were the result of codification and recasting. We do not know how many of these 
are in the EEA annexes but, since the internal market assumes a large share of EU 
regulation, perhaps as much as 2000 or more items in the annexes are phantoms, as 
these EU legal acts no longer exist. Third, there are many JCDs on amendments of 
directives and regulations. For every amendment, a new JCD is adopted. 
Amendments can be substantive and prepared for years, but there are numerous 
amendments that are trivial (e.g. one sentence or a minor aspect, etc.). Therefore, 
the annexes comprise many hundreds of items where double-counting or triple-
counting occurs, due to amendments. 
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3.2.2.1 Free movement of goods 
Liechtenstein fully applies the EEA acquis with regard to the free movement 
of goods. However, as suggested above, special arrangements for 
Liechtenstein were provided for in Decision 1/95 as well as innovative 
solutions by Liechtenstein itself. 
The EEA Council acknowledged the customs union between 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland, with a declaration attached to Protocol 4 to 
the EEA on rule of origin. Swiss customs authorities are empowered to 
issue certificates-of-origin (EUR1) for EEA goods, which are imported into 
Liechtenstein and brought to Switzerland and subsequently re-exported 
into the market of an EEA contracting party. Furthermore, the term 
‘exporter’ for the purpose of Protocol 4 also covers Swiss exporters, if the 
latter re-export EEA goods imported into Switzerland via Liechtenstein 
back to the market of an EEA contracting party. 
Furthermore, Annex II of Decision 1/95 permits the application of 
Swiss technical regulations and standards deriving from the Swiss-
Liechtenstein Customs Union by Liechtenstein to certain products58 
marketed in the Liechtenstein market. Products exported to other EEA 
contracting parties must, of course, be compliant with the technical 
regulations and standards of the EEA acquis. 
These amendments to the EEA with regard to the free movement of 
goods reflect the importance of Liechtenstein’s relationship with 
Switzerland and exemplify the pragmatism Liechtenstein employs when it 
comes to the adoption of foreign legislation. Two distinct legal orders are 
applicable in Liechtenstein. In the words of Advocate General Colomer: 
Two legal systems meet in one place: one governs relations 
between Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the other regulates the 
latter’s membership of the EEA. If there is no conflict between the 
                                                   
58 Products covered by Annex II of Decision 1/95: Motor vehicles, agricultural and 
forestry tractors, lifting and mechanical handling appliances, household 
appliances, gas appliances, construction plant and equipment, other machines, 
pressure vessels, measuring instruments, electrical material, textiles, foodstuffs, 
technical regulations, standards, testing and certification, medicinal products, 
fertilisers, dangerous substances, cosmetics, construction products, personal 
protective equipment, toys, machinery, tobacco, energy, spirit drinks, cultural 
goods, explosives for civil use, medical devices, recreation craft and marine 
equipment (Products covered by Annex II to the EEA). 
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systems, they are permeable; as a general rule, nothing prevents a 
product from Switzerland moving from the territory of its partner 
to that of another EEA member, and vice versa. If, on the other 
hand, there is conflict, the barriers are raised and the markets are 
sealed, so that goods authorised in Liechtenstein can be exported 
to the other Contracting Parties to the Agreement only if they 
comply with EEA rules. In conclusion, goods which enjoy 
unimpeded freedom of movement within the customs union do 
not, merely because of that, enjoy the same freedom within the 
EEA.59 
Another interesting aspect in the context of free movement of goods 
is Liechtenstein’s implementation of the ‘pharmaceutical package’.60 This 
legislative package was incorporated into the EEA in May 2009.61 The 
provisions of this legislative package oblige the EEA EFTA states to employ 
centralised and decentralised authorisation procedures for human and 
veterinary medicinal products.62 Liechtenstein negotiated a bilateral 
agreement with Austria,63 which provides for the automatic recognition of 
Austrian authorisations also with regard to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein 
outsourced authorisation procedures required by EEA law to another EEA 
contracting party, Austria. 
With regard to veterinary and phyto-sanitary matters, foodstuffs and 
spirits as well as the removal of technical barriers to trade in wine, the EEA 
                                                   
59 Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Cases C-207/03 and C-252/03 Novartis, 
[2005] ECR I-3209, para 39. 
60 Directives 2004/24/EC, OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p.85; 2004/27/EC, OJ L 136, 
30.4.2004, p. 34; 2004/28/EC, OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 58; Regulation EC 726/2004, OJ 
L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 1. 
61 EEA Joint Committee Decision Nr 61/2009 of 29 May 2009. 
62 Directive 2001/82/EC of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to 
veterinary medicinal products, OJ L 311, 8.11.2001, p. 1; and Directive 2001/83/EC 
of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for 
human use, OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 67. 
63 Agreement between the Austrian Federal Government and the Government of 
the Principality of Liechtenstein regarding the automatic recognition of authorised 
or registered medicinal products in Austria for human or veterinary use, Austrian 
Federal Law Gazette, BGBl III No.  126, 12 November 2010. 
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is not applicable to Liechtenstein.64 In these areas, Liechtenstein has access 
to the EU market through the EU-Swiss agreements. This interesting 
solution will be discussed in section 3.3 on “Trilateralisation”. 
3.2.2.2 Free movement of persons and right of establishment 
Liechtenstein is an independent country with small territorial extension in 
the heart of Europe. Due to its geographic and demographic features, the 
principles of free movement of persons and the right of establishment are 
two very sensitive areas for the principality. 
The EEA took due notice of this sensitivity when Liechtenstein first 
became a member of the EEA. In Decision 1/95 of the EEA Council, the 
EEA contracting parties acknowledged the validity of the free movement of 
persons with regard to Liechtenstein: 
The EEA Council recognises that Liechtenstein has a very small 
inhabitable area of rural character with an unusually high 
percentage of non-national residents and employees. Moreover, it 
acknowledges the vital interest of Liechtenstein to maintain its 
own national identity. 
Therefore Protocol 15 to the EEA allowed Liechtenstein to keep in 
force its national provisions making the entry, residence and employment 
subject to prior authorisation for a transitional period until 1 January 1998. 
Moreover, Liechtenstein was authorised to keep in force quantitative 
limitations for new residents, seasonal workers and frontier workers. These 
restrictions on the free movement of persons would have to be gradually 
reduced by the end of the transitional period. At the end of this transitional 
period, Liechtenstein invoked a safeguard clause while continuing to 
uphold the mentioned restrictions also after the expiry of the transitional 
period. The EEA Joint Committee undertook a review of the situation in 
Liechtenstein with regard to the freedom of movement of persons. This led 
to a negotiated compromise solution. On 17 December 1999,65 the EEA Joint 
Committee decided that the “specific geographical situation of 
                                                   
64 Veterinary and Phytosanitary Matters: Annex I to the EEA; foodstuffs: Chapter 
XII of Annex II to the EEA; spirit drinks: Chapter XXVII of Annex II to the EEA; 
removal of technical barriers to trade in wine: Protocol 47 to the EEA. 
65 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 191/1999 of 17 December 1999 
amending Annexes VIII (Right of establishment) and V (Free movement of 
workers) to the EEA Agreement, OJ L 074, 15.03.2001, p. 29. 
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Liechtenstein still justifies the maintenance of certain conditions on the 
right of taking up residence in that country”. In the same decision, the EEA 
Joint Committee required Liechtenstein to introduce a quota based on 
parameters set out in the decision. This decision provided for a new 
transitional period until 31 December 2006. Before the expiry of the second 
transitional period, the EU was negotiating with the EEA EFTA states the 
EEA enlargement for the 10 new EU member states. EEA membership 
follows from EU membership.66 In the course of these negotiations, 
Liechtenstein obtained a transformation of the previous two transitional 
periods into a quasi-permanent exception. The conditions laid down in the 
EEA Joint Committee Decision 191/1999 concerning the national measures, 
which Liechtenstein is allowed to maintain, shall continue to apply subject 
to a review “every five years, for the first time before May 2009”.67 The 
details of the special arrangement for Liechtenstein can be found in the 
beginning of Annex VIII to the EEA Agreement under the heading sectoral 
adaptations.68 Up until today no such review has been conducted. 
However, it is very likely that future reviews will confirm the application 
of the special regime, as it is hard to imagine that the geographic and 
demographic situation of Liechtenstein would change significantly. 
According to the current arrangement, Liechtenstein issues 56 
residence permits for economically active and 16 permits to economically 
non-active persons. Half of the totally available permits are issued 
according to a lottery drawing taking place twice a year. 
3.2.2.3 Free movement of services 
In the field of services, Liechtenstein fully applies the EEA acquis. 
Nevertheless, relations can sometimes be conflictual and pragmatic 
                                                   
66 Art. 128 EEA. 
67 Agreement on the participation of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic 
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic in the European Economic Area - Final Act – 
Declarations, OJ L 130, 29.4.2004, pp. 11-80. 
68 See Annex IV for the detailed reproduction of the special arrangement 
negotiated by Liechtenstein. 
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solutions have to be found. An example is in payments services, although 
this was eventually resolved.69 
A further complication has occurred in the context of Regulation 
1781/2006 laying down rules for payment service providers to send 
information on the payer throughout the payment chain. This is done for 
purposes of prevention, investigation and detection of money laundering 
and terrorist financing. This regulation was incorporated into Annex IX to 
the EEA in 2008.70 The consequence of this regulation with regard to 
Switzerland is that payment orders directed to Switzerland can no longer 
be treated as inland transactions by Liechtenstein institutions and 
Liechtenstein therefore had to invoke a derogation pursuant to Art. 17 of 
that regulation. The upshot is a costly adaption of the payment 
infrastructure within Liechtenstein.71 
3.2.2.4 Free movement of capital 
Art. 40 EEA prohibits any restriction and discrimination of the free 
movement of capital amongst the Contracting Parties of the EEA. The ECJ 
ruled that the substantial content of Art. 40 EEA is identical in substance to 
the relevant provision in the TFEU.72 However, in a subsequent case73 
involving a Liechtenstein company owning real estate property in France 
(‘Rimbaud Case’), the identical treatment of capital originating in 
                                                   
69 A special problem did arise with respect to the Principality’s relations with 
Switzerland. Since Liechtenstein is in a monetary union with Switzerland, payment 
services are regulated by Swiss law, including money transfers, direct withdrawals 
and credit card payments. After the incorporation of Directive 2007/64/EC – the 
payment services Directive – into Annex IX of the EEA Agreement in 2008 by EEA 
Joint Committee Decision No. 114/2008 (OJ L 339, 18.12.2008, p. 103), Switzerland 
was regarded in the light of the Directive as a third country. This situation caused 
Swiss credit card issuers to raise their fees for payments in Liechtenstein. As 
Liechtenstein had not yet issued its own credit cards, but its population was using 
cards issued by Swiss entities, this situation called for the introduction of 
Liechtenstein-issued cards. However, this solution raises new complications, as the 
newly issued cards would be regarded as third-country cards in Switzerland. This 
issue has been resolved in 2012. 
70 EEA Joint Committee Decision No. 81/2008, OJ L 280, 23.10.2008, p. 12. 
71 For further details on the two issues, see Frommelt & Gstoehl (2011). 
72 ECJ, Case C-452/01 Ospelt, 2003 ECR I 9743. 
73 ECJ, Case C-72/09 Etablissement Rimbaud, 2010 ECR I 10659. 
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Liechtenstein was cut short because of lack of sufficient mutual 
administrative assistance on tax matters, the EU’s Mutual Administrative 
Assistance Directive 2011/16/EU74 not being applicable under the EEA 
Agreement.75 
Such exchange of information procedures are established within the 
EU by the EU’s new Mutual Assistance Directive 2011/16/EU76 or by 
bilateral agreements providing for an equivalent procedure. In an earlier 
case,77 based on almost identical facts involving a Luxembourg company, 
the Court, deemed the French legislation as infringing the free movement 
of capital as laid down in the TFEU. The problem is no longer relevant for 
Liechtenstein since the Tax Information Exchange Agreement between 
France and Liechtenstein is now in force and addresses the issue. 
Meanwhile, Liechtenstein concluded an agreement with France on 
the exchange of information in tax matters,78 which will most probably 
prevent an identical assessment of the facts as happened in the ‘Rimbaud 
case’. Nonetheless, this judgment shows that market access may not always 
apply fully for economic actors originating from EEA EFTA countries due 
to the limitations of the EEA (here, with respect to exchange of 
                                                   
74 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L 64, 
11.3.2011, p. 1. 
75 The facts of the case concerned a French 3% tax due by foreign entities owning 
real estate in France. The payment of this tax can be avoided if the owner of the 
real estate provides the French tax authorities either an annual disclosure 
regarding the name and location of the ultimate shareholders, or by committing to 
do so at the request of the French tax authorities. This exemption applies only if the 
French tax authorities can verify the accuracy and completeness of the information 
provided. Since between France and Liechtenstein no exchange of information 
procedure, which would have allowed the French tax authorities to verify the 
information provided, existed at the time, the Court denied the tax benefit to the 
Liechtenstein company in conformance with Art. 40 of the EEA Agreement. 
76 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, OJ L 64, 
11.3.2011, p. 1. 
77 ECJ, Case C-451/05 Elisa, 2007 ECR I 8251. 
78 Agreement between the Government of Liechtenstein and the Government of the 
Republic of France concerning the exchange of information in tax matters, 
Liechtenstein Law Gazette 2010, Nr 358, 18 November 2010. 
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information). In the Rimbaud case, the non-inclusion of the EU’s mutual 
assistance Directive 77/79/EC79 allowed France to treat a Liechtenstein 
company differently from a company with a seat in the EU.  
3.2.2.5 The EEA Financial Mechanism and Norway grants 
The EEA countries agreed on the need to reduce regional economic and 
social disparities and to strengthen the bilateral relations with 15 central 
and southern European EEA countries.80 This treaty objective is realised by 
the EEA grants. Funding is available for non-governmental organisations, 
research and academic institutions and the public and private sector. The 
funds of the EEA grants are administered by the Financial Mechanism 
Office (FMO), which is administratively part of the EFTA Secretariat in 
Brussels. Next to administering the EEA grants, the FMO also acts as its 
secretariat, reports to the Financial Mechanism Committee (FMC, 
consisting of representatives from the EEA EFTA states) and serves as a 
contact point for the beneficiary countries. 
The FMC is the highest decision-making body of the EEA grants. It 
consists of representatives of the EEA EFTA states and its tasks are to 
formulate the policy of the EEA grants, draw up guidelines, approve 
programme allocations, monitor and control the allocations and finally 
evaluate the use of the grants. 
The EEA grants are directed towards regions within the EU showing 
demonstrable needs for funding in line with national priorities and general 
European policy goals. The main policy fields include environmental 
protection and management, protection of cultural heritage, climate 
change, renewable energy, human and social development, civil society 
and academic research in the mentioned areas. 
Since the EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994, the EEA EFTA 
states have contributed to social and economic progress of the 15 (less-
affluent) EU countries by four cohesion instruments:  
 Financial Mechanism for the period 1994–1998, 
 Financial Instrument for the period 1999–2003,  
 EEA Financial Mechanism for the period 2004–2009, 
 EEA Financial Mechanism for the period 2009-2014. 
                                                   
79 Further recourse to this Directive will be made below under 3.5. 
80 Art. 115 EEA. 
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The overall budget for the EEA grants for the period of 2009-2014 
amounts to €988.5 million, available in annual tranches of €197.7 million in 
the period 1 May 2009 to 30 April 2014.81 
Figure 1. Allocation of EEA grants, 2009-2014 
 
Source: Financial Mechanism Office. 
While the EEA grants are jointly financed by Liechtenstein, Iceland 
and Norway, Norway has also decided to develop its own programmes of 
grants in addition to the EEA grants. 
The Norway grants amounted to €800 million for the period of 2009-
2014. The figure below shows the allocation of these funds with respect to 
single EU member states. 
                                                   
81 Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism 2009-
2014, OJ 2010 L 291, p. 4. 
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Figure 2. Allocation of Norway grants, 2009-2014 
 
Source: Financial Mechanism Office. 
In 2007, when the agreements to include Bulgaria and Romania in the 
EEA were signed, Norway agreed to additionally grant €68 million to 
Bulgaria and Romania in the framework of Norwegian Cooperation 
Programmes. 
3.2.3 The legal and institutional structure of the EEA 
The institutional model of the EEA is based on the so-called ‘two-pillar’ 
structure. On the one side, the EEA EFTA countries set up their own 
institutions in the framework of EFTA, which roughly mirror the EU’s 
institutions (EFTA pillar). On the EU side of the agreement, the EU is 
represented simply by its existing institutions (EU pillar). The two sides of 
the ‘two-pillar’ structure meet in joint EEA bodies consisting of 
representatives of the EEA EFTA states and the EU. The institutional 
structure of the EFTA pillar is completed with the EFTA Court and the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). The EFTA Court and ESA were set up 
independently from other EEA EFTA institutions by the Surveillance and 
Court Agreement,82 concluded only by the EEA EFTA states. 
                                                   
82 Agreement between the EFTA states on the Establishment of a Surveillance 
Authority and a Court of Justice, OJ (1994) L344, p. 3. 
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The following section presents the composition and main functions of 
these three kinds of EEA EFTA institutions. An overview is found in Figure 
3.  
Figure 3. The two-pillar EEA structure 
 
Note: This diagram illustrates the management of the EEA Agreement. The left 
pillar shows the EFTA states and their institutions, while the right pillar 
shows the EU side. The joint EEA bodies are in the middle. 
Source: EFTA Secretariat. 
 
3.2.4 Joint EU and EFTA Organs 
3.2.4.1 The EEA Council 
The legal foundations of the EEA Council can be found in Arts 89 to 91 of 
the EEA Agreement. It is the highest political organ of the EEA, but not 
really comparable with the European Council of the European Union. The 
EEA Council has no ‘summits’ (e.g. with prime ministers) and usually 
operates at the Council of Ministers level. In actual practice, however, the 
EU Council of Ministers is represented by the Presidency, whether the 
foreign minister or e.g. the minister for European affairs. But formally, it 
consists of the members of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, 
one member of the government of each EFTA-EEA state and members of 
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the European Commission. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is 
replaced by the EEAS. The EEA Council meets twice a year, apart from 
urgent meetings, with an alternating presidency between a member of the 
Council and one of the EFTA-EEA states of six months. The EFTA 
Surveillance Authority and the European Investment Bank enjoy observer 
status in the EEA Council’s meetings. 
Figure 4. EEA Council meeting in Brussels, November 2011 
 
Source: http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu. 
In the EEA Council, decisions are taken by agreement of the EU, 
represented by the Council and the EEAS, on one side, and the EEA EFTA 
states, speaking with one voice, on the other side. This decision-making 
procedure therefore requires a ‘double-consensus’. In a first stage, the 
EFTA-EEA states have to reach a consensus amongst each other and in a 
second stage, agreement with the EU has to be reached. This requires a 
high degree of compatibility between the EEA-3 countries; indeed, for 
practical purposes, the EFTA-EEA states operate as one bloc. This 
procedure is based on ‘one state-one vote’ principle, implying that even 
(very) small countries have ‘veto-power’. 
In the EEA Council this decision-making modus does not have 
practical consequences, as it gives general political impetus (without 
voting) and meets only twice a year. However, this procedure is also 
applied in the EEA Joint Committee, which is more important for regular 
decision-making on legislation. 
3.2.4.2 The EEA Joint Committee 
The EEA Joint Committee (EEA JC) is the most important organ in the EEA 
decision-making process as it is responsible for the daily management of 
the EEA. It serves the contracting parties as a forum for the exchange of 
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views and information, but its most critical role is incorporating new EEA-
relevant EU acquis into the annexes to the EEA. Its meetings take place 
approximately 8 times a year and are not public. According to Art. 93 of the 
EEA Agreement and its rules of procedure,83 the EEA JC consists of the 
representatives of the contracting parties. Their ambassadors represent the 
EEA EFTA countries and the European External Action Service (EEAS) as 
well as representatives of the EU member states represent the EU side. 
However, the EU member states are almost never present. The European 
Central Bank and the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) enjoy observer 
status, but interviews revealed that the ECB is usually absent. As is the case 
with the EEA Council, the representative of the EU, i.e. the EEAS, holds the 
chair for six months followed by a representative of an EEA EFTA state for 
the subsequent six months. 
In its rules of procedure, the EEA JC may establish subcommittees to 
assist its work. At the moment the EEA JC is assisted by five permanent 
subcommittees. These subcommittees are responsible for the following 
subject matter: 
 free movement of goods, competition, state aid, state monopolies of a 
commercial character, intellectual property and procurement; 
 free movement of capital and services; 
 free movement of persons; 
 flanking and horizontal policies such as research and development, 
social policy, environment, statistics, education, consumer protection, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, audiovisual sector and 
civil protection; and 
 legal and institutional matters. 
In actual practice, the first four subcommittees often meet jointly.  
Furthermore, under each subcommittee a working group can be 
established to deal with individual tasks. These working groups report to 
the subcommittee under which they have been established. Recently, 
                                                   
83 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 1/94 of 8 February 1994 Adopting the 
Rules of Procedure of the EEA Joint Committee (OJ L 85, 30.3.1994, p. 60; EEA 
Supplement No. 1, 30 March 1994, p. 1) as amended by: Decision of the EEA Joint 
Committee No 24/2005 of 4 February 2005 amending the Rules of Procedure of the 
EEA Joint Committee (OJ No L 161, 23.6.2005, p. 54 and EEA Supplement No. 32, 
23.6.2005, p. 32), e.i.f. 8.2.2005. 
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informal meetings have been held with the EEAS to address e.g. the 
backlog in implementation (see further) and the preparation of EU (hence, 
EEA) membership of Croatia.  
3.2.4.3 The EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee 
The EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee consists of 24 parliamentarians, 12 
from the European Parliament and 12 from the EFTA countries’ 
parliaments. It meets twice a year, once in an EFTA state and once in the 
European Parliament. 
The EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee is an advisory body and 
contributes to the better understanding between the EEA EFTA countries 
and the European Union by debate and discussion. It has no procedural 
powers in the EEA decision-making procedures. The Committee may 
express its views in the form of report and resolutions. The president, who 
is elected by the plenum of the Committee and alternatively comes from 
the European Parliament and the EFTA countries each year, has the right to 
be heard by the EEA JC, but this has not happened for years. 
3.2.4.4 The EEA Consultative Committee 
As the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee, the EEA Consultative 
Committee is an advisory body, composed of members of the EFTA 
Consultative Committee and the European and the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC). The Committee meets once a year to deepen 
the ties between the social partners of the EFTA and EU sides, given the 
deep market integration between all EEA countries. The Committee 
expresses its view in reports and resolutions. 
3.2.5 The Organs of the EFTA Pillar 
3.2.5.1 The EFTA Standing Committee 
The Standing Committee is a forum in which the EFTA states consult each 
other to agree on a common position before meeting the EU representatives 
from the EEAS in the EEA Joint Committee. It brings together the 
ambassadors of the EEA EFTA states and Switzerland, which enjoys 
observer status, as well as ESA. The Standing Committee has set up sub-
committees to assist its work. These subcommittees again have different 
working groups to prepare the work of the Standing Committee. 
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Figure 5. Structure of the EFTA Standing Committee 
 
Source: EFTA Secretariat. 
3.2.5.2 The EFTA Consultative Committee 
The Consultative Committee of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) consists of representative of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations of the EFTA countries. Its representatives meet with 
representatives of the European Economic and Social Committee in the 
EEA Consultative Committee. 
The EFTA Consultative Committee is forum for dialogue and 
consultation between the EFTA social partners and the EFTA authorities. It 
gives input to work of the EFTA Standing Committee and the EFTA 
Ministerial Council focusing on economic and social issues related to the 
EEA. The EFTA Consultative Committee meets four to five times a year. 
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3.2.5.3 EFTA Parliamentary Committee 
The EFTA Parliamentary Committee84 is composed of parliamentarians 
from the EFTA member states. The Committee links the work of EFTA with 
the national political life of its member states. Its work focuses on EEA-
related matters and its representatives meet with Members of the European 
Parliament in the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee. It also meets twice a 
year with the EFTA Standing Committee. 
3.2.6 The EFTA Court and EFTA Surveillance Authority 
In analogy with the EU, the enlarged internal market under the EEA needs 
an institutional foundation to guarantee its correct implementation and 
judicial arbitration in case of a violation of the agreement. Accordingly, the 
EEA requires the EEA EFTA states to “establish an independent 
surveillance authority (the EFTA Surveillance Authority or ESA, the 
authors) as well as procedures similar to those existing in the Community, 
including procedures for ensuring the fulfilment of obligations under this 
Agreement and for control of the legality of acts of the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority regarding competition (Art 108 (1) EEA),” as well as a court of 
justice (the EFTA Court, Art 108 (2) EEA). 
Following the ‘two-pillar’ system, the CJEU and the European 
Commission have enforcement powers which should ensure the fulfilment 
of the obligation under the EEA by the EU member states, while ESA and 
the EFTA Court are responsible for this task with regard to the EEA EFTA 
states. The two pairs of institutions are expected to work together and 
inform each other about ongoing cases and complaints. 
For this purpose the EEA EFTA states have concluded the 
Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA).85 The SCA agreement entered 
into force on the same date as the EEA, 1 January 1994, with respect to 
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. With the accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU on 1 January 1995 and the 
subsequent accession of Liechtenstein to the EEA, the SCA was adjusted to 
meet the new factual circumstances with regard to ESA and the EFTA 
                                                   
84 Formally, there is a committee for EFTA and one for the EEA, but in actual 
practice they meet jointly. 
85 Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance 
Authority and a Court of Justice, OJ (1994) L344, p. 3. 
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Court.86 From this date onwards, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are 
parties to the SCA, as well as to the EEA. Although similar in important 
aspects for the EEA, ESA and the European Commission are not fully 
comparable. The greatest difference is that ESA has no political role, unlike 
the Commission with the critical right (indeed, a near-monopoly) of 
initiative. On the other hand, whereas the Commission is the ‘guardian’ of 
the EU Treaty, ESA is the guardian of the EEA Agreement for the EEA-3. 
Recently, ESA’s remit has been extended a little, for instance it is involved 
in the allocation of CO2 permits under the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
and has become responsible for veterinary and transport safety inspections.  
3.2.6.1 The EFTA Court 
Initially the EFTA Court87 was located in Geneva, but its seat was moved to 
Luxembourg, not far from the CJEU, in 1996. The EFTA Court’s bench is 
filled with three judges, one from each EEA EFTA state. The Judges of the 
EFTA Court are appointed by common accord of the EEA EFTA states for a 
term of six years (SCA Art 30). The current EFTA Court President is a Swiss 
citizen (Prof. Carl Baudenbacher, who was nominated by Liechtenstein). 
The Court has jurisdiction with regard to EFTA states that are parties 
to the EEA Agreement – currently Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The 
Court has jurisdiction with respect to: 
 the settlement of disputes between two or more EEA EFTA states 
regarding the interpretation or application of the EEA; 
 actions brought by ESA against a EEA EFTA state to fulfil an 
obligation under the EEA  
 to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA 
agreements, raised before a national court. In contrast to the EU legal 
order, these advisory opinions are not binding and no national court 
is legally obliged to request such an opinion. 
 actions brought by a member state against decisions of ESA or its 
failure to act; 
 actions brought by a natural person against decisions that are of 
direct and individual concern to this person or ESA’s failure to act. 
                                                   
86 Agreement adjusting certain Agreements between the EFTA States (‘Adjusting 
Agreement’) of 29 December 1994 (EFTA states’ official gazettes).  
87 For more information on this institution, see its website (www.eftacourt.int). 
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In short, the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court mainly corresponds to the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU in the EU legal order, with the exception of the 
non-binding nature of advisory opinions, in contrast to the binding 
preliminary ruling procedure in the EU’s legal order. 
The proceedings before the EFTA Court consist of a written and an 
oral part and all proceedings are in English except in cases where an 
advisory opinion is sought by a national court of an EEA EFTA state. In the 
latter case, the opinion of the Court is in English and in the national 
language of the requesting court. The average duration of proceedings 
before the EFTA Court between the years 2003 and 2008 was six to eight 
months.88 
3.2.6.2 The EFTA Surveillance Authority 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) is located in Brussels and consists 
of three members, appointed by a common accord by the EEA EFTA states 
for a renewable term of four years. The members of ESA, the so-called 
‘College’, are completely independent in the performance of their duties. 
The EEA EFTA states appoint a president from the three College members 
for a term of two years.89 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority is endowed with the function of 
supervising the fulfilment of obligations under the EEA by the EEA EFTA 
states. This means the correct and timely implementation of the main text 
of the EEA agreement including the competition provisions, its constantly 
updated annexes as well as its protocols. As regards competition law, ESA 
enjoys the same competencies as the Commission in the EU. ESA 
cooperates closely with respective Commission services to ensure the 
homogeneous application of Internal Market law. ESA can take decisions, 
formulate recommendations, deliver opinions and issue notices or 
guidelines with regard to the specific matters.90 
                                                   
88 EFTA Court, Legal Framework and Case Law, 3rd ed, Luxembourg, 2008 
(http://www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/Legal_Framework_Finalweb.pdf). 
89 The current College members of ESA are: Oda Helen Sletnes (President, 
Norway), Sabine Monauni-Tömördy (Liechtenstein) and Sverrir Haukur 
Gunnlaugsson (Iceland). 
90 The ESA College employs officials and other employees to enable it to fulfil the 
tasks set out in the SCA. Currently ESA employs 67 highly qualified officials, 
mainly lawyers but also economists, veterinary and food safety inspectors and 
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ESA monitors and assesses the implementation of EEA law 
(Directives and Regulations) into the national legal orders of the EEA EFTA 
states. Next to the four freedoms (goods, workers, services and capital), 
ESA is also competent for the areas of food safety, transport, public 
procurement, state aid, competition rules, environment and energy. The 
competences of ESA correspond to those of the Commission, the main 
difference being the exclusion of fisheries and agriculture. 
The EEA EFTA states are obliged to submit to ESA the measures with 
which they intend to implement EEA law. ESA will assess the national 
implementation measures. In case of non- or mal-implementation, ESA will 
first send a ‘Letter of Formal Notice’ to the respective EEA-3 state asking it 
to clarify and explain its national measure. This is followed by a ‘Reasoned 
Opinion’, if the ‘Letter of Formal Notice’ and the state’s response to it does 
not prove full compliance. The ‘Reasoned Opinion’ provides the respective 
EEA-3 state for the opportunity to forward its arguments to prove 
compliance of the national measure and/or adjust its national measure so 
as to conform to EEA law, respectively ESA’s ‘Reasoned Opinion’. In case 
the EEA-3 states do not conform to the ‘Reasoned Opinion’ or are of a 
different legal opinion, ESA can bring the matter to the EFTA Court.91 
ESA not just ensures the application of the EEA with regard to the 
EEA EFTA states, but also enforces the competition, state aid and 
procurement provisions of the EEA against individual market actors. To 
this end it enjoys the same powers as the Commission does vis-à-vis 
individuals. The Preamble of the EEA Agreement notes the “important role 
that individuals will play in the European Economic Area through the 
exercise of the rights conferred on them by this Agreement and through the 
judicial defence of these rights.” Therefore, ESA also protects the rights of 
individual market actors granted to them under the EEA against 
infringement of those rights by an EEA EFTA state or other market actors. 
Every individual can directly file complaints with ESA, which may initiate 
proceedings if it deems the complaint justified. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
communications and IT experts. The nationality of these officials is not limited to 
the EEA-3 states. 
91 Art. 31 SCA. 
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EFTA Secretariat in Brussels 
The EFTA secretariat is a low-key institution in the Brussels circuit but this does 
not mean it is unimportant. The EEA-3 countries rely heavily on the EFTA 
Secretariat, established for this purpose in Brussels (besides the EFTA Secretariat 
in Geneva since 1960). Unlike the European Commission, which has the sole right 
of legal initiative at EU level, the Secretariat serves the EEA-3 in the day-to-day 
management of the functioning of the EEA. 
The term ‘functioning’ should be read as: 
 the anticipation of and response to a steady stream of internal market 
legislation, followed by 
 the incorporation of these EU acts into EEA-3 domestic legislation, based on 
Joint Committee Decisions. 
Given the nature and set-up of the EEA, the EU is typically the ‘policy driving 
force’ of the internal market-related activities of the EEA-3. The EFTA Secretariat 
lubricates virtually the entire process on the part of the EEA EFTA countries. For 
resource-related reasons, Iceland and Liechtenstein lean more heavily than Norway 
on the work, expertise and informal contacts of the EFTA Secretariat.  
In practice, the Secretariat 
 prepares drafts of (EEA-related) documents for internal EFTA meetings 
(Standing Committee, subcommittees, working groups, consultative 
committees) and the meetings of EEA bodies (Joint Committee, advisory 
bodies and the EEA Council). Whenever joint texts are negotiated between 
member states, the Secretariat is a crucial resource whether for intra-EFTA 
instances or for the entire EEA (with the EEAS).  
 performs Secretariat work (e.g. drafts agendas, conclusions, minutes, 
background notes and papers and speaking points) and 
 monitors EU activities, especially with a view to anticipating future EU 
legislation (‘pipeline acquis’ – expected EU acts announced in Commission 
annual programmes, roadmaps and otherwise), on which it may provide 
early recommendations and analysis. The Secretariat is held to regularly 
update lists of what may be forthcoming as well as analysis of the impact for 
the EEA-3 
In interviews by the authors, the Secretariat invariably gets favourable reviews. 
Nevertheless, the Secretariat‘s effectiveness might be hindered by a habit of 
attracting officials only on fixed duration contracts (maximum 6 years). This 
practice leads to high staff turnover whilst institutional memory and expertise 
suffer. The Norwegian report by the EEA Review Committee of January 2012 calls 
for an audit of the Secretariat in this respect. It goes without saying that an 
effective Secretariat is very important for Liechtenstein, especially because of its 
naturally limited administrative capacity. 
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3.2.7 The decision-making process of the EEA 
As indicated above, the EEA EFTA states have not transferred any 
legislative powers to a supranational organisation, unlike the member 
states of the EU. Accordingly, the basic rule of public international law – a 
state cannot be bound by a treaty without its consent – is applicable to the 
‘post-signature’ acquis. Therefore, following the internal decision-making 
procedure in the EU, the incorporation of EEA-relevant EU legislation into 
the EEA agreement has to be based on a unanimous decision by all 
contracting parties. Normally, under classical international law, this would 
require negotiations between all parties to an agreement in order to change 
the latter. However, for the very dynamic context of the EEA, updating its 
annexes nearly on a monthly basis (to a lesser degree its Protocols) to keep 
up with the EU’s legislative developments, this would be totally 
inadequate and render the EEA unworkable. Therefore, a de facto almost 
automatic and rapid mechanism had to be invented, while legally 
respecting the sovereignty of the EEA-3.  
The model chosen is a so-called ‘two-pillar’ system. For this purpose, 
EFTA opened a branch of its secretariat in Brussels and created the bodies 
necessary to coordinate and prepare the EFTA EEA states’ participation in 
the joint EEA organs. The different EFTA bodies were introduced above in 
section 3.2.5. The coordination function of the EFTA bodies is essential for 
the proper functioning of the EEA because in the decision-making body, 
the EEA Joint Committee, the EFTA side of the EEA, faces the EU side with 
one single voice.92 Therefore, the EEA EFTA states have to reach an accord 
before meeting with the EU in the EEA Joint Committee. 
The EU pillar on the other side consists of the EU institutions, as 
(now) listed in Art. 13 TFEU. After the negotiation of the EEA, three 
additional bodies have been added to the family of EU institutions, i.e. the 
Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the European Council. 
Furthermore, with the Treaty of Lisbon and the establishment of a 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the representation of the EU by 
the Commission has been replaced by the EEAS. These changes of EU 
institutions have so far not been formally reflected in the EEA. More 
problematic still, the European Parliament is not recognised in the EEA as a 
true co-legislator, although this role was already prominent in 1995 and has 
                                                   
92 Art. 93 EEA. 
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become applicable to practically all internal market legislation, following 
the treaty amendments of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. 
The EFTA pillar and the EU pillar of the EEA meet in the joint EEA 
bodies. These bodies are made up of EU representatives and EEA EFTA 
countries’ representatives in equal measure. These organs create an 
institutional bridge between the internal and autonomous decision-making 
procedures of the EU on one side and the EFTA-EEA countries on the 
other. The joint EEA bodies are the EEA Council, the EEA Joint Committee, 
the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee and the EEA Consultative 
Committee. As noted, the most important of these bodies is the EEA Joint 
Committee ensuring the effective implementation and operation of the 
EEA. The EEA Joint Committee takes decisions, which amend the annexes 
of the EEA with references to new EEA-relevant EU legislation. The period 
between the entry into force of EU acts within the Union and within the 
EEA should be kept as small as possible. The ideal scenario would be 
simultaneous entry into force, but this cannot be fully achieved. In fact, 
implementation delays of the EEA-3 have become somewhat worrying.  In 
the field of services, for example, the average delay between the entry into 
force of an EU legal act and the entry into force of the EEA Joint Committee 
decision incorporating it into the EEA was 623 days. With respect to legal 
acts in the field of environment the delay amounted to 641 days.93 
Facilitating such a high level of homogeneity, the Commission is held 
to inform the EEA EFTA states’ officials about prospective Internal Market 
legislation in the proposal stage of new acts. This also implies the right of 
EEA EFTA states to participate in committees that help the Commission to 
draft legislative proposals. Either side of the EEA can raise issues 
concerning legislative proposals in the EEA Joint Committee. This 
procedure provides for the possibility of the EEA EFTA states to actively 
shape EU legislation already in the proposal stage of new acts and is 
usually referred to as ‘decision-shaping’. 
In the event that the EEA EFTA states do not want to take over new 
EEA-relevant EU acts or if they cannot reach an accord on a ‘single voice’, 
Art. 102 paras 4 to 6 EEA stipulates that the part of the Annex of the EEA 
that would be directly affected by the new EU legislation, will be 
suspended, after a conciliation procedure would prove to be unsuccessful. 
Such a suspension of an entire annex would not merely include the specific 
                                                   
93 Frommelt & Gstoehl (2011, p. 49). 
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legal act having caused the disagreement in the EEA Joint Committee but 
also already included legal acts in that annex relevant to this subject. There 
is a caveat in para. 6, namely, that the rights and obligations (e.g. for 
companies) already acquired shall remain. In other words, the price to be 
paid by the EEA-3 for a refusal to incorporate one new EEA-relevant EU act 
is likely to be considerable, if not high. It would abolish market access of 
the EEA EFTA states with regard to that specific area of the Internal 
Market. No wonder Art. 102 paras 4–6 is usually called the ‘nuclear option’. 
This nuclear option has the practical effect of by-passing the formal 
maintenance of sovereignty (on EEA issues) for the EEA-3 countries and 
forcing them to accept a de facto dependence on EU decision-making. In 18 
years, Art. 102 has only been formally invoked twice and in both instances, 
the six-month conciliation allowed any suspension to be averted.94 Because 
some 7,000 legal acts and recommendations have gone through the two-
pillar system since 1995 (the post-signature acquis), it is exceedingly hard to 
uphold the notion of any policy autonomy for the EEA EFTA countries in 
EEA-relevant EU acts, unless and only if one is willing to argue that the 
‘decision-shaping’ is always successful in addressing the concerns of the 
EEA-3. Nevertheless, there have been instances that proved very difficult to 
reconcile. And today there are several EU acts already in force for a while, 
such as the 2008 postal Directive, the deposit insurance Directive adopted 
during the crisis and e.g. the data retention Directive where the probability 
of compromise is regarded as low to zero. Norway is manifest in refusing 
to incorporate the postal Directive, for example. Hence, the nuclear option 
will have to be applied and the taboo of never invoking it will soon be 
broken. Is this a sign that the writing is on the wall? Might it happen more 
frequently now that the EU internal market continues to deepen further? 
Will the strong tendency evident for the last decade to apply regulations 
(instead of directives) for the internal market prompt more instances where 
reconciliation will be next to impossible?95 
From the EU perspective, the insistence of the EEA-3 countries to 
retain sovereignty in EEA matters automatically renders them ‘third 
                                                   
94 In both cases the EU objected: in 2002 about the money laundering Directive 
(conciliation took 8 months) and in 2006 about the Directive on the free movement 
of persons (with almost 12 months of talks).  
95 In Pelkmans & Correia de Brito (2012, p. 39 and footnote 70), it is shown that 
after 2002 the number of EU regulations for the internal market increased four-
fold, whereas the number of directives remained roughly constant.  
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countries’ in a legal sense, their very close cooperation with the EU 
notwithstanding. In this light, the EEA’s institutional structure and the 
close involvement of third countries in the preparation of EU internal 
decision-making is unique. Indeed, the EEA Agreement is the most 
advanced and sophisticated procedural mechanism for the involvement of 
third countries in the preparatory stages of the EU decision-making 
process.96 
On the EU side the EEA is managed by the Commission and since the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty also by the EEAS. While the former is 
responsible for the technical questions with regard to the EEA, the latter 
represents the EU in the joint EEA bodies. 
3.2.8 An assessment of Liechtenstein’s EEA membership 
This section will shed some light on the effects and results of 
Liechtenstein’s EEA membership for the last 18 years. We should 
emphasise that we do not pretend to make an independent, new 
assessment. 
After strong initial resentments towards the EEA in the early 1990s, 
especially coming from the free professions,97 the overall assessment after 
18 years of EEA membership is a positive one. The latest report from the 
Liechtenstein government to the parliament on the occasion of 15 years 
EEA membership in 2010 draws a positive conclusion. Liechtenstein 
managed to maintain and even improve the good general economic 
framework of the Principality during the 15-year membership in the EEA. 
Initial fears such as negative effects in the services sector did not 
materialise. Moreover, EEA membership opened the door for new business 
opportunities and new markets for Liechtenstein’s entrepreneurs. In this 
context the legal order of the EEA served Liechtenstein especially well. It 
protects the Principality against the ‘usual power politics’ and guarantees 
application of the rule of law in relation to the EU and its member states 
with regard to market access. This is and was especially important in the 
context of the tax transparency and fraud issues as well as state aid matters 
in taxation of the last decade. The overall conclusion of the Liechtenstein 
                                                   
96 See Roman (2008, p. 44). 
97 See e.g. Richard Hopkins, “Can Liechtenstein’s Lawyers Survive the EEA?”, 
International Financial Law Review, March 1992, p. 21. 
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government is that level of integration provided for by the EEA is generally 
appropriate. 98 
Figure 6. Expenditure incurred by Liechtenstein due to the EEA from 1995-2009 
(Swiss francs) 
 
 
EEA membership of course comes at a cost. These costs can be 
substantial, also with regard to administrative capacity. In the period 
between 1995 and 2009, the Principality incurred in total approximately 28 
million CHF additional costs due to its EEA membership.99 These costs 
break down as follows: 5.3 million CHF for ESA and the EFTA court, 17.8 
million CHF for the participation in EU programmes and 5.2 million CHF 
for EEA grants. Figure 6 shows a sharp increase of expenditure in the fields 
of EEA grants and EU Programmes, while the administrative costs of ESA 
and the EFTA court are relatively stable. 
                                                   
98 Bericht und Antrag der Regierung an den Landtag des Fürstentums 
Liechtenstein betreffend 15 Jahre Mitgliedschaft des Fürstentums Liechtenstein im 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), No. 17/2010, pp. 72–74.  
99 According to the Bericht und Antrag of the government to the Parliament, the 
exact number is 28,394,588 CHF. 
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Figure 7. Share of total costs per field of expenditure since 1995 
 
 
Figure 7 shows that the bulk of the costs (63%) incurred by the 
Principality due to its 18 years of EEA membership is in the field of EU 
programme participation. EEA grants account for just 18% and the 
administrative costs for ESA and the EFTA Court account for the remaining 
19% of total costs. Hence, the mere costs of the EEA are relatively small 
compared to additional EU programme costs. These numbers, however, do 
not include the costs incurred within the national administration for 
additional personal. Initial approximations of the government estimated 10 
additional posts. After the negative referendum in Switzerland in 1992, the 
creation of additional posts appeared to be necessary. Accordingly, 
estimates of 1995 included 13 additional posts. 
The revised estimate turned out to be insufficient for the high 
workload of the Principality due to the plethora of legal acts incorporated 
into the EEA. The latest estimates say that approximately 85 employees 
within the national administration deal with EEA matters on a regular 
basis.100 
                                                   
100 Cf. Bericht und Antrag der Regierung an den Landtag des Fürstentums 
Liechtenstein betreffend 15 Jahre Mitgliedschaft des Fürstentums Liechtenstein im 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), No. 17/2010, pp. 63-65. 
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3.3 Trilateralisation – linking Liechtenstein, Switzerland 
and the EU 
Although Liechtenstein’s economic interest might be largely shaped by the 
EEA, its profound economic interdependence with Switzerland remains 
quite significant too. In several areas, this has eventually led to pragmatic 
forms of accommodation of Liechtenstein’s regulatory preferences between 
the EU, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. We refer to this form of 
accommodation as ‘trilateralisation’. The first instance where the 
Principality had recourse to this form of cooperation with the EU was in the 
context of the EEC-Swiss Free Trade Agreement of 1972, whose scope was 
enlarged to Liechtenstein by a separate trilateral agreement.101 
3.3.1 Trade in agricultural products 
With the entry into force of the EEA in Liechtenstein, EEA Council Decision 
1/95 temporarily suspended the application of Protocol 3 to the EEA on 
processed agricultural products until 1 January 2000. On 26 October 2004, 
an agreement between the EU and Switzerland was signed amending the 
EU-Swiss FTA as regards the provisions applicable to processed 
agricultural products.102 This agreement also provided for the extension of 
its application to Liechtenstein, given the Customs Union between 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. With EEA Joint Committee Decision No. 
177/2004, the transitional exemption of Protocol 3 to the EEA was 
transformed into a lasting arrangement for Liechtenstein. In future, 
Liechtenstein will continue to apply Swiss legislation to processed 
agricultural products. 
As to veterinary issues,103 EEA Council Decision 1/95 likewise 
temporarily exempted Liechtenstein. With EEA Joint Committee 
Decision 1/2003 and the entry into force of the Swiss-EU agreement on 
                                                   
101 Additional agreement on validity for the Principality of Liechtenstein of the 
agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss 
Confederation of 22 July 1972, OJ L 300, 31.12.1972, p. 188. 
102 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
amending the agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 concerning the provisions applicable to the 
processed agricultural products, OJ L 23 of 26.01.2005, p. 17. 
103 Annex I of Chapter I to the EEA. 
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trade in agricultural products,104 this exemption from the application of 
the EEA veterinary rules became permanent. 
Most recently, Switzerland, the EU and Liechtenstein have agreed to 
extend the EU-Swiss agreement on trade in agricultural products also to 
Liechtenstein in 2007.105 As a final step of regulating trade in agricultural 
products between Switzerland, the EU and Liechtenstein, the EEA Joint 
Committee decided to exempt Liechtenstein fully106 from the application of 
EEA acquis related to agricultural products with EEA Joint Committee 
Decision No. 97/2007, thus ensuring a consistent application of a single set 
of rules for the entire food chain on the Liechtenstein market. 
Although seemingly technical, this result is remarkable. Liechtenstein 
had initially intended to implement the EEA acquis to trade in agricultural 
products. When it turned out that Swiss-EU trade in agricultural products 
grew continuously (although the original EFTA concessions in agriculture 
were minimal), Liechtenstein chose to maintain its regulatory framework 
and attempt its inclusion into the Swiss-EU bilateral relationship. The 
outcome can be referred to as the ‘trilateralisation’ of trade in agricultural 
products between Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the EU. 
3.3.2 Schengen association – one agreement – three participants 
A prima facie similar, although technically very different, solution was 
found for the free movement of persons under what is called ‘Schengen’.107 
                                                   
104 This agreement is part of the EU-Swiss Bilateral I agreement package; for further 
information see Annex VII of the study. 
105 Additional Agreement between the European Community, the Swiss 
Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein extending to the Principality of 
Liechtenstein the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation on trade in agricultural products, OJ L 270, 13.10.2007, p. 5. 
106 The application of Annex I to the EEA (Veterinary and Phytosanitary Matters), 
Annex II to the EEA (Chapter XII: foodstuffs, Chapter XXVII: spirit drinks) and 
Protocol 47 to the EEA (removal of technical barriers to trade in wine) was 
suspended with regard to Liechtenstein by EEA Joint Committee Decision No. 
97/2007 of 28 September 2007, OJ L 47, p. 3. 
107 For the purpose of this study the Schengen Association of Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein is used to illustrate what the authors refer to as ‘trilateralisation’. The 
following is also applicable to the Dublin association of Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein. The latter is based vastly on the same basic principles as the former. 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
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The Schengen acquis, originally separate treaties between just five of the 
then 12 EEC member states,108 included into the EU legal order by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, nowadays applies in all EU member states (except the 
UK, Ireland, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus) as well as to Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland and since December 2011 also to Liechtenstein. 
A logical precondition for a 
third country to become associated 
with the Schengen area – although 
not explicitly mentioned in any of 
the association agreements 
concluded – is a treaty on the 
freedom of movement of persons. 
With regard to the EEA 3, the EEA 
fulfils this requirement. 
Switzerland and the EU concluded 
a separate agreement on the 
freedom of movement of persons in 
the framework of Bilateral I.109 
While Iceland and Norway had already concluded a Schengen 
Association Agreement with the EU110 in 1999 as a consequence of Finland, 
                                                                                                                                 
concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for 
examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland, OJ 
L53 of 27/02/2008, p. 3; Protocol between the European Community, the Swiss 
Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the 
European Community, and the Swiss Confederation concerning the criteria and 
mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for 
asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland, OJ L161 of 24/06/2009, p. 6. 
108 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, pp. 13–18. 
109 Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of 
persons, OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 6. 
110 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Republic of 
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the association of these two states to the 
implementation, to application and to the development of the acquis de Schengen, 
OJ L 176 of 10.07.1999, p. 35. 
The Schengen acquis abolishes 
 internal border controls between the 
EU member states and associated 
third countries 
and establishes harmonised rules for 
 Visas 
 External border controls 
 Illegal migration 
 Criminal and police cooperation 
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Sweden and Denmark joining Schengen, it was neither offered nor of 
interest to Liechtenstein at that time. 
However, in 2001 when it became clear that its neighbour 
Switzerland, with whom the Principality had applied an open-border 
policy for decades, was interested in a Schengen Association Agreement, 
Liechtenstein also expressed its interest in participating in the Schengen 
area and in engaging in parallel negotiations to that end. The EU however 
wanted to progress and conclude negotiations with Switzerland first as this 
constituted – for all sides – a pre-requirement for Liechtenstein joining. This 
strong connection was furthermore reflected in the EU-Swiss agreement111 
itself by an article enabling Liechtenstein to accede to the EU-Swiss 
agreement by means of a protocol. Taking into account that Norway and 
Iceland also share one association agreement in this field, Liechtenstein 
decided to make use of the protocol solution, provided that this approach 
would allow for the granting of the same status as the other three EFTA 
states. In addition, it had to be a ‘stand-alone’ solution, meaning that 
Liechtenstein’s association will continue even if the Swiss agreement is 
terminated. Before all of this could be achieved during the negotiations in 
the first half of 2006, Liechtenstein and the EU completed their negotiations 
on an agreement on taxation of savings112 in 2004, and the Swiss people 
approved their Schengen association in a public vote in June 2005.  
While the Swiss Schengen Association Agreement entered into force 
on 1 March 2008 and thereby paved the way for Switzerland to become a 
fully-fledged Schengen member on 12 December 2008, the Liechtenstein 
protocol was only signed by the three parties at the end of February 2008.113 
                                                   
111 Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ L53 of 
27/02/2008, p. 1. 
112 This agreement entered into force in 2005 and was followed by a positive 
Council decision in 2006 to open negotiations on the protocol allowing 
Liechtenstein to participate in the Schengen area on the basis of the EU-Swiss 
agreement. 
113 Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss 
Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the 
Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the 
European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s 
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Furthermore, due to the reluctance of some EU member states in the 
Council connected to tax cooperation of the Principality,114 Liechtenstein 
was only able to fully join as Schengen member on 19 December 2011.115 
Since December 2011, Liechtenstein is the 26th member of the 
Schengen area. Liechtenstein took over the entire Schengen acquis with 
minor exemptions and fully participates in the mixed committee initially 
established under the EU-Swiss agreement and extended by the protocol. 
This achievement of Liechtenstein is of interest in the context of this study 
for two reasons. 
First, Liechtenstein did not insist on negotiating and concluding a 
parallel agreement covering the whole substantive scope of Schengen 
membership, but decided to make use of the clause in the Swiss agreement 
allowing it to participate in the arrangement negotiated by its neighbour 
and close partner Switzerland via an additional protocol. The result is 
again an example of what we refer to as ‘trilateralisation’, although in this 
case, the negotiated Schengen protocol is de facto an own Schengen 
Association Agreement. As the protocol contains itself all the essential 
provisions and has its own termination clauses that are independent from 
the Swiss agreement, it is not dependent on the latter’s (continued) 
existence. Actually, the protocol transforms the bilateral Swiss-EU 
agreement into a full trilateral agreement identical in substance to the 
Norway-Iceland-EU Schengen Association Agreement. As in the field of 
processed agricultural products, the Schengen arrangement of 
Liechtenstein highlights the Principality’s pragmatic and flexible approach 
when it comes to European integration and at the same time highlights its 
close bonds with Switzerland. Second, similar to the EEA agreement, the 
EU-Swiss-Liechtenstein Schengen Association Agreement is a dynamic 
agreement. It obliges Liechtenstein to take over the Schengen acquis as it 
                                                                                                                                 
association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis, OJ L83 of 26/03/2008, p. 3 and 5. 
114 This led to the negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement between the EU and 
Liechtenstein to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of 
their financial interests and to ensure exchange of information on tax matters (anti-
fraud agreement). This agreement has so far not been agreed to by the EU Council. 
115 Schengen enlargement: Liechtenstein to become 26th member state, Brussels, 13 
December 2011, 18446/11, PRESSE 489. The entry into force of the Schengen 
protocol is linked to putting into effect the Dublin/Eurodac protocol with regard to 
Liechtenstein. 
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stood with regard to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland at the date of 
signature of the additional protocol and also its further development. 
To this end, the Schengen Association Agreement established 
institutional and procedural mechanisms. A ‘mixed committee’ is set up, 
which consists of representatives of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Council 
and the Commission, and which in practise meets together with the mixed 
committee of the other EFTA states Norway and Iceland established by 
their Schengen Association Agreement. The mixed committee meets at the 
level of ministers, senior official or experts depending on the subject 
matter.116 The mixed committee is informed by the Council about any new 
legislative proposal falling within the scope of the Schengen Association 
Agreement. In the same manner as in the EEA, the Commission is held to 
informally consult with experts from Liechtenstein and Switzerland when 
drawing up legislative proposals as they do with the other Schengen-
associated states Norway and Iceland. 
After new legislation is adopted within the EU, the Council 
immediately informs the four associated states. Following this information, 
the EFTA states have 30 days to notify the Council whether they accept the 
new legislation or not. They might also notify further internal 
constitutional requirements, mainly direct democratic constitutional 
requirements, which allow them to fulfil the national constitutional 
requirements during an extended notification period. 
In case of non- or a negative notification, the Schengen Association 
Agreement shall be “considered terminated unless the Mixed Committee, 
after carrying out a careful examination of ways of continuing the 
Agreement, decides otherwise within 90 days. Termination of the 
Agreement shall take effect three months after the expiry of the 90-day 
period” (Art 7 (4)). This is therefore a heavier ‘nuclear option’ which leaves 
little, if any, choice. Similar to the EEA Joint Committee, the mixed 
committee shall keep under constant review the case law of the CJEU to 
guarantee the application of the Schengen acquis in a homogenous manner. 
Compared to the EEA institutional and procedural set-up, the 
Schengen Association Agreement appears to be rather simple and 
straightforward. Although there is only a single body and a plain ‘take-it-
or-leave’ take-over procedure, with an even more severe ‘nuclear option’ 
                                                   
116 Cf. Arts 3-5 Schengen Association Agreement. 
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than the EEA, in its Art. 7, the Schengen Association Agreement has 
nonetheless satisfied the Liechtenstein government. 
This mainly owes to the fact that, in contrast to the EEA, where 
Liechtenstein does not participate in the discussion of the Council prior to 
decisions on EEA-relevant EU legal acts, the Schengen mechanism provides 
for participation of Liechtenstein’s officials in such discussions, also at 
ministerial level. Of course, Liechtenstein has no vote in the formal 
decision-making. In the case of Liechtenstein, its demographic features 
would render it very hard to influence Council voting effectively, even if it 
were an EU member state. Accordingly, sitting at the table and 
participating in discussions at ministerial level appears to be already a 
useful accomplishment. Compared to the very technical procedures of the 
EEA, where such a place at the table of the Council is not even foreseen, the 
Schengen mechanism provides a ‘sense of inclusion’ for Liechtenstein 
officials in the decision-making process of the EU. It may well be that 
Liechtenstein one day would find this set-up more effective and pragmatic 
than the EEA mechanism. 
In the context of future integration strategy, the Schengen mechanism 
can be regarded as an alternative model to integrate third-countries into the 
Internal Market.  
3.4 EFTA 
Nowadays, EFTA as an organisation is often forgotten when thinking about 
European integration in a wider sense. With the EEA having become so 
prominent for three EFTA states and leaving only Switzerland in EFTA 
without the EEA but having ‘deep’ bilateral agreements with the EU, EFTA 
has largely lost its significance for market integration in Europe. It still 
matters in trade policy, however, vis-à-vis third countries.  
In 1952 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands signed the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and subsequently in 1957 the Treaty on the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Treaty on the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom). 
Following these events, attempts to avoid an economic dividing-line 
on the European continent were explored within the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the forerunner of the 
Organisation for European Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
attempts to form a Western European free trade area, however, failed 
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mainly due to the irreconcilable differences of the British and French 
positions. In late 1958 and early 1959, seven non-EEC countries (United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Denmark and Norway) 
came together to explore the possibility of the creation of a free trade area 
amongst themselves. The final outcome of this process led to the 
Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association on 4 January 
1960 in Stockholm (Stockholm Convention). EFTA established an industrial 
free trade area amongst its contracting parties. 
In the 1960s Western Europe was characterised by two economic 
blocs, ‘inner six’, the EEC members, and the ‘outer seven’,117 the EFTA 
members. With Finland,118 Iceland119 and Liechtenstein joining later, EFTA 
consisted of 10 members and associated countries. This situation would 
change drastically in the decades to come. By 1973 EFTA was reduced to 
just six full members plus Finland and Liechtenstein, while Western Europe 
was close to achieving the goal of a continent-wide industrial free trade 
area due to the EFTA-EEC FTAs of 1973, which were implemented fully by 
the end of the decade.120 Portugal left EFTA for the EU in 1986, whereas 
Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU in 1995, leaving EFTA with 
just four members, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
Initially, the Principality was not an EFTA member on its own right, 
but its participation was mediated by Switzerland as well as its 
representation in EFTA organs. This status of mediation through 
Switzerland changed in 1991, when the Principality became a full EFTA 
member on its own.121 
EFTA lost many members in the course of time and consequently was 
reduced greatly in economic importance as a free trade area. The EEA has 
established a (deep) FTA amongst the EEA-30, including three of the four 
current EFTAns. As a response to this new reality, the EFTA members 
                                                   
117 EFTA founding members: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
118 Finland became an associated member in 1961. Note that Ireland never was an 
EFTA member but had a FTA with the UK.  
119 Iceland joined in 1970. 
120 With the exception of some sectors with longer transitional periods (paper and 
steel) and more generally trade in agriculture and fish; see Norberg et al., 1993, p. 
47). 
121 Frommelt & Gstoehl (2011, pp. 12-16). 
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amended the Stockholm Convention in June 2001 in Vaduz. This so-called 
‘Vaduz Convention’, introduced into the Stockholm Convention the rules 
and principles of the EEA and the EU-Swiss bilateral relationship with 
regard to intra-EFTA relations (such as principles of free movement). 
This adaptation, however, had little effect on Liechtenstein as it 
already enjoyed deep market integration into Switzerland due to the 
customs and monetary unions. The main significance of the ‘Vaduz 
Convention’ lies in the Icelandic and Norwegian relationship with 
Switzerland. 
Despite the minor importance of EFTA for today’s free trade in 
Europe, it is still very active in the conclusion of FTAs with the world 
economy.  
Figure 8. Global trade blocs 
 
Source: EFTA Secretariat. 
EFTA has concluded 24 FTA agreements covering 33 countries. For 
Liechtenstein this means market access to the EEA-30 market via the EEA, 
the Swiss market via its bilateral relationship with Switzerland and at the 
same time the Principality benefits from EFTA’s web of free trade 
agreements throughout the world. 
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3.5 Agreements between Liechtenstein and the EU outside 
the EEA 
Liechtenstein’s relationship with the EU has so far been described by the 
EEA, its association with Schengen and Dublin and the participation of the 
Principality in agreements between Switzerland and the EU. A fourth type 
is based on bilateral agreements between Liechtenstein and the EU. 
Currently, five bilateral agreements are in force between the EU and 
Liechtenstein, two of which are side products of Liechtenstein’s accession 
to the EEA and EEA enlargement with respect to Romania and Bulgaria.122 
One agreement is on external border funds,123 a consequence of the 
Schengen association with Liechtenstein and another one deals with the 
exchange of classified information.124  
Notwithstanding the importance of these agreements within their 
respective fields, the most important bilateral agreement in the context of 
this study is the agreement on taxation of incomes from savings of 2004.125 
This agreement was already mentioned in section 3.3.2 in the context of 
Schengen, as it was a precondition for Liechtenstein to enter the Schengen 
area. 
                                                   
122 Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European 
Community and the Principality of Liechtenstein concerning the provisional 
application of the Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the European Economic Area and the provisional application of four 
related Agreements, OJ L 221, 25.08.2007, p. 7. 
123 Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland, the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein 
on supplementary rules in relation to the External Borders Fund for the period 
2007 to 2013, OJ L169, 03.07.2010, p. 22. 
124 Agreement between the European Union and the Principality of Liechtenstein 
on security procedures for exchanging classified information, OJ L187, 21.07.2010, 
p. 1. 
125 Agreement between the European Community, and the Principality of 
Liechtenstein of the measures equivalent to those provided for in Council Directive 
2003.48.CE on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments – 
Memorandum of understanding, OJ L 379, 24.12.2004, p. 83. 
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Under this agreement Liechtenstein applies measures equivalent to 
those of the EU’s Directive on taxation of savings income.126 Liechtenstein 
levies a withholding tax on EU bank clients, 75% of which is transferred to 
the tax relevant country of residence of EU citizens. The rate of the 
withholding tax corresponds to the incremental rate of the Directive and 
has stood at 35% since 1 July 2011. 
This agreement can be regarded as a step forward in tax cooperation 
between Liechtenstein and the EU. However, the 2004 agreement only 
provides for an exchange of information in very limited circumstances such 
as sufficiently justified requests in the case of the suspicion of fraud. 
The tax evasion affair of the year 2008127 and the subsequent 
repositioning of the Principality as a cooperative jurisdiction,128 which had 
as a direct consequence the removal of Liechtenstein from the OECD’s 
blacklist of uncooperative tax havens in May 2009, brought about even 
deeper cooperation with EU member states in anti-fraud and tax matters. 
Against the backdrop of these turbulent times for the Principality, the 
EU concluded an anti -fraud agreement with Liechtenstein in June 2008. 
After reopening this draft anti-fraud agreement to enlarge and deepen its 
scope – insisted on in preliminary negotiations by the EU and several of its 
member states – the Commission proposed another Council decision in 
December 2009 to approve the amended anti-fraud agreement.129 
The anti-fraud agreement with Liechtenstein is intended to serve as a 
model for similar agreements with Switzerland, Andorra, Monaco and San 
Marino.130 The Council, however, has so far not adopted this agreement 
due to vetoes of Austria and Luxembourg. These two countries are the last 
                                                   
126 Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in 
the form of interest payments, OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, p. 38. 
127 For a more detailed overview of these events see Maresceau (2011, pp. 520-525). 
128 See Liechtenstein Declaration of 2009 
(www.oecd.org/ctp/harmfultaxpractices/42826280.pdf).  
129 Amended Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Union, of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Principality of Liechtenstein, of the 
other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their 
financial interests and to ensure exchange of information on tax matters, COM 
(2009)648 final. 
130 Ibid, p. 4.  
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EU member states, which still apply a withholding tax and refuse the 
automatic exchange of information as provided for in Directive 2003/48 
(mainly, because of their reticence to give up bank secrecy). This 
transitional option provided for under the regime of the taxation of savings 
Directive should come to an end once the EU concludes anti-fraud 
agreements, for which the Liechtenstein anti-fraud agreement serves as the 
basis, with Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San 
Marino.131 
Liechtenstein nowadays finds itself in the curious and somewhat 
frustrating position that it has fulfilled the calls from the EU side to provide 
for more transparency and cooperation in tax matters, only to be put on the 
bench again by internal struggles within the EU. The current situation is 
not likely to change in the near future.132 
3.6 Bilateral relations with EU member states 
3.6.1 Tax agreements with EU member states 
The bilateral relationship between the EU and Liechtenstein with regard to 
taxation and transparency does not prima facie exclude bilateral 
agreements between Liechtenstein and EU member states. In parallel with 
the developments in bilateral relations with the EU, Liechtenstein recently 
concluded tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and double 
taxation agreements (DTAs) with several EU member states and Norway 
and Iceland.133 
The parallel existence of these bilateral agreements and the envisaged 
anti-fraud agreement with the EU is not unproblematic. Some question the 
competence of EU member states to conclude bilateral agreements due to 
an overlap with EU competencies in the same field. This means that these 
bilateral agreements cannot include provisions that contradict or regulate 
the same field as the EU-Liechtenstein agreement on taxation of savings of 
2004. 
                                                   
131 Art. 10 (2) of Directive 2003/48/EC. 
132 “Danes push for deal on banking transparency”, European Voice, 24 February 
2012 (http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/danes-push-for-deal-on-
banking-transparency/73678.aspx).  
133 For a complete and current list of TIEAs concluded by Liechtenstein, cf. 
http://www.regierung.li/index.php?id=306. DTAs are relevant as well because 
they normally contain information exchange rules, too. 
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Once the intra-EU 
blockage of the EU-
Liechtenstein anti-fraud 
agreement by Austria and 
Luxembourg would be 
lifted, potential conflicts of 
existing bilateral 
agreements of EU member 
states with the Principality 
will need to be addressed. 
For Liechtenstein, 
the bilateral route in the 
field of tax information 
exchange proved to be the 
only possible way to 
address the demands 
raised by its European 
partners, as long as intra-
EU struggles within the 
EU prevent a collective 
solution with regard to tax 
information exchange. Liechtenstein acted swiftly and provided for the 
necessary transparency of its financial sector to live up to its intentions in 
the Liechtenstein Declaration of 2009. This again is an example of the 
pragmatic approach of the Principality, using international law to 
accommodate its place within an integrated Europe. 
Tax information exchange and double 
taxation agreements concluded by 
Liechtenstein since 2009 
EU member states 
 Austria, DTA & TIEA concluded 29.1.2013 
 United Kingdom, TIEA concluded 
11.08.2009; DTA 11.06.2012 
 Luxembourg, DTA concluded 26.08.2009 
 Germany, TIEA concluded 02.09.2009, 
DTA 17.11.2011 
 France, concluded 22.09.2009 
 Ireland, concluded 13.10.2009 
 Belgium, concluded 10.11.2009 
 Netherlands, concluded 10.11.2009 
 Finland, concluded 17.12.2010 
 Denmark, concluded 17.12.2010 
 Sweden, concluded 17.12.2010 
EEA contracting parties 
 Iceland concluded 17.12.2010 
 Norway 17.12.2010 
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4. THE DYNAMISM OF LIECHTENSTEIN’S 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Introduction and overview 
The strategic environment of Liechtenstein is in flux. There are many 
reasons why the Principality might be well served by a thorough reflection 
about these actual and potential changes. There is no doubt that 
Liechtenstein’s European integration strategy of the last quarter century 
has been successful, perhaps even more successful than expected at the 
time. The paramount question today is whether this success can be taken 
for granted in light of the dynamics of the country’s strategic environment. 
The present chapter discusses eight actual or potential changes that (may) 
affect the future positioning or indeed the predicament of Liechtenstein in 
the medium- to long-run. Chapter 5 will present a range of scenarios and, 
on this basis, discuss a spectrum of options for addressing these challenges, 
ranging from relatively technical to more disruptive ones. We hope that 
this analysis can be helpful for Liechtenstein to set out a future European 
integration strategy in its best interest. 
Liechtenstein’s future European integration strategy is and will 
remain inextricably linked to the EU, directly as well as indirectly. The EU 
has developed into a kind of European ‘hegemon’, so far broadly a ‘benign 
hegemon’ as an economic and civil power, not a military one. The most 
important recent change for Liechtenstein is therefore that the EU has 
recently gone beyond the 18 years routine of daily EEA affairs and taken 
stock of the working of the EEA – which can be analysed on the EU-27 side 
(see 4.2) and on the EEA EFTA countries’ side (see 4.3) – and its relations 
with Switzerland (see 4.4), the possible accession to the EU by Iceland and 
the repercussions for the EEA (see 4.5) and finally the future economic 
integration with three small-sized states which are not part of the EEA 
(Andorra, Monaco and San Marino) (see 4.6). All of these aspects are of 
clear interest to Liechtenstein. The stocktaking has begun with the EU 
Council conclusions in December 2010, in which it makes a number of 
important policy statements and ‘encourages’ a review of the EEA on the 
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EU side. This review was submitted to Council on 7 December 2012. The 
present chapter will also venture into two more far-fetched and so far only 
potential changes in the near future that might be of strategic interest to 
Liechtenstein: a new ‘solution’ for Turkey, one option of which might be 
membership of the EEA (see 4.7) and, in the longer run, EEA membership 
of one or more relatively advanced countries now under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (see 4.8). Finally, the EU itself is transforming 
rapidly, prompted by the financial and economic crisis, and this is likely to 
have repercussions for Liechtenstein as an EEA-3 country (see 4.9).  
 In December 2010 the Council of the European Union published its 
conclusions on its relations with the EFTA states.134 The main message 
concerning the EEA is a very positive one. In the words of the Council: 
the EEA: functions properly so long as all Contracting Parties 
incorporate the full body of the relevant EU acquis relating to the 
internal market into their national law. The Council welcomes that 
the EEA countries have demonstrated an excellent record of 
proper and regular incorporation of the acquis into their own 
legislation and encourages them to maintain this good record to 
ensure the continued homogeneity of the internal market. The 
Council notes with interest that Norway and Liechtenstein have 
launched work for an in-depth review of their experiences with the 
EEA Agreement. The Council encourages a parallel exercise on the 
EU-side and looks forward to an exchange on findings with the 
EEA EFTA countries in due time.135 
Section 4.3 will focus on a possible amendment of the EEA 
Agreement. The reason is simple. The two EEA-3 countries remaining in 
the EEA in case Iceland might join the EU, Norway and Liechtenstein, have 
themselves reviewed the EEA, the benefits they enjoy and the costs 
incurred, be it political (especially Norway) or administrative (especially 
Liechtenstein). Both reports are quite favourable and provide few, if any, 
reason for major initiatives on their part. However, this does not mean that 
amending the EEA Agreement is excluded, because both countries surely 
have specific desires for amendment. First, the EEA Treaty has never been 
substantially amended (except for an extension of the membership base as 
a consequence of EU enlargements) and the experience of 20 years of EEA 
                                                   
134 Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, 3060th General Affairs 
Council meeting, Brussels, 14 December 2010. 
135 Ibid., paras 3 and 4. 
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(18 years with respect to Liechtenstein) has given rise to a number of 
suggestions on how to improve the EEA. Liechtenstein could make an 
inventory of suggestions for amendment. The enthusiasm for a new version 
of the EEA Treaty is tempered by the risk of opening a Pandora’s box. 
However, the EU has a tradition of distinguishing a relatively modest, 
technical and ‘controlled’ treaty change from a genuine rewrite of the 
treaty. The former need not open a Pandora’s box. A prerequisite for 
sticking to a modest treaty change is presumably that a rather precise 
negotiating mandate is first formulated by the 30 political leaders, (perhaps 
even) helped by a proposal of the Commission after extensive consultation 
with the EEA-3. One key issue is whether some currently excluded and 
sensitive policy areas (like fisheries or agriculture) would be covered, 
which is (probably) inconsistent with pursuing a modest and ‘controlled’ 
amendment. A few suggestions for EEA amendments and improvements 
will be made in chapter 5.  
The Swiss-EU relationship did not get such a positive evaluation 
from the European Council (see 4.4). In surprisingly straightforward 
wording, the Council stated: 
in full respect of the Swiss sovereignty and choices, the Council 
has come to the conclusion that while the present system of 
bilateral agreements has worked well in the past, the challenge of 
the coming years will be to go beyond this complex system, which 
is creating legal uncertainty and has become unwieldy to manage 
and has clearly reached its limits. In order to create a sound basis 
for future relations, mutually acceptable solutions to a number of 
horizontal issues, set out below, will need to be found.136 
In short, for the EU, the bilateral and sectoral approach to Swiss-EU 
economic relations is exhausted. The EU will seek a solution providing for 
an institutional framework for the taking over of new EU acquis, the 
surveillance of its implementation and a tribunal to secure homogeneous 
interpretation and legal certainty. Obviously, the future of Swiss-EU 
economic relations is critical for Liechtenstein. 
A fourth possible change in the strategic environment of 
Liechtenstein’s European integration is the application for EU membership 
by the EEA EFTA state Iceland (see 4.5). If Iceland accedes to the EU, the 
EEA would be left with just two countries on the EEA EFTA side of the 
                                                   
136 Ibid., para 6. 
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agreement. This gives food for thought both on technical and legal 
solutions as well as on the nature of future cooperation between the two 
remaining EEA EFTA partners.  
A fifth change may follow from a renewed interest in European 
integration on the part of three countries ’with small territorial dimension’, 
namely, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino (see 4.6). San Marino is openly 
playing with the wish of full EU membership, while Andorra is seeking a 
deep association possibly of an EEA-like kind, which is also the second-best 
scenario for San Marino. Monaco, on the other hand, is very reluctant when 
it comes to any kind of deeper market integration, although – or because – 
it is already involved profoundly via France. However, it too is engaged, 
with the other two in this process of reflection. In the view of the Council of 
the EU, 
a similar assessment (as concerning the EEA) should also be 
undertaken concerning the relations of the EU with the European 
countries of small territorial dimension, and more in particular the 
Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the 
Republic of San Marino. Their current relations with the EU are 
extended but fragmented, with large parts of the acquis related to 
the internal market not introduced in their legislation and 
therefore not applicable.137  
In November 2012, the Commission published an options paper as 
the basis for further debate and later decisions 138 
A sixth element of possible change in the medium run concerns 
Turkey (see 4.7). Despite its official status as a candidate country, Turkish 
membership seems further away than ever.139 On the one hand, there are 
national and European debates, mainly concerned with the shift to a more 
Islamic civil society in Turkey; on the other hand the Cyprus conflict and 
the very slow progress of acquis adoption under official pre-accession are 
increasingly frustrating the prospect of Turkish accession.140 Irregular and 
                                                   
137 Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries, para 8. 
138 European Commission (2012c). 
139 Böhler, Pelkmans & Selçuki (2012b). 
140 Commission Staff Working Paper, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, accompanying 
the Communication from the Commission of the European Parliament and the 
Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, COM(2012) 600 
final. 
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informal suggestions (even by Chancellor Merkel) about a ‘privileged 
partnership’ have been heard for at least a decade or more, without ever 
defining what such a partnership would consist of. Given the mutual 
interest in ‘deep’ economic integration between the EU and Turkey, and 
remaining frictions on issues related to the political Copenhagen criteria,141 
it seems to be just a question of time and opportunity until EEA 
membership of Turkey might politically be suggested as a (politically) 
convenient alternative.142 
Seventh, in the longer run, the EEA model might perhaps also 
become interesting for the more advanced countries falling under the ENP 
and wishing to be part of the EU internal market (see 4.8). Some of them 
cannot become an EU member (as they are not a European country), and 
others might not be ready for all the Copenhagen criteria.  
The eighth challenge comes from the EU itself (see 4.9). The EEA is 
quite a resilient arrangement, having accommodated no less than three EU 
treaty renewals without major problems. Also, the start of the eurozone in 
1999 has so far not given rise to any particular EEA issues. What is new 
today is the deepening and widening of the EU’s economic integration as a 
result of the financial and sovereign debt crisis and the transformation of 
the eurozone that goes considerably further. In particular, the degree of 
centralisation acceptable to EU member states seems to be shifting up and 
this is likely to create challenges inside the EEA. 
4.2 The EEA review of the EU 
As noted, the EU Council of Ministers has, after having taken notice of the 
reviews of the EEA in Liechtenstein and Norway, “encouraged a parallel 
exercise on the EU side” of the EEA. As of late January 2013, the situation is 
as follows: the EEAS in close cooperation with the European Commission 
submitted a review in the form of a Commission Staff Working 
                                                   
141 Stability of institutions, guarantee of democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities. 
142 An example of how easily this suggestion can arise and how immune the 
original authors can be to counterarguments, given the nature, operation, 
demanding requirements and membership of the EEA, readers are referred to an 
exchange on the leading website for economists in Europe (VoxEU) between 
Gylfason & Wijkman (2010), Böhler, Pelkmans & Selçuki (2012a) and Gylfason & 
Wijkman (2012). 
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Document,143 discussed in more detail below, and shortly thereafter the 
Council adopted ‘Conclusions’ on 20 December 2012.144 The Council 
conclusions referred first to the relations with the four EFTA countries, 
called “stable and close”, looking forward to “further strengthening and 
deepening”, and announcing to reassess the state of relations in two years. 
This general statement is followed by country-specific comments, which we 
shall refer to where appropriate. Second, the Council notes the following on 
the EEA review: “[T]he EEAS and the Commission have carried out an 
assessment of the EEA agreement which will be closely examined by the 
Council in the coming months. The Council expects that an extensive 
exchange with EEA partners on the results of the respective reviews is held 
at the next EEA Council meeting in May 2013” (para. 27). Except (“as a 
matter of priority”) for expressing a concern about the backlog of EU legal 
acts which have not yet entered into force in EEA EFTA countries, the 
Council takes no position at this moment. We shall thus focus on the EEAS-
Commission EEA Review in some detail.  
The Review assumes a broad approach and casts the net wide. In 
doing so, it touches upon several potential changes in Liechtenstein’s 
strategic environment, which we discuss in other subsections in this 
chapter, such as amending the EEA Treaty (4.3), the links with Switzerland 
(4.4), the option of only two EEA EFTA countries (4.5) and the question of 
the market integration with the AMS countries (4.6). There is even an 
indirect reference to countries falling under the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy. In 4.2 we shall only sum up what suggestions are made for changes 
that can be accomplished within the present EEA Treaty framework.  
The Review recalls the rather different situation at the outset of the 
EEA from that of today. It finds that: “the EEA Agreement can be 
considered to have functioned well: it has provided the bedrock for very 
good and close EU relations with the EEA EFTA countries over the past 
two decades.” It suggests that, with some pragmatic extensions, the EEA 
Agreement would offer “EEA EFTA countries a convenient alternative EU 
membership-status on an à-la-carte basis, suitable to the political and 
institutional sensitivities of one of the two sides”. Subsequently, a series of 
issues are discussed, with queries (presumably to the Council) either in the 
                                                   
143 European Commission (2012a). 
144 Council of the EU, meeting No. 3213 of the Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy Ministers, Brussels, 20 December 2012. 
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text or explicitly in a few question boxes. Most of these are found under 
horizontal issues, discussed below. Some sectoral issues are of very limited 
importance to Liechtenstein: the EU efforts to liberalise market access for 
agricultural goods and processed agri-products as well as the transit 
question in fisheries are all directed to Norway (and Iceland to a lesser 
extent, not least as it is negotiating accession anyway). Other ones are of a 
lesser importance in general (e.g. whether the EEA-Norway grants fit the 
EU’s regional or Cohesion Policy, the beneficiaries are the same; a highly 
technical issue of temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences relate to 
aspects that Liechtenstein has already addressed (e.g. an anti-fraud 
agreement where the problem now lies on the EU side). A few procedural 
suggestions are made which either seem a useful instance of modernisation 
(e.g. better use of the EUR-Lex database and electronic tracking of the 
processing of EEA-relevant acquis) or ‘soft’ additions to the EEA acquis, 
without any need for amendment (social dialogue and political dialogue). 
Under the label of a “more comprehensive approach”, some parts of non-
EEA cooperation between the EEA-3 countries and the EU might be 
considered to be brought under “a single framework”, without any further 
specification. But not ‘Schengen’, because Schengen, Dublin and 
EURODAC “seem adequate as stand-alone measures”. Finally, the 
enlargement of the EEA on account of non-EU countries is brought up, 
explicitly opening up the option of revising the EEA Agreement so as to 
remove the EFTA requirement for EEA membership of non-EU countries.  
Apart from the last question, which we shall discuss later, the core of 
the EEA Review is therefore to be found in the horizontal issues. Six such 
issues are introduced as follows: 
i. On the scope of the Agreement. One question relates to the 
implications of the quite dynamic internal (market) development of the EU 
for the day-to-day operations of the EEA. The Review concurs with our 
observation in chapter 3 that a grey zone has emerged between what is 
internal market stricto sensu (as was quite clear in the early 1990s) and 
what falls under other policies, generating problems of identifying ‘EEA 
relevance’, as discussed in greater detail below. This question is 
exacerbated by an EU practise of legislating ‘packages’ (not always 
delineating what exactly is internal market-related and what is not, because 
for the EU it is irrelevant) and, occasionally, by new institutional 
arrangements arising from EU treaty amendments. The Review 
subsequently concurs with the “heightened interest by EEA EFTA states in 
judicial cooperation, … including terrorism, serious crime and police 
cooperation”. The Review advocates the inclusion of EU policy on 
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trafficking in human beings (Dir. 2011/36) in the EEA Agreement. Policy 
domains much closer to the internal market such as taxation, in which 
Liechtenstein might possibly be interested, are not mentioned. 
ii. On EEA relevance of a future EU legal act. The two sides in the EEA 
each make their own assessment of what acts are EEA-relevant (see chapter 
3), which is bound to lead to frictions. In the recent past there have also 
been more and more cases where the EEA-3 countries themselves could not 
agree what was EEA-relevant, thereby putting into question the ‘single-
voice’ principle for the EEA-3 in the Agreement. At times, this has 
prompted one or the other EFTA EEA country to incorporate EU acts not 
having been marked as EEA-relevant (see footnote 53 for a telling 
example). Such moves lead to laws that neither enjoy ESA surveillance nor 
judicial protection by the EFTA Court. Thus, on both sides, the issue of 
EEA relevance has become more problematic than it was initially. 
Although there are potentially heavy conflict resolution rules (esp. Art. 102, 
EEA) ex post, there is no common procedure ex ante. The review suggests 
to carry out a systematic scrutiny of EEA relevance in internal market 
issues stricto sensu as well as in case of the five flanking policies specified 
in the EEA Agreement.145 
iii. On delays in the incorporation of legal acts. The increasing backlog (at 
least until 2011) of incorporating EEA-relevant EU acts into the domestic 
legislation of EEA EFTA countries has begun to seriously worry the EU. As 
noted, the EU Council of Ministers calls it a matter of priority. In late 2011 
the backlog amounted to more than 500 acts, and was reduced to 427 by 
October 2012. This ought to be appreciated against the total of more than 
7,000 acts since the beginning of the EEA (but remember that many of those 
are not EU Regulations or Directives, but also Recommendations or 
Decisions; see also the box on p. 31). The thrust of the Review on this point 
is that the EU should develop a “response strategy” as it discerns a 
“growing recourse to a selective approach”. In a lengthy analysis the 
Review attempts to substantiate that the EFTA side exploits more and more 
often its “de facto delaying power” via a) prolonged negotiations between 
the EEA-3 (as it has to speak with ‘one voice’); b) late submission of Joint 
Committee Decisions (JCDs); c) protracted negotiations of ‘adaptations’, 
requested in no less than 33% of all cases, often on institutional issues, 
                                                   
145 Social policy, consumer protection, environment, statistics and company law. 
Part V, EEA.  
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where the Review insists with unusual frankness that such requests are 
increasingly difficult or unacceptable to address; d) delays in domestic 
procedures, and tactically failing to live up to the (timely) notification 
requirement, thereby pre-empting the infringement procedure by ESA (a 
‘clear breach’) and e) delays in the application of EU acts, adding up 
roughly to one year difference between the EU and the EEA-3, but e.g. five 
years for the hygiene package.  
iv. Conflict resolution on new (EEA relevant) EU acquis. The EU has 
never invoked Art. 102, EEA, always trying to employ persuasion or to find 
equivalence of legislation. The EU essentially holds that the problem has 
grown but refrains from using a term like ‘intolerable’ – instead it asks, in a 
question box, whether the Art. 102 suspension procedure should be 
launched in “some specific unresolved cases”. From media reports, it is 
known that the Review refers to Norway. But the irritation about “lengthy 
negotiations and unproductive situations of public political controversy” in 
some EEA-EFTA countries (suggesting an “alleged imposition from 
Brussels” although the country itself is the culprit) is obvious.  
v. EEA-3 participation in EU agencies. During the EEA negotiations, the 
EU hardly had EU agencies, and none in the regulatory domain. Moreover, 
the CJEU assumes a strict position here. The Review advocates a horizontal 
Agreement but avoids providing details. This issue is already important 
(see chapter 3) and is bound to grow more important in future, with the 
internal dynamics of the EU in single market and EMU questions. 
vi. Strengthening the EFTA Surveillance Authority. The Review 
advocates strengthening, although it realises that ESA is not accountable to 
the EP or equivalent (as the Commission is) and not controlled by the EU 
Court of Auditors (except for financial control by the EFTA Board of 
Auditors). Strengthening would refer to the control, by ESA, of the 
application of the EEA Agreement and better monitoring.  
It might be useful to underline that the Commission ignores or in any 
event does not explain two important reasons for the increasing backlog, its 
priority issue. One is that the regulation on the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) with stronger supervisory powers and the task of writing 
a common rulebook is (constitutionally) very difficult for the EEA-3 to 
swallow, as this more centralised agency will be able to exercise 
considerable influence on EEA-3 banks although the EEA-3 countries are 
not represented in the EBA, except as observers. As a result of this problem, 
a comet tail of subsequent EU (implementing) acts has become jammed in 
the EEA system. Second, the increasing number of EU acts that have ‘direct 
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effect’ (the sharp rise in the use of EU Regulations rather than Directives in 
the internal market; greater frequency of Decisions and some comitology 
legislation) causes queues in national EEA-3 parliaments (at least in 
Norway and Iceland) because their involvement is constitutionally 
required. It shows that deepening of the internal market becomes more 
cumbersome, if not close to intolerable, for the two-pillar structure to 
handle properly. There is also the suggestion that the EFTA side has a de 
facto delaying power “...with limited recourse for the EU” because it is the 
EFTA side that “is responsible for drafting the Joint Committee Decisions 
(JCDs) which introduce EU acts into the EEA Agreement”. This 
presentation is curious, if not self-serving, since right from the start of the 
EEA, the EU has left the drafting to the EEA-3 (having a very strong 
interest in making the EEA work) and has never been willing to make 
available the resources for assuming systematically this work. The EEA-3 
have set up a special EFTA-EEA secretariat in Brussels (see box on p. 50) 
that coordinates deliberations amongst the three and has built up a 
tradition of pro-active drafting of JCDs. The EU could have co-financed an 
EEA Secretariat and made available human resources together with the 
EEA-3; alternatively, the Commission could have shared the burden of 
drafting by alternating with the EEA-3 on, say, a half-yearly basis. All this 
is not to say that there are no genuine problems with the backlog – 
problems of domestic political resistance or sensitivity do exist and have 
worsened.  
One can also understand that the EU is worried about the high 
number of adaptations of EU acts, representing around one-third of the 
total. Yet, most of these adaptations are institutional and are therefore 
embedded in such a two-pillar system, with at least formal maintenance of 
national sovereignty for the EEA-3. In any event, the overall backlog has 
gotten out of hand and measures have to be considered. The Review takes 
the position that, ideally, the ‘large majority of acts’ should enter into force 
simultaneously in the EU and in EEA-3. Interviews lead us to believe that 
the following suggestion lies behind this statement: an identical date of the 
entry-into-force for both sides, with a six-month extension to allow for the 
fulfilment of constitutional requirements in EEA-3 countries. Twisting the 
arm of the EEA-3 with legislative clauses decided solely by the EU 
internally is inconsistent with the nature of the EEA, no matter how 
important the backlog issue is. The EEA is based on an international treaty 
and each and every introduction of a new EU legal act into the annexes is 
formally a negotiation, followed by a JCD. The solution to render this 
system efficient and effective is the requirement of a ‘homogeneous’ (and 
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dynamic) (wider) internal market. And normally this works admirably 
well. However, the limit of this system is reached where national (EEA-3) 
constitutions have to be honoured. Until and unless these are adapted to 
make this possible, Norway and Iceland (and sometimes Liechtenstein) will 
need time to let their national parliaments decide. Such a system of strict 
deadlines would have to be voluntarily accepted by the EEA-3, with all the 
consequences at home for the introduction of fast-track procedures. 
The EEA Review of the EU follows two reviews of the working of the 
EEA by Liechtenstein in 2010 (Government of Liechtenstein, 2010) and by 
Norway in 2012 (Government of Norway, 2012).146 However, the 
Liechtenstein Review is about the first 15 years of Liechtenstein in the EEA 
and focuses on the domestic aspects; it is not about future integration 
strategy and contains no proposals to amend the EEA Agreement. Nor 
does the Norwegian White Paper make any proposal to amend the 
Agreement, although in the summary it says it is in the interest of the EU 
and the EEA EFTA states “to maintain and further develop the EEA 
agreement”. The independent Norwegian EEA Review Committee report147 
stresses an important characteristic of Norwegian domestic politics about 
Europe: depoliticisation.148 The White paper differs fundamentally from the 
Norwegian EEA Review Committee report in that the latter is frank and 
open in its analysis and suggests numerous improvements, some of which 
would imply amendments of the EEA Agreement, whilst the former is 
merely expressing praise and satisfaction, adding some open and general 
wishes on “further developing the internal market” and securing the 
participation “in EU agencies, supervisory bodies and other specialist 
bodies”. The upshot is that the EEA Review by the EU will be the trigger to 
further analysis, consultation, negotiation, improvements of the EEA 
without treaty change and with possible amendments of the Agreement.  
                                                   
146 Government of Norway (2012). The latter report is in Norwegian, but its key 
messages have appeared in English (www.eu-norway.org/news1/Norway-the-
EEA-Agreement-and-Norways-other-agreements-with-the-EU/). 
147 Norwegian EEA Review Committee (2012); for selected chapters in English, see 
www.eu-norway.org/news1/Report-by-the-EEA-Review-Committee-Norways-
agreements-with-the-European-Union/  
148 Ibid., chapter 27, p. 8: “There is little reason to rock the boat. For some the 
memories of 1994 [a reference to the controversies around the referendum on EU 
membership, J.P & P.B.] still live with them, and it is feared that debates about the 
EEA and Schengen could revive fundamental tensions over EU membership.” 
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 81 
Quite another matter is a series of queries about the enlargement of 
the number of EEA countries that one might envisage. Several of the 
subsections in this chapter relate to this general issue. In case the EU would 
find enlargement of the EEA suitable, it is sometimes held that the EU 
cannot formally achieve that in routine legislative proposals. Enlargement 
of the EEA-30 with non-EU countries would occur if, and only if, the four 
current EFTA states would first agree on the candidate country’s EFTA 
membership (Art. 128, EEA). If correct, this legacy would maintain the 
curious power of Switzerland to veto enlargement of an association (the 
EEA) of which it is not a member, solely because the EEA was designed 
exclusively for EFTA at the time. However, a careful reading of Art. 128 
does not confirm this widely held view: it merely says that EFTA members 
may apply, not that others might not. Anyway, this (supposed) power of 
veto can be removed by the EEA-30 of course, but it requires a revision of 
Art. 128 in a formal renegotiation with ratification. Lacking any progress in 
enlargement procedures of the EEA, the EU might eventually be faced with 
several parallel new frameworks for different (groups of) countries in 
Europe, which increases complexity, especially if they are heterogeneous. 
Having the EEA Agreement as an umbrella framework for countries in 
Europe wishing to be part of the internal market, would seem to be 
preferable for the EU, assuming of course that those countries are willing 
and able to be part of the demanding EEA.  
4.3 Amending the EEA Agreement 
In 2012 the EEA celebrated its 20th anniversary. The EEA provides for a 
solid and wide bridge of market integration between (currently, EFTA) 
countries not willing to accept supranationality and the non-internal-
market acquis of the Union but keen to participate ‘deeply’ in the EU’s 
market integration.  
It was noted before that the EEA can be described as a stable and 
dynamic agreement at the same time. While dynamism refers to the steady 
development of the substantive scope of the EEA, month after month, 
stability of the EEA holds true in the sense that the main text of the EEA 
agreement has never been amended with regard to its institutional and 
procedural aspects. 
This is remarkable, to say the least, keeping in mind that the basis of 
the EEA is the concept of the Internal Market dating from the period before 
the Treaty of Maastricht. At the same time, it is useful to realise that, 
conceptually and in terms of fundamental treaty provisions, the internal 
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market has hardly changed since the Single European Act,149 even though 
the EU treaties have been amended with respect to values, institutional 
aspects and justice and home affairs. Nevertheless, after 20 years of intense 
experience with the EEA, one wonders whether a revision of the EEA is not 
becoming more and more urgent for the EEA-3 to keep up with the 
developments on the EU side of the agreement. In this regard, not only the 
question of the substance of such a revision is important but also what 
procedural method should be used to amend the EEA. Indeed, the EU 
Review of the EEA comprises three suggestions for substantive 
amendments of the EEA agreements: i) assuming a ‘more comprehensive’ 
approach by bringing in some bilateral agreements under a single 
framework – it should be noted that the Commission does not specify that 
‘a single framework’ should be the EEA; ii) bringing under the EEA the EU 
policy on trafficking in human beings, if not more judicial cooperation and 
iii) opening the debate, not yet a proposal, on enlarging the non-EU EEA 
and doing away with the prior EFTA conditionality for EEA membership. 
The removal of this condition of course requires treaty amendment, too. We 
further investigate these questions below under 5.3 and 5.4. 
4.4 Transforming Swiss-EU economic relations 
The Council of the EU and the Commission insist on four major points, 
which together would surely transform Swiss-EU economic relations and 
bring the Swiss much closer to an EEA-like arrangement. First, the EU 
insists on an institutionalised procedure regulating the take-over of new 
EU acquis (insofar as covered in Swiss-EU bilaterals) including the case law 
of the CJEU. Second, an independent, preferably international surveillance 
mechanism should be installed. Third, the EU Council calls for an effective 
judicial enforcement mechanism for the bilateral agreements. Fourth, a 
tribunal serving as the final arbitrator in disputes concerning the bilateral 
agreements should be set up. 
The Council also identifies several other points of contention, 
including the cantonal practice of preferential company taxation, which is 
incompatible with the EU competition rules (but it is contested whether 
                                                   
149 For a comparison over time, see Pelkmans (2006, pp. 18 et seq). The major areas 
of deepening and widening of the internal market since 1992 did not require a 
revised EU treaty. The deepening and widening since 1992 is set out in Pelkmans 
(2011a and 2011b).  
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 83 
these rules apply). Furthermore, the incoherent application of the freedom 
of movement of persons agreement is brought up. A recent example is the 
re-establishment of quantitative limitations for certain categories of 
residence permits as regards EU citizens of eight EU member states 
(Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Czech 
Republic).150 Last but not least, the cooperation and information exchange 
in tax matters and the fight against fraud and evasion in tax matters are 
also mentioned in the Council conclusions. 
As a result the EU will take into consideration that “in assessing the 
balance of interests in concluding additional agreements, it will have in 
mind the need to ensure parallel progress in all areas of cooperation, 
including those areas, which cause difficulties to EU companies and 
citizens”. This essentially means that, if the structural questions of the 
Swiss-EU relationship are not resolved, no further substantial negotiations 
will be concluded. This need not have direct implications for Liechtenstein, 
depending on which dossiers are at stake, but it does not augur well for 
EU-Swiss economic relations. 
The EU-Swiss relationship is of great concern to Liechtenstein. As 
noted, the Liechtenstein-Swiss economic relationship is a very close one. 
Some circles even consider it of greater importance to Liechtenstein than 
the relationship with the EU and its EEA partners. In any event, the 
transformation of Swiss-EU relations will be keenly watched by 
Liechtenstein. 
4.5 Icelandic EU membership application 
In July 2009, Iceland submitted its application for EU membership and 
formal accession negotiations were opened in July 2010. In October 2012, 
out of 33 negotiation chapters, 18 negotiation chapters were opened and 10 
provisionally closed.151 By the end of 2012, 27 chapters had been opened 
and 11 closed. Many chapters do not require much adjustment, as EEA 
membership has already obliged Iceland to implement the bulk of EU 
internal market legislation into its national legal order. Furthermore, the 
                                                   
150 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/ 
press_release_speeches/press_release/2012/2012-april/press_release-2012-april-
10.html. 
151 European Commission (2012b). 
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chapters “Science and Research” and “Education and Culture” are also 
more or less aligned. 
Icelandic accession to the EU would matter to the EEA. The three 
EEA contracting parties would be reduced to just two, Norway and 
Liechtenstein. Some minor adjustments of the EEA would be inevitable (see 
5.6). So far, the will to continue the EEA with just two members on the 
EFTA side is firm. A lingering thought, however, is whether this scenario is 
invariably always positive for Liechtenstein in the longer run. Huge 
differences in size, diverse economic interests, the geographical distance 
from one another and contrasting political traditions suggest that it might 
well be a somewhat artificial couple. One seasoned observer in the Brussels 
EU circuit opined (in an interview) that the departure of Iceland from the 
EEA would render Liechtenstein more vulnerable to the consequences of 
Norwegian domestic political sensitivities, more so than is already the case 
in matters like the backlog, for example. He added: “I would advise them 
to find a new friend.” 
It is unclear whether Iceland will finally decide to join the EU or not. 
Iceland sees its application for membership not as swapping it with EEA 
membership, but as a natural development in its European integration 
strategy. With the financial crisis hitting Iceland extraordinarily hard in 
2008, the country was especially drawn to deeper integration with the EU 
given the euro. As EEA membership already integrated Iceland into the 
EU’s internal market, there are not many policy areas left that are 
contentious. Fisheries, agriculture and regional cohesion are the big 
challenges in the negotiations with the EU. 
An interesting aspect of Icelandic public opinion is that a majority of 
Icelanders support its government’s decision to start accession 
negotiations, but there is nonetheless a rather strong majority against 
accession. This odd situation can be understood as giving the government 
the consent to assess the negotiation possibilities, especially to explore 
special arrangements and/or opt-outs in case of Icelandic membership. 
Political parties show little enthusiasm for EU membership. Within 
the present government coalition, only one of the two parties supports 
membership. The upcoming Icelandic parliamentary elections, scheduled 
for April 2013, might see the centre-right party coming back into power. 
According to recent opinion polls held in October and November 
2012, only 36% support the upholding of the EU membership application 
while 54% are in support of scrapping the application, while 10% are 
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undecided.152 When it comes to EU membership itself, 58% oppose it and 
just 27% support it, while 15% are unsure.153 
4.6 The AMS countries and European integration 
The European countries ‘with small territorial dimension’ or ‘small-sized 
countries’, as the EEAS calls them, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino 
(AMS) are currently in a process of re-evaluating their European 
integration strategy. Their ambitions vary from full EU membership, to 
EEA membership or an EEA-like structure all the way to sectoral 
integration. 
The AMS countries are often seen as similar given their common 
characteristic: very small size. Nevertheless, they are quite different, not 
only in their integration prospects but also in their structures. Indeed, they 
also differ from Liechtenstein, in particular in the structure of their 
economies and the (lack of) experience in detailed market integration. The 
differences in the structure of their economies would seem to call for 
individualised solutions for each of them. Table 1 shows that the AMS 
countries have a number of similarities with the EU and Liechtenstein, 
facilitating the process of ‘deeper’ economic integration to which they now 
aspire. However, the table also lists a series of differences with 
Liechtenstein, some of which matter a great deal when embarking on closer 
integration: the AMS are not in the EEA and do not have a high degree of 
internal market acquis adoption (and this without EU surveillance); the 
three are not industrialised (a lot of acquis is relevant here) in contrast to 
Liechtenstein; and they are not members of the Schengen area. Moreover, 
their current customs union arrangements might make the EEA option (in 
case one would pursue this) rather complicated unless the EFTA 
requirement were dropped. 
 
 
                                                   
152 See http://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2012/11/12/ 
fjolgar_sem_vilja_afturkalla_esb_umsoknina/). 
153 See http://heimssyn.is/um-80-kjosenda-sjalfstaedisflokks-og-
framsoknarflokks-andvigir-esb/). 
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Table 1. Similarities and differences between Liechtenstein and AMS countries 
 Liechtenstein Andorra Monaco San Marino 
SIMILARITIES 
1. Very small size Idem Idem Idem 
2. Good relations with EU Idem Idem Idem 
3. Values in common with 
EU 
Idem Idem Idem 
4. High income p.c. Idem Idem Idem 
5. UN and Council of 
Europe membership 
Idem Idem Idem 
6. Specialising in financial 
services 
Idem Idem Idem 
7. Savings tax agreement 
with EU 
Idem Idem Idem 
DIFFERENCES 
8. FTA with EU  CU with EU CU with 
France 
CU with EU 
9. Highly industrialised 
(with 42% of GDP ) 
More 
agricultural 
than industrial 
Industry 
small 
More 
agricultural 
than 
industrial 
10. Tourism not important Tourism key Tourism key Tourism key 
11. Currency Swiss Fr Euro Euro Euro 
12. EEA member, with IM 
acquis for 18 yrs 
IM acquis 
adoption only 
selective; no 
monitoring; no 
independent 
enforcement 
Idem, except 
some acquis 
via France 
Idem 
13. Member of Schengen 
area 
No No, but visa-
free via FR  
No, yet no 
border 
controls 
between Italy 
and San 
Marino  
14 Member of WTO  No No No 
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The European Commission is currently reflecting on an EU strategy 
to better integrate the AMS countries into the EU internal market. 
According to interviews conducted in early 2012 in Brussels, the most likely 
legal structure might be a framework agreement, providing the 
institutional set-up, completed by three country-specific protocols. These 
protocols will most likely contain different parts of the EU’s internal 
market acquis to provide for the most efficient integration possible, 
especially in the light of the limited administrative capacities of the 
countries. However, this remains speculation. The Commission has 
meanwhile published a paper 154 with five options for the AMS. The first 
one, maintaining the status quo, is rejected. This is obvious when the AMS 
are clearly seeking deeper integration and the EU has shown to be 
receptive. The second one is a sectoral approach, and exactly one that the 
EU has found too complicated and lacking legal certainty in the case of 
Switzerland. Indeed, the Commission rejects this option, too. The third 
option is a framework association agreement, the fourth is participation in 
the EEA and the fifth, EU membership. In chapter 5, the two, what the 
Commission calls, “viable” options will be discussed under, respectively, 
5.4 and 5.5. EU membership, a ‘long-term possibility’ for the AMS, is 
discussed for the case of Liechtenstein in 5.10, given the first-ever opening 
for small-sized countries in a Commission document.  
4.7 Turkey 
2013 marks the 16th year since Turkey applied for EU membership. Since 
the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Turkey has been an official 
candidate country for EU membership. Its pre-accession status, which 
should come with a further deepening of economic integration 
accompanied by the gradual realisation of the required domestic reforms 
and appropriate market institutions, as well as the on-going negotiations of 
the 35 chapters for accession, are beginning to lose credibility. Only one of 
35 chapters has been provisionally closed and the 2012 progress report is 
anything but stimulating reading.155 
Too little pre-accession and EU preparation is taking place, despite 
the hopeful beginnings a while ago. The political impetus inside the EU has 
weakened considerably, with sensitivities about the practical implications 
                                                   
154 COM (2012) 680 of 20 November 2012, see European Commission 2012c.  
155 See European Commission (2012d). 
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of a less secular and more conservative Muslim society, possibly about the 
mere size of the country, about the stagnation of human rights reform, 
about the slow pace of structural and economic reforms after an initially 
promising start and about the lack of political will to resolve the Cyprus 
question. It is also true that the ambitious (e.g. technical harmonisation) 
annexes of the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union, in force since 1996, have 
not yet been fully implemented or, in some respects, just partially or not at 
all.  
The political resolve in Turkey has also waned given the Arab spring 
and Turkey’s strategic interests in the region, the beginnings of the Black 
Sea cooperation, the active interest it takes in economic relations with East 
Asia (Turkey is courted by several East Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, to conclude free trade areas), the recurrent political strains in 
high-level political relations between the EU (or, indeed, EU countries) and 
Turkey and, not least, the apparently lower priority of still deeper 
economic integration with Europe, beyond the appreciable 
accomplishments of today, since Turkey has enjoyed healthy economic 
growth before and even during the crisis.156  
The frustration on both sides and the sombre prospects of a success 
once referenda would be held on Turkish membership, have long 
prompted calls for what is termed a ‘privileged partnership’. It is hard to 
give concrete meaning to this idea because sceptical leaders (like Angela 
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, to mention the two most prominent ones) are 
prudent enough not to define it, whereas Ankara (indeed, the country as a 
whole) rejects it firmly. This seems justified: how can one be a candidate 
country for EU membership, with a clear route travelled by many 
candidates before, and nevertheless be presented with a (less!) privileged 
‘partnership’ instead? However, this does not deter some observers and 
politicians from suggesting the EEA as a model for such a partnership (see 
also 4.1). These suggestions are usually driven by the simplistic idea that 
the EEA is about deep economic integration without EU membership, 
without showing much of an understanding of how the EEA really works 
and how demanding it is in terms of acquis adoption and enforcement. It is 
crucial for the EEA-3 to clarify, in no uncertain terms and long before 
                                                   
156 On average, real annual economic growth has been 4% since 2005, implying 
steady catch-up with the EU per capita income. Lately, economic growth seems to 
be petering out with a mere 1% in 2012 and a similar growth rate expected for 
2013.  
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European politics might drift towards this ‘partnership’ with Turkey for 
reasons of convenience, what it takes to be an EEA member and what this 
must mean for Turkey as well.  
4.8 EEA membership for European neighbourhood 
countries? 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, in an 
attempt to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged 
EU and its neighbours. It aims to strengthen ties instead, thereby 
supporting prosperity, stability and security for all. The ENP framework 
covers 16 of the EU’s closest neighbours – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. However, it is a 
bilateral policy between the EU and each one of the mentioned partner 
countries, complemented by regional and multilateral cooperation 
initiatives, such as  
 the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), 
 the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, formerly known as the Barcelona Process, re-launched in 
Paris in July 2008) and 
 the Black Sea Synergy. 
Within the ENP, the EU offers its neighbours a privileged 
relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values 
including democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, 
market economy principles and sustainable development. The ENP goes 
beyond existing relationships by offering political association and deeper 
economic integration, increased mobility and more people-to-people 
contacts. The level of ambition of the relationship depends on the extent to 
which these values are shared. 
The ENP remains distinct from the process of EU enlargement 
although it does not prejudge, for European neighbours, how their 
relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with treaty 
provisions. 
In contrast to the EEA, the ENP has a broad political agenda 
stimulating the ENP countries to develop domestic structures and norms to 
live up to the high standards of the EU in fields beyond economic relations, 
such as fundamental rights, good governance, the rule of law and 
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democracy. This political ambition is accompanied by the establishment of 
a (bilateral) “deep and comprehensive free trade area with a view to 
providing for gradual integration into the EU’s internal market”.157 
However, this gradual integration into the internal market has to be 
‘read’ properly and cannot be compared to the EEA. The initial 
Communication of the Commission merely foresaw a “stake in the internal 
market for the ENP countries”.158 Moreover, the envisaged association 
agreements will most likely include “best endeavour-clauses,”159 far away 
from the strict, rule of law-based internal market legal order provided for 
by the EEA. 
These differences are not the result of discrimination from the EU-
side of the ENP country against the EFTA countries. Rather, the ENP 
countries are structurally not yet fit to take part in a homogeneous internal 
market, based on the EU acquis. This might change in the decades to come. 
One country trying hard to mimic far-reaching market liberalisation is 
Georgia. With Ukraine, an FTA has been agreed but not yet signed 
(pending i.a. on more humane treatment of the jailed former prime 
minister). It is conceivable in future that progress would become 
impressive enough for the EEA to begin to be considered as an option. But 
it is good to remember what the Commission writes in the EEA Review. 
After first stating that the EEA has proven to be a well-functioning means 
to extend the internal market and certain EU policies “to the three EEA 
EFTA states with advanced legal systems and a high level of 
development”, the Commission adds that “EEA participation requires a 
legal and economic capacity to assimilate and implement correctly a 
substantial volume of EU legal acts” (European Commission, 2012a, p. 17). 
4.9 EEA implications of the recent ‘inner dynamics’ of the 
EU 
Ever since 1995, the substance of the EEA has grown enormously, 
altogether with some 7,000-plus EU acts or decisions or recommendations 
                                                   
157 Joint Press Statement, 14th EU-Ukraine Summit, 16691/10, PRESSE 312. 
158 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relation 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COM(2003) 104 final, p. 4. 
159 Hillion (2011, p. 11). 
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with ‘EEA relevance’ included in annexes. Despite three treaty changes, the 
scope of the internal market treaty rules has remained practically the same. 
Since the financial crisis, a renewed ‘deepening’ of EU economic integration 
can be observed, which goes beyond previous developments in the field of 
the internal market. We refer to the on-going attempts of the EU, de-facto 
led by the eurozone, to build up a more coherent and effective Economic 
Union, underpinning the monetary union, but at the same time improving 
the internal market for financial services and its proper functioning. 
Indeed, for a while (say, between late 2008 and spring 2011), the EU 
response to regulatory gaps and failures as well as the neglect of financial 
stability (giving rise to systemic risks via contagion) consisted of the 
strengthening of the (prudential) regulation of financial markets whilst 
extending rules and supervision to market players and activities thus far 
having remained unregulated (such as derivatives without a counterparty, 
credit rating agencies, equity and hedge funds managers, corporate 
governance of banks and bonuses, etc.). New EU institutions were set up 
such as EU agencies (called Authorities) for supervision of banks (EBA), 
insurance and securities as well as a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). 
The new agencies represent a modest degree of centralisation, with some 
marginal power to decide in case of conflicts between national supervisors. 
This has proven difficult to digest for the EEA-3. Indeed, Norway and 
Iceland argue that this set-up generates significant constitutional problems 
for them. When this study was concluded, the EU and the EEA EFTA states 
had still not resolved the participation of the EEA-3 in the EBA. In any 
event, Liechtenstein seems ready to accept the new architecture for 
supervision of banks, insurance companies and securities firms. The ESRB 
probably does not pose a fundamental problem as it remains an advisory 
organ with analytical, reporting and (soft) warning duties. On the contrary, 
the ESRB can be regarded as an improvement of the governance of EMU 
and the EU-27-wide economic policy coordination under Art. 121 TFEU, 
which can only benefit the EEA-3 as well.  
A tougher challenge appeared with the debates on an effective EU 
bank resolution regime, possibly with an EU deposit guarantee system 
(that is, a centralisation compared to mere EU regulation of national 
systems) as well. For bank resolution to be effective, it needs to be capable 
of rescuing or splitting up (in good and ‘bad’) banks, and in particular 
those operating transnationally and/or otherwise posing dangers of 
92  THE DYNAMISM OF LIECHTENSTEIN’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
contagion.160 In turn, for credibility and readiness, this requires EU bank 
rescue funds (not to be confused with the European Stability Mechanism or 
ESM, which is meant for sovereign risks of eurozone countries), which do 
not exist and for which there is, as yet, no legal basis. Stronger yet, such 
resolution has traditionally been reserved for national treasuries, backed up 
by ‘national fiscal capacity’, in other words by national taxpayers, a 
capacity that the EU level does not have. Moreover, it opens the possibility 
that EU authorities and not national ones would decide to seize control of a 
failing bank, a highly sensitive issue. Such centralisation sits uncomfortably 
with the EEA approach, if it can be made compatible at all. One can have 
endless conversations about what ‘sovereignty’ is and is not, especially 
given today’s profound economic interdependence, but it is exceedingly 
hard to argue credibly that the ultimate sacrifice of national control over 
banks when failure is imminent, does not undermine a core principle of the 
EEA Agreement (two-pillar structure). Therefore, if it would turn out that 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) would apply EU-wide over the 
entire internal market – the economically sound position – EEA 
participation in the ECB bank supervisor, in one form or another, would be 
a ‘must’. 
In the course of 2012, this debate intensified in the light of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. The upshot is likely to be an outcome 
that renders it even more difficult for EEA-3 countries to make it 
compatible with the two-pillar system.161 The newest proposals have 
                                                   
160 For example, a domestic bank which maintains a portfolio of sovereign bonds, 
some of which might be risky, or which has extended its investments to risky 
ventures in other EU countries during a ‘bubble’. 
161 The central problem in this crisis is the vicious interaction between weak banks 
and weak sovereigns in the euro area. It looks like a throttling embrace. Many 
banks in the relatively unproblematic countries of the eurozone hold portfolios of 
sovereign bonds from problematic countries in the same eurozone (partly, as their 
higher risk ensures higher interest rates earnings). And they cannot be sold for a 
good price. The upshot is that the weakness of such banks is a direct function of 
the probability of debt restructuring of the weak eurozone countries. In the 
extreme, one may say that Greece’s debt restructuring cannot be pursued, although 
it would be rational, simply because such banks (e.g. in France, Germany and other 
euro countries) would lose enormously. A fortiori, this is true for Spanish or Italian 
banks, not to speak of Greek banks loaded with Greek bonds. With the obligation 
of strengthening own bank capital under new rules beginning in 2013, 
deleveraging is pursued vigorously by banks, which further increases the anxiety 
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become known as the ‘banking union’. The ‘banking union’ is not a 
eurozone but an EU proposal, consisting of three closely related elements: 
i) common, centralised supervision of all (6,000-plus) banks in the EU, with 
national supervisors in a subordinate role – this goes much further than the 
EBA; ii) a single EU bank resolution authority and iii) an EU-wide deposit 
insurance system, pre-empting bank runs and reducing savings or capital 
flight between EU countries, whilst yielding bank-paid EU funds over time 
for bank resolution. The coherence of these proposals makes them credible, 
but at the same time, quite radical for some EU countries (mostly, outside 
the eurozone, albeit Germany does not favour the common deposit 
insurance system – yet – and e.g. France has some reservations about bank 
resolution). However, for the EEA-3, this is irrelevant when it comes to 
strategic reflection about future integration strategies. Liechtenstein will 
have to position itself, because if the Liechtenstein banks (and other EEA-3 
banks) were not to fall under the banking union, it would mean nothing 
less than that the internal banking market would no longer be a single one. 
The main query is whether and to what degree, two supervisory systems 
can be maintained without differential effects on rating, distinct effects in 
terms of competition and uncertainties in the case of crisis. Rescuing a bank 
with national state aid has proven to be a clumsy, if not unsuitable 
approach, yet this would be the consequence of not resorting under a 
common bank resolution regime, belonging to the banking union. These 
effects will be less problematic, the more uniform the so-called common 
supervisory rule book – which is being written by the EBA at the moment – 
will be.  
There is an even more grandiose ‘vision’ pronounced by Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy: the banking union would have to be 
regarded as one of four ‘unions’ together completing a new and effective 
EMU, or better, the E of EMU. These other three unions are: a fiscal union 
for the eurozone (but open to other EU countries), a ‘competitiveness’ 
union and a ‘political union’. We think it is useful for Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Iceland to follow these new ideas closely as they might affect, 
directly or indirectly, the details, working and economic effects of the EU 
internal market. The problem is that it is still early days in these 
developments and their long-run implications are not yet clear. The four 
‘unions’ add up to an admittedly elegant exposition of what it takes to have 
                                                                                                                                 
about this vicious interaction. This is the compelling background for the newest 
proposals set out in the text above. 
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an effective and credible EMU, with political legitimacy. It is conceivable 
that some elements of these ‘unions’ might eventually develop in ways, 
which might affect the EEA as it stands, but there would seem to be no 
immediate issue. It should be noted that the fiscal union basically exists 
since the so-called ‘six-pack’ decision in the autumn of 2011, the integration 
of national fiscal conduct in the European Semester of economic policy 
coordination and the recent new treaty – an intergovernmental one, ratified 
by eurozone and some non-euro countries, but leaning on EU rules – called 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (of 2 March 2012). 
The so-called ‘competitiveness union’ or the ‘political union’ might have 
been communication labels, but little has been heard from them since. They 
would seem to entail no consequences for the EEA as far as we can now 
grasp. 
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5. THINK STRATEGY: ASSESSING 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
5.1 Introduction 
Given the many actual or possible changes in Liechtenstein’s strategic 
environment, as sketched in chapter 4, the present chapter discusses nine 
options, several with sub-options. The various options are not always 
exclusive: in some instances, (sub)options can be applicable 
simultaneously. The aim of analysing so many options is mainly to 
facilitate strategic thinking on the part of Liechtenstein’s political leaders, 
the public administration, public opinion and opinion leaders with respect 
to the Principality’s positioning in European integration in the near and 
mid-term future. We venture to add that the present analysis might also 
help to structure, and perhaps clarify, the ongoing debates in the ‘EU 
circuit’ in Brussels and national capitals. In this sense, it can also be 
regarded as a contribution to the EEA Review, which the Commission and 
the EEAS initiated in December 2012.  
For Liechtenstein as a country and the few non-Liechtenstein 
observers who are knowledgeable about the country’s positioning in 
European integration, a considerable part of the following scenario-based 
analysis is not entirely new, or, at least, it could be retrieved from the work 
of scholars or documents. Indeed, the prospect of the Oslo Process of EU-
EFTA negotiations (24 years ago) and the emergence of the EEA already 
prompted three government reports discussing several strategic choices for 
the Principality (Government of Liechtenstein, 1989; 1992a about the EEA; 
1992b about EU membership). Because more than a generation has passed 
since those days, it seems worthwhile to re-iterate the main points against 
the backdrop of the current accomplishments and the dynamics of 
Liechtenstein’s strategic environment. In addition, the present chapter is 
based on a much wider spectrum of options. The authors also wish to refer 
to a recent contribution of two authoritative Liechtenstein scholars in a rich 
paper [Frommelt & Gstoehl, 2011] requested by the Norway EEA Review 
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Committee. This study is most helpful in many ways. It also contains lots of 
little known data and analysis on e.g. the backlog and some other aspects of 
the EEA-3, with an emphasis on Liechtenstein. Our strategic approach is 
considerably wider, however. Another important difference is that the 
European Commission has meanwhile issued critical papers on the AMS 
and on the EEA (European Commission, 2012c and European Commission 
2012a) whilst the Council of Ministers of the EU has also expressed its (still 
prudent) view.  
A central problem of any strategic analysis of this kind is whether 
and to what extent one considers options as relatively limited changes of 
the status quo, or, more daringly, one is also willing to explore politically 
more radical scenarios. When it comes to relatively limited changes of the 
status quo, it is reasonable to expect a broadly accommodating attitude of 
countries and/or the EU, possibly with some frictions about special 
derogations or the opposite, extra ‘opt-ins’. This seems reasonable because 
the homogeneity of internal market rules, rights and obligations is 
essentially a functional concern, and because the hegemon, anchor and 
magnet functions of the EU (and its internal market) remain attractive for 
all European countries and even slightly beyond. If selective issues arising 
from the internal market acquis are truly sensitive, some kind of 
accommodation will eventually have to be found, perhaps at a price. The 
same goes for institutional extension to include for example Switzerland.  
But more radical or ‘unwelcome’ scenarios should not be excluded a 
priori, if one wishes to ‘think strategy’. As illustrations, it is worth 
considering less and not only more EEA, a modest degree of splintering of 
the EU (with Britain – not Scotland – exiting the EU and renegotiating some 
kind of market access agreement; also, what about potential independence 
movements of Catalonia and Flanders, although – if ever they would 
become ‘countries’ and separate states – they would wish to remain or 
indeed ‘become’ EU members), a withdrawal of the Turkish candidacy for 
EU membership (hence, alternative ways to access the EU internal market) 
and, increasing tensions between the eurozone and the ‘outs’, the non-euro 
countries of the EU. What these far-fetched and very different scenarios 
have in common is ‘high politics’ rather than a functional approach of 
problem-solving given the lure of major economic benefits. For 
Liechtenstein, the functional approach and the reliance on treaties and the 
rule of law is much to be preferred. The more radical scenarios might be 
seen as ‘out of the box’ and disturbing. However, as long as the EEA would 
remain, Liechtenstein could afford to remain an innocent bystander, 
watching the political turbulence from afar. This could work in the case of 
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Turkey’s withdrawal from pre-accession as long as it would opt for a weak 
bilateral instead and not for an attempt to join the EEA. It is also likely to 
happen if the EU might fragment by some regions going independent, yet 
wishing to stay inside the EU anyway. In the case of a British exit, 
implausible as it would seem today, Liechtenstein might simply join the EU 
response on a new market access agreement. Its experience and good 
performance in the EEA might be of help in case Britain would wish to 
accede an enlarged EEA. However, one cannot take for granted that, were 
Britain to accede the EEA, the EEA would not be transformed de jure or de 
facto, and whether such a change would be beneficial for Liechtenstein is 
impossible to judge at the moment. The scenarios of ‘less EEA’ and frictions 
between the eurozone and the ‘outs’ (at least, if these would result in 
adverse effects for the proper functioning of the single market) might be 
worrying for Liechtenstein. At the moment, it is in particular the 
construction of the ‘banking union’ that should ensure better (European) 
supervision of banks all over the single market and – in the supposedly 
rare occasion of a bank failure – the EU supervisor (the ECB) would act 
both instantaneously and with direct intervention powers to solve the 
consequences (i.e. bank resolution) with the help of EU rescue funds and 
without adverse implications for taxpayers, savers and/or systemic risks. 
But the details of this sound idea turn out to be difficult to agree inside the 
eurozone as well as between EU eurozone and (at least, some) non-
eurozone countries. Both the options of ‘less EEA’ and ‘more EEA’ may or 
may not be worrisome, depending on the form and substance of each one 
of them.  
In Table 2 we summarise the nine scenarios/options and sub-options 
that we consider important enough to reflect upon: status quo, more EEA, 
enlarging the EEA, EEA-bis and EEA-tris, less EEA, bilateralism, more EU, 
less EU via core and ‘others’ as well as exit, and Liechtenstein joining the 
EU. 
Table 2. Scenarios/options for Liechtenstein’s integration strategy 
No. Scenario Requirements 
1. Status quo EEA Status quo, no change necessary 
1.a Status quo-plus EEA No treaty change; better managing the EEA 
(reduce backlog); address specific items 
(e.g. EEA relevance) 
2.  ‘More EEA’ (treaty 
change) 
Extension of scope/substance; tighter 
procedures 
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3. (Non-EU) EEA 
enlargement  
Switzerland (no treaty change); other new 
members via EEA Treaty change (or, 
possibly, EFTA Treaty) 
4. EEA-bis, or, more 
parallel EEA look-alikes 
4.A for Switzerland; 4.B for AMS countries; 
4.C for Turkey; 4.D for advanced 
neighbourhood; 4.E for the UK minus 
Scotland 
5. Less EEA Scope of EEA reduced (via Art. 102 or 
treaty change) 
  EEA-2 (after Icelandic accession to the EU) 
6. Bilaterals on single-
market-minus  
For the UK, minus Scotland; perhaps EEA-
3 countries, Switzerland, Turkey, AMS and 
neighbourhood. The key question is: what 
differences with 4? 
7. More EU deepening Especially Single Market, its governance, 
including the banking union – Can the 
EEA absorb this change? 
8. Less, or differentiated, 
EU 
Reducing scope of substance (opposite of 
‘widening’) or ‘variable geometry’ (e.g. 
euro ‘ins’ vs ‘outs’) 
  EU countries exiting (opposite of 
‘enlargement’); corollary >> options 4 or 6 
for ex-EU country? 
9. Liechtenstein joining EU Although not current policy, adverse 
scenarios might prompt a U-turn – Can the 
EU accommodate a small-sized country? 
And can Liechtenstein handle it? 
 
5.2 Status quo: If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it 
Chapter 4 has shown that there is a lot of flux in the strategic environment 
of Liechtenstein. Nevertheless, the EEA-3 are quite happy with the EEA 
and so is the EU. The Governments of Liechtenstein162 and Norway163 have 
                                                   
162 Bericht und Antrag der Regierung an den Landtag des Fürstentums 
Liechtenstein betreffend 15 Jahre Mitgliedschaft des Fürstentums Liechtenstein im 
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clearly signalled this and the European Council Resolution of December 
2010 is full of praise of the EEA and the EEA-3. The Council Conclusions of 
20 December 2012 essentially repeat this, underlining the ‘priority’ of 
reducing the number of outstanding legal acts (see 4.2). So, why ‘fix’, i.e. 
amend, the EEA when there would seem to be little urgency and the minor 
irritations or drawbacks might be accommodated otherwise?  
Although there is undoubtedly merit in merely enjoying the secure 
and beneficial status quo, Liechtenstein’s environment might not allow it 
due to changing circumstances. A first option, avoiding the cumbersome or 
somewhat risky route of treaty amendment, is what we call the ‘status-quo-
plus’ (see below in 5.2): functional solutions of current issues in the EEA 
such as better managing the incorporation process (less backlog) and 
addressing institutionally the question of determining what EU legislative 
proposals are ‘EEA relevant’, both firmly within the context of the existing 
Agreement. EEA Agreement annexes have also been amended with EU 
legal acts in domains that fall outside the formal EEA remit, showing a 
highly pragmatic flexibility and pointing to considerable discretion to 
‘develop’ a status quo-plus without much ado. Another possibility is that 
the EU and/or one or more EEA countries might wish to propose a 
controlled and limited EEA Treaty revision about the substance, 
institutions and procedures, pre-empting a Pandora-box effect via a tightly 
circumscribed mandate (see 5.3). This could come about, say, because the 
Icelandic application for EU membership might fail or because scepticism 
about the EEA in Norway might be growing to intolerable levels and the 
government would feel compelled to act. The latter possibility could mean 
a modest amendment of the EEA (‘more EEA’) or perhaps even what we 
call ‘less EEA’ (see 5.6). As noted in 4.3, the recent Commission EEA 
Review suggests two possible amendments of the substance of the EEA 
Agreement (both ‘more EEA’).  
                                                                                                                                 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), No. 17/2010, accessible on 
http://www.llv.li/amtsstellen/llv-sewr-dokumente_publikationen-ewr-
abkommen/llv-sewr-dokumente_publikationen-
veroeffentlichte_berichte_und_antraege.htm.  
163 Norwegian EEA Review Committee (2012), “Outside and Inside, Norway’s 
agreements with the European Union”, accessible in Norwegian at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/nou-er/2012/nou-2012-
2.html?id=669368. Even more so, the Norwegian White Paper of October 2012 (see 
Government of Norway, 2012). 
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Another reason for not allowing the status quo might emerge from 
Switzerland. So far, Switzerland has responded very prudently to the 
critical December 2010 Council view. That might well be a function of the 
cordial relations between two partners. The EU has exercised pressure via 
the freezing of some dossiers (e.g. electricity interconnectors and related 
issues), but it is not excluded that firmer insistence will be observed soon. 
Once EU pressures become serious, the Swiss might begin to compare the 
EU proposals with other options (such as joining the EEA, see 5.4) and this 
might be seen by the EU as well as Switzerland and the EEA-3 as an 
occasion to go for a limited revision of the EEA as well. The EU would 
probably welcome Swiss EEA membership since it solves the Swiss 
bilateral problem in a sound fashion and would better justify the 
demanding EEA processes. Of course, if the Swiss would wish to join the 
EEA, the complications of the Liechtenstein-Switzerland market integration 
are likely to be reduced and this would be welcome. Much less probable 
but not impossible is Swiss EU membership, a fall-back option still toyed 
with in Switzerland by some political factions in the federal government 
and the cantons. Swiss EU membership would reduce the complexities 
now inherent in ‘trilateralisation’, but that is probably much less important 
than Liechtenstein being forced to rethink its options in such an event. With 
the Swiss going into the EU, Liechtenstein might be tempted or feel 
compelled to join the EU together (5.10), but it would thereby incur the 
considerable costs of EU membership (for a small-sized country) and, at the 
same time, feel uncertain how quickly and under what terms the EU would 
be willing to accommodate such a small country, in particular, 
institutionally.  
In some scenarios, it is costly to stick to the EEA Agreement when it 
comes to enlargement. Thus, when considering treaty amendment, the 
question of what non-EU countries can join the EEA (enlargement164) 
demands attention (5.4). The EEA has no articles on enlargement with non-
EU countries, besides the possibility for Switzerland to opt in as EFTA 
member. The Agreement does specify, as noted in 4.3, that (other than EU 
                                                   
164 For readers only reading chapter 5, it is useful to clarify three terms, as the 
literature and the EU circuit is not always unambiguous in terminology. 
‘Deepening’ a given domain of the acquis refers to firmer commitments, fewer 
exceptions of this accepted acquis domain and tougher (or speedier) procedures. 
‘Widening’ refers to scope (i.e. which domains are added to the acquis) and not to 
the number of countries. The latter falls under the label of ‘enlargement’. 
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countries) EFTA states can apply. Keeping this element of the status quo 
has become questionable. Even the European Commission in its EEA 
review speaks of “… some merit for engaging in further reflection on the 
advantages and disadvantages of enlarging the EEA Agreement or 
enlarging the geographical coverage of the EEA”.  
Nor might the status quo be preferable in the case of the AMS 
countries, and possibly not in the case of Switzerland. The AMS countries 
might end up in bilateral approaches, given their differences and distinct 
preferences (see 4.6), but the EU would find this less than preferable. For 
the moment, two of the five options in the recent Commission AMS options 
paper165 are seen as ‘viable’: participation in the EEA or a framework 
association agreement, which one might call ‘EEA-bis’ for simplicity. 
However, this option can also be read in the December 2010 Council 
conclusions for Switzerland; this could be denoted as “EEA-tris” (see 5.5). 
In 5.5 and 5.7, various EEA look-alikes are discussed and compared with 
the option of going bilateral for these countries as well as for Turkey (if 
opting for EEA membership or an EEA look-alike) or, eventually, for 
advanced neighbourhood countries. Recently, it has become clear that the 
domestic debate inside the United Kingdom has led to some discussion 
about the EEA or EEA look-alike options (e.g. Buchan, 2012).  
It might also be difficult to maintain the status quo if the deepening 
of the EU single market (especially, the banking union, but possibly also 
moves towards more independent EU agencies in network industries) 
would be pursued with gusto (5.8). On the other hand, there are euro-
sceptical voices in the Union calling for a reduction of scope, that is, the 
opposite of ’widening’ (for instance, some substantive powers on selective 
labour market regulation should be ‘returned’ to the member states) or for 
more ‘variable geometry’, which are likely to affect the EEA acquis (5.9, ‘less 
EU’, perhaps in combination with 5.6). Of course, ‘less EU’ taking the form 
of an EU country leaving the Union is of direct concern to the EEA-29 ; 
what matters perhaps just as much is the subsequent step – would that 
country opt for the EEA (5.4), an EEA look-alike (5.5) or a bilateral 
agreement (5.6)? Finally, the option of Liechtenstein joining the EU, even if 
remote today, might become more realistic in some scenarios such as a 
Swiss desire to join the EU or (say) Icelandic EU membership in 
combination with Norway going bilateral.  
                                                   
165 See European Commission (2012c), as quoted in 4.6. 
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For all these reasons, the status-quo should not be taken as a given. 
More likely than the status quo in its current form is the ‘status quo-plus’. 
The status quo-plus cannot be firmly defined in substantive terms, 
precisely because it presupposes new initiatives to change practices, 
introduce new procedures and amend annexes in a highly pragmatic way 
(as the EEA-3 has already done several times, e.g. introducing effective 
national criminal sanctions that were never envisaged to be part of the 
Agreement). Thus, the status quo-plus may well be a dynamic but 
somewhat ad-hoc route to reduce practical problems in the functioning of 
the EEA as they arise. What can be done is to give a few examples of 
current issues that might be resolved without the overly heavy (and risky) 
amendment of the EEA Agreement itself.  
The EU Review of the EEA is summarised in 4.2. Issues to be resolved 
or lubricated under a ‘status quo-plus’ approach may include the following 
four:  
i. Judicial cooperation, including on terrorism, serious crime and police 
cooperation. The EU Review speaks of “how to address heightened 
interest by EEA EFTA States” in this area which might point to the 
status quo-plus approach. It finds it important “to include the policy 
on trafficking in human beings in the EEA Agreement” and adds that 
there is a need “for a coherent approach”. Given the two-pillar 
system and precedents, this formulation does not necessarily imply 
(only) amendment of the Agreement; it may also be solved by 
incorporation in the annexes, because national parliaments can agree 
beforehand.  
ii. The serious omission of not having any organized coordination of which EU 
legal acts are “of EEA relevance”. This oversight should be addressed 
under the status quo-plus approach. Of course, the present ‘omission’ 
has the advantage that the EEA-3 can mark an EU legal act as EEA 
relevant, even when the EU does not, so that the three can bring it 
into the annexes. Thus, the EU could assume a ‘benign neglect’ 
attitude (as it has so far) whenever the EEA-3 would align their 
legislation to EU legal acts, even when the EU has not denoted it as 
“EEA relevant”.166 Should the opposite happen or be expected, 
                                                   
166 It is not entirely clear what the EU’s attitude is: benign neglect or disapproving. 
The EU Review notes that “no analysis has been undertaken so far by the EU side 
to verify to what extent the acquis in the flanking sectors has been incorporated. 
Consideration should be given to whether the EU should carry out a systematic 
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however, a procedure with pre-agreed criteria ought to be employed 
in which both sides can discuss the matter and the probable 
consequences. The difference of view can be the consequence of 
(what the EU Review calls) ‘grey areas’, precisely where the criteria 
should help the parties to agree, or result from the lack of ‘one EEA-3 
voice’. Different views can emerge from the correct observation that 
the division “between the four freedoms of the internal market and 
flanking sectors […] has become more permeable and the inter-
linkage between the two has […] increased”. The flanking sectors167 
are not considered part and parcel of the internal market, only 
considered ‘relevant to the four freedoms’, which reflects a legalistic 
(rather than a conceptual economic) approach to the internal market 
in the Agreement. Moreover, why only five such sectors? Such a 
narrow legalistic approach sits uneasily with the deepening and 
widening of the internal market, which is fundamentally the result of 
the functional inter-linkages (whether inconsistencies, omissions, 
complementarities or distortions, etc.), which market participants 
experience. It might be that EEA negotiators two decades ago wanted 
to delineate in fairly exact legal terms the borderlines of the internal 
market and call that the ‘internal market’. This is largely based on the 
four freedoms – whereas the internal market is by definition an 
economic concept and has to be defined more widely in order to 
avoid drawing arbitrary demarcations. For sound economic reasons 
given the ultimate EU treaty objectives, what really matters to serve 
these objectives with its most prominent ‘means’, the single market, is 
that the internal market functions properly, as recognised in the 
treaty from the beginning. For the EEA to be truly ‘homogeneous’, it 
is the combination of the establishment and the proper functioning of 
the internal market, which matters for prosperity, growth and other 
                                                                                                                                 
scrutiny of the assessment of ‘EEA relevance’ of EU acts by the EFTA side in 
general and whether it should assess the current scope of incorporation of EU 
acquis outside the internal market into the EEA Agreement, resources permitting” 
(p. 5).  
167 Called “horizontal provisions relevant to the four freedoms” (Part V, EEA), 
there are five: social policy, consumer protection, environment, statistics and 
company law.  
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economic EU goals.168 Indeed, this is the thrust of what the EU itself 
has been doing. The almost permanent dynamism of deepening and, 
to some extent, widening, of what is often informally denoted as the 
single market is driven by the functional logic of spill-overs and 
interdependencies between markets and/or policy domains, which 
simply by-passes any too narrow legal fixation.  
Still, the question is not always functional. Disagreement 
between the EEA-3 countries can also occur. It may be caused by 
domestic political constraints in (say) one country, a problem 
presumably not encountered in the other two. Experience has shown 
that this rarely happens, but when it does, a procedure on ‘EEA 
relevance’ should not be expected to resolve the problem, unless the 
EU would invoke Art. 102 and non-incorporation would entail a cost 
for the unwilling country as well as for the other two EEA countries. 
The Review is explicit in calling for a “response strategy” in such 
cases, breaking the taboo on the recourse to Art. 102.169 Coming close 
to an overt threat, the Review lifts the taboo and openly discusses the 
possible use of this ‘heavy’ procedure, with an explicit question 
addressed to Council (p. 10).  
iii. The complex set of issues around the ‘backlog’ in the incorporation of EU 
legal acts. Both the ‘priority’ declared by the EU Council as well as the 
tone and details of the Review strongly suggest that the 
‘homogeneity’ of the internal market is endangered by the nature and 
the size of the backlog. In 4.2 we have already observed that the 
Review fails to appreciate that a considerable share of the backlog is 
not political but the upshot of two forms of deepening of the internal 
                                                   
168 This reasoning is elaborated more concretely and at great length in Pelkmans, 
2006, various chapters, and in a more concise form, in Pelkmans, 2011b. This is also 
why e.g. the EU Digital Agenda has the effect of extending internal market issues 
into private law and other areas, why a properly functioning internal market 
cannot do without a least-distortive taxation acquis, why an EU patent is 
indispensable for the working of the internal market and why a relaxed and ad-hoc 
EU attitude to environmental policies (leaving more discretion to member states, as 
sometimes advocated in eurosceptic circles) would seriously undermine the proper 
functioning of the internal goods and services market.  
169 Interestingly, the Review does not say that Art. 102 has never been invoked; 
rather, it says that it has never “been considered”, which points to a taboo. 
Nevertheless, the Review is inaccurate (our footnote 94, p. 53).  
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market acquis, creating greater problems for the EEA-3 than in the 
past. One sticking point is the Regulation on the European Banking 
Authority, where the more centralised character of supervision 
generates problems for the EEA-3, in turn causing a logjam of 
implementation legislation; the other one is a little noticed but 
significant form of deepening of the internal market, namely, the 
EU’s increasing use of EU Regulations instead of Directives and the 
higher frequency of employing Decisions, both of which have ‘direct 
effect’, hence prompting the need for parliamentary approval one by 
one in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. From experience and for 
domestic institutional reasons, we know that this tends to take less 
time in Liechtenstein than in Iceland and Norway. The compromise 
character of the EEA combining supranationalism for the EU and 
formal insistence on sovereignty by the EEA-3 is subjected to 
increasing tensions by this steady deepening. 
This is not to deny that EEA-3 countries (and, in particular, 
Norway) have more and more systematically looked for what the 
Norway EEA review has called ‘safety valves’ for domestic politics in 
case of highly sensitive issues. The recent frequency of this happening 
has led some observers to call this ‘obstructionism’. Liechtenstein is 
worried about this trend, if only because it fears that, sooner or later, 
the EU will no longer accept such procedural tactics and act with Art. 
102 actions which might also damage Liechtenstein. The ‘response 
strategy’ of the EU may well include more strict adherence to the 
letter and spirit of the EEA Agreement in a status quo-plus approach 
for deliberate late submissions of JCDs or tactically late notifications 
and the like. Moreover, the mere publication of the EU EEA review 
itself has already led to accusations directed at Norway by one MEP 
in the media,170 generating political pressures that have so far been 
untypical for the amicable atmosphere in the EEA-30 circuit. Whether 
the problem of ‘adaptations’ – where institutional matters play a role 
– can be resolved like this is far from certain, since the roots of these 
requests for adaptation are often found in the compromise nature of 
the EEA as such. For the Commission to hold that such requests are 
increasingly difficult or unacceptable to address is tantamount to 
                                                   
170 “EU threatens to punish Norway for breaching EEA agreement”, Euractiv, 30 
January 2013 (http://www.euractiv.com/consumers/eu-threatens-punish-selfish-
norw-news-517431#comment-10446).  
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saying that the underlying philosophy of the EEA is at stake or, 
perhaps unwittingly, that the EEA-3 have to drift, with the EU, 
towards ever greater deepening, without representation.  
iv. The rising influence of EU Agencies. A subset of the slow but steady 
trend of deepening the internal market consists of the rising influence 
of EU agencies. The EU Review advocates a ‘horizontal Agreement’ 
on EEA-3 participation in EU agencies, but provides no detail. 
Whatever the details of an eventual proposals, it is disturbing and 
inefficient to negotiate, each time, a special arrangement for EEA-3 
countries in every new agency of some importance or with every 
major new task for them. More and more agencies have executive or 
even regulatory influence, regulatory or pre-regulatory functions or 
powers in case of conflicts between national regulators. Although 
there are sound reasons why EU agencies have arisen,171 especially 
with the deepening and widening of scope of the internal market, it 
is, for some of them, the nature of their competences and a creeping 
tendency of quasi-centralisation (e.g. in banking and some network 
industries) that render it critical for the EEA-3 countries to be able to 
participate in such agencies (if only, due to their constitutional 
requirements). Not only will this issue not go away, if anything, it is 
likely to grow in importance in future. Calling for a horizontal 
agreement amounts to a recognition of the EU of a genuine problem 
that deserves to be addressed in a status quo-plus approach.  
The EU review also advocates a strengthening of control, by ESA, of 
the application of the EEA Agreement. Moreover, ESA should invest in 
better monitoring, as the Commission and ESA monitoring are not 
comparable in rigour and scope. Although the EU review does not say so, it 
stands to reason that advocating a “strengthening […] of the level of 
control by ESA [...]” has everything to do with item iii. above, the increase 
in the backlog. ESA could intervene if (for example) tactically late 
submissions frustrate its surveillance and enforcement function, rather than 
recourse by the EU to Art. 102 or other more contentious measures. This 
would appear to be a sound application of the status quo-plus approach.172 
                                                   
171 See for instance Majone (2002), Coen & Thatcher (2008), Lavrijssen & Hancher 
(2008), Nicolaides, Geveke & den Teuling (2003) and Geradin & Petit (2005).  
172 Legally, however, it would imply that ESA’s enforcement functions apply 
already before an EU legal act becomes part of the EEA Agreement. 
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5.3 More EEA, via treaty revision of substance and 
institutions 
After 20 years of EEA, the intentions of the founding fathers of the EEA 
have been more than just fulfilled. The EEA provides for an unwavering 
bridge between EFTA states (minus Switzerland) and the EU’s Internal 
Market. 
On the one hand, the stability of the EEA suggests that the agreement 
negotiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s is of high quality. On the other 
hand, given the dynamism of the EU with three EU treaty revisions and 
continuous deepening of the internal market in this period, one wonders 
whether a substantive and perhaps institutional amendment of the EEA 
Agreement is not desirable or, indeed, necessary for a proper functioning of 
the EEA. Note that a treaty amendment for purposes of allowing EEA 
membership for non-EFTA countries (in fact, enlargement) will be 
discussed in 5.4.  
Reasoning in terms of strategic options, the closest alternatives with 
respect to solving lingering problems about the functioning of the EEA are 
the status quo-plus (5.2) and treaty amendment, more specifically a modest, 
tightly controlled treaty revision (5.3). Should one wish to consider more 
radical changes of the EEA Treaty, the nature of the original EEA and its 
underlying presumptions about sovereignty and political legitimacy might 
be affected to such an extent that the closest alternative options would 
rather be a far-reaching bilateral with the EU (5.6) or indeed EU 
membership (5.10). Thus, if one were to argue that the deepening of the 
internal market requires much stronger degrees of centralisation in some 
policy domains (which are inconsistent with the current EEA Agreement), 
such transfer of powers would be regarded by EEA-3 countries as an 
overhaul of the Agreement, likely to cause a political earthquake in their 
domestic constituencies. During interviews, in the CEPS EEA workshop 
with practically all stakeholders, held in June 2012, and in the recent 
literature, the authors have not found any credible advocacy for a radical 
amendment of the EEA Agreement. This is likely to be ascribed to thinking 
in terms of alternatives: once it would be suggested to address problems by 
deep reforms of the EEA, countries would likely go for other options with 
greater political legitimacy. But precisely for that reason, neither the EEA-3 
nor the EU would be interested to propose and support such a radical 
move in the first place. 
The case of Iceland is telling: it is exploring the full consequences of 
EU membership, but if the voters would not support accession, Iceland is 
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almost certainly not going to plea for more than selective amendments of 
the EEA Agreement. The Norwegian Government White Paper of October 
2012 does not suggest any radical revisions. In the main messages, there are 
two phrases which, if anything, point to a status quo-plus approach or 
perhaps to technical/incremental change. It states that “… it is in the 
interest of all parties to maintain and further develop the EEA agreement” 
(a wording that is fully consistent with the status quo-plus, but might 
possibly be read as favouring technical revisions, too). The government 
also writes that “Norway wishes to continue to play an active part in 
further developing the internal market…[ ] …in accordance with the Single 
Market Act I and the Single Market Act II”173 (which would seem to imply 
little else than a constructive attitude to make the EEA work well in the 
near future). The independent Norwegian EEA Review Committee did not 
advocate an overhaul of the EEA Agreement. It proposes to bring the 
‘patchwork’ of numerous cooperation arrangements with the EU, besides 
the EEA itself, into a “common framework” and the simplest way of doing 
this “would probably be some form of expanded EEA Agreement…. The 
reform could be purely institutional and could involve a common 
framework around existing agreements, or, one might at the same time 
consider whether further areas of EU cooperation should be included.”174 
The Commission’s EEA Review looks sympathetically at such suggestions 
but its formulation is still very open at this stage.175 The only ‘further area’ 
the Norwegian Committee discusses explicitly in this respect is ‘justice 
policy’ in a general framework agreement or as an extension of the EEA. Of 
course, this is exactly the area which the Commission suggests to reflect on, 
with one specific proposal at this stage: “… include the policy on trafficking 
in human beings in the EEA Agreement”.176 
Once one views the status quo-plus and technical or modest EEA 
Treaty revisions as close alternatives, one can appreciate that the EU and 
the EEA-3 would not be too eager to go down the route of formal EEA 
Agreement revision. The fear of not being able to contain the revision to a 
                                                   
173 Government of Norway (2012). 
174 Ibid., p. 9 of ch. 28. 
175 European Commission (2012a, p. 16): “Benefits could be found in bringing some 
of these agreements under a single framework agreement for the sake of legal 
clarity…” 
176 Ibid., p. 5. 
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few well-defined issues (opening the Pandora box) always plays a role. The 
authors suggest that, prior to the formal opening of such negotiations, a 
clear and unanimous political agreement should be concluded on what 
would be the only questions to be negotiated; if, for some domestic (e.g. 
elections) or other reasons, this political deal is not honoured later on, the 
other EEA parties would suspend the negotiations. If the new demands 
from party X to the Agreement for less or more areas of negotiation cannot 
be unanimously accepted, the political deal is considered ‘dead’. This 
containment approach would deter opportunistic behaviour and help 
accelerate the negotiations. However, quite apart from any containment of 
Pandora effects, the incredible flexibility of the EEA as experienced over 
two decades renders the status quo-plus very attractive to all EEA parties. 
Just remember that, beyond the policy areas that are clearly part and parcel 
of the internal market as defined in the Agreement, a range of ‘grey area’ 
EU legal acts have been incorporated in the annexes, as well as some acts 
not being ‘EEA relevant’ according to the Commission.  
Thus, it is likely that the issues discussed in 5.2 will not be moved 
into the option of amendment of the Agreement too easily. Moreover, the 
flexibility stretches beyond these already remarkable accomplishments. As 
to participation of EEA-3 countries in EU agencies, so far, a highly 
pragmatic approach has been followed (be it at times after lengthy 
negotiations, attempting to satisfy national constitutional requirements as 
well as the CJEU case law), without amendment of the Agreement. Another 
example is found in minor technical adaptations accomplished via the rules 
of procedure in the EEA Joint Committee. More daringly, one might even 
consider including new technical amendments in newly created 
supplements (whether annexes, protocols, other) to the EEA Agreement. It 
is only in the case of judicial cooperation (such as trafficking in human 
beings) that a highly specific amendment of the Agreement would be called 
for. This should be possible. The EU itself has also practiced very minor 
amendments of the treaty, e.g. on the EU budget rules or a few sentences in 
the EMU section of the treaty. In the very near future, however, there is one 
question that might be more challenging for the EEA: the EU banking 
union, in fact, a more centralised supervisory structure, with bank 
resolution powers (from the better capitalisation of a bank, or, its 
restructuring, all the way to seizing control of a failing bank, and resolving 
all problems, including temporary funding of a ‘bad’ bank). Knowing that 
the EBA regulation (and a tail of EU implementing acts) has still not led to 
agreement in the EEA on the representation issue after almost two years – 
an EBA which is far from fully centralised in such critical functions – one 
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cannot but wonder how the banking union is going to be absorbed into the 
EEA under a status quo-plus approach. The recent negative ruling of the 
EFTA Court on Icesave and the lingering duty of Iceland to pay for lost 
deposits of citizens of the UK and the Netherlands177 will certainly not 
increase the willingness of EU countries to make substantive concessions in 
such a dossier.  
An issue dear to the EEA-3 is that, two decades ago, ‘decision-
shaping’ has been framed in a rather narrow fashion: it merely refers to the 
preparatory track of a Commission legislative proposal. In other words, the 
EEA-3 do not routinely have access to Council committees or (say) the 
Coreper, let alone, the Council of Ministers, when EEA-relevant questions 
are worrisome for one or all EEA-3 countries. Neither do these countries 
have guaranteed access to the European Parliament or their committees, 
although there might be informal possibilities based on goodwill or via 
hearings. Occasionally, this lack of access to the EU legislator, where they 
could alert these bodies to take into account specific aspects important for 
the EEA-3, can be very frustrating for EEA-3 diplomats or ministers. All 
that is desired is an opportunity to be consulted, to help ‘shape’ legislation 
that, later, they will have to incorporate in any event.  
Some accommodation on the part of the EU would appear to accord 
well with the unique depth and quasi-automaticity of the EEA. It is also 
hard to argue convincingly that ‘decision-shaping’ should concern solely 
proposals and not the very decisions that matter in the final analysis. So far, 
the EU has been deaf about ideas to turn ‘proposal-shaping’ into genuine 
‘decision-shaping’.178 Indeed, the Commission’s EEA Review does not even 
mention this issue. Here, the EU seems not to behave as the benign 
hegemon. The typical response, if ever the question is addressed, is that the 
EEA-3 are ‘third countries’ as far as Council and the EP are concerned. Why 
can’t these organs, once the (EEA-relevant) issues are pressing enough, give 
a hearing to the EEA-3? Outside the EEA-3, there are no ‘third countries’ 
with anywhere near the same obligations about internal market legislation. 
Again, the question arises whether this can be accomplished pragmatically 
under a status quo-plus approach or whether to go the route of an 
                                                   
177 Case E-16/11 of 28 January 2013 (see 
www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/16_11_Judgment.pdf).  
178 With one exception: Schengen. In Schengen issues, the EEA-3 countries have a 
seat at the table, without a vote of course. See section 3.3.2.  
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amendment of the EEA Agreement. The latter makes the problem heavier 
and tougher to solve than clever accommodation under a pragmatic 
approach. One suggestion is to consider Memoranda of Understanding 
between the Council, respectively the European Parliament, and the EEA-3, 
with practical solutions for relatively important issues, without jamming 
the system for every individual EU legal act.  
5.4 More EEA, via (non-EU) enlargement 
At the moment, the EEA is meant for EU and EFTA countries. Legally, 
there is a subtlety in Art. 128, EEA: it says that EFTA members “may 
apply”. New EU member states must become members of the EEA. Strictly, 
it does not say that non-EFTA non-EU countries cannot apply or are 
excluded. Nevertheless, the factual reading nowadays is clearly that the 
EEA is an exclusive club, unless Art. 128 is amended. The Commission’s 
EEA Review says “that, de facto, participation in the Agreement is open 
exclusively to the only remaining EFTA member Switzerland” (p. 17). 
There have also been informal suggestions from the EEA-3 that they 
consider the EEA as ‘theirs’ and would resist new members other than 
Switzerland. With the functional and more open debate on the AMS, given 
the Commission’s options paper of November 2012, these informal 
objections are now being transformed into conditionalities such as 
administrative capacity and other qualities, which may open the door to 
enlargement. 
Initially EFTA was a club of seven countries, which most probably 
fulfilled all EU membership criteria, but were (at first or are still) not 
willing to join the EU. The number reduced to only three by the mid-1990s. 
Due to sequencing, the EU offer stood even when the number of countries 
and indeed the total population of the non-EU EEA fell sharply. However, 
during the negotiations, the EEA turned out to emerge as a complex 
organisation, legally and institutionally. It needed this structure to 
accommodate the wishes of the EFTA countries (sovereignty) and the EU 
(international surveillance, independent court, homogeneity) alike. One 
might be forgiven for thinking that, for reasons of complexity alone, the 
EEA-3 might welcome enlargement, since a larger size of the group would 
better justify the intricate structures of the EEA. Indeed, imagine for a 
moment that Switzerland would join the EEA-3 after all, and remembering 
that it was often Switzerland in the early 1990s that insisted on procedures 
entailing complexity in the EEA-to-be in order to bolster the domestic 
political legitimacy for a later referendum, it would surely be welcomed by 
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the EU, as it would make all the EEA efforts for the Union more 
worthwhile. 
Nevertheless, after the sharp decline in non-EU EEA membership, a 
curious reversal has taken place. In 1989, it was the EU side offering this 
exclusive deal to its closest trading partners and direct neighbours, but 
nowadays it is the EFTA resisting enlargement. In the 2010 report on EU 
policy,179 the Swiss federal government held that an enlargement of EFTA, 
a precondition for EEA membership, is not on the table and might never be. 
Of course, if the EEA-30 wants to change the EEA Agreement and open up 
to other candidates, Switzerland is irrelevant. In the absence of a treaty 
change, however, and interpreting Art. 128 as is usually done, the Swiss 
attitude would block any EEA enlargement other than Swiss EEA 
membership! Today, the question is whether the Commission’s EEA 
Review has not shifted the goalposts. The Review sees “… some merit for 
engaging in further reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of 
enlarging … the geographical coverage of the EEA” (p. 17). For this issue, 
the EU being roughly 100 times the size of the EEA-3, matters a great deal: 
it is the large and prosperous EU’s internal market that other countries are 
interested in and the EEA model could perhaps be one option for other 
countries to obtain good access.  
But which non-EU candidate countries would wish to join the EEA? 
One might envisage the following, depending on one’s willingness to 
include less or more far-fetched scenarios: Switzerland, AMS countries, 
Turkey, a few more advanced countries in the wider EU ‘neighbourhood’ 
like eventually Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova, or, in case the UK (without 
Scotland) would say ‘yes’ to a referendum (in 2017) exiting the EU, possibly 
Great Britain. As long as Switzerland would be the one and single country 
joining the EEA-3, there is no problem whatsoever. Quite the contrary, as 
an EFTA member it could join right away and, as noted, the EU would 
welcome it, because it would solve the problems with Switzerland as 
specified in section 4.4 and render the heavy EEA structure more justifiable. 
In addition, it would simplify a number of issues of relations between 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Today the probability of the Swiss joining 
the EEA is very low. This position might change only if there were 
sufficiently important changes in their strategic environment, or, perhaps, 
if the EU might eventually be fed up with the reticence of Switzerland to 
                                                   
179 Government of Switzerland (2010, p. 7265). 
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accommodate the four demands (4.3) as specified in the December 2010 
Council Conclusions and respond more fiercely vis-à-vis Switzerland. 
For all other countries mentioned, it is a good deal more complicated. 
The core question for them is whether they would be willing and capable. 
First, some remarks on willingness. It is most doubtful, to put it mildly, 
whether the UK would be politically prepared to join the EEA, although 
the country would surely wish to remain ‘in’ the internal market in one 
way or another. The overwhelming reason is ‘political legitimacy’. The EU 
has a considerable degree of political legitimacy with its direct and indirect 
representation in the Council and the European Parliament, by virtue of 
being regarded as the decisive European integration project pre-empting 
war in Europe (confirmed by the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012), by countries’ 
right to vote and by the benefits of a common (though relatively small) 
budget. EEA membership has none of those features. It is an indirect 
alignment of national policy with the EU’s internal market, with limited 
rights to ‘shape’ policy and a quasi-obligation to take over new acquis. 
Great Britain going into the EEA would also mean that there is no 
representation of its people, unlike the direct elections for the European 
Parliament and the indirect representation via the Council of Ministers. 
One might perhaps argue that the EU does not have enough political 
legitimacy, but moving from the EU to the EEA would certainly amount to 
a major setback in this regard.180 
As noted before and underscored in the literature on the EEA, 
including the recent Norwegian assessment report on the EEA,181 countries 
like the EEA-3 make a political choice to accept this in exchange for joining 
the internal market, merely on the basis of ‘policy-shaping’. This choice 
made by relatively small European countries having very important 
economic links with the EU is not so strange, if one remembers the setting 
around 1990-91. The Maastricht Treaty was about to introduce even more 
qualified majority voting (QMV) on internal market subjects (than the 
Single European Act). This matters most for small countries, fearing an 
uphill struggle to engineer a blocking minority for issues, which are really 
crucial for them. Thus, their rationale amounted to: if you can easily be 
outvoted even as an EU member, the EEA construct – with its quasi-
                                                   
180 Prime Minister Cameron, in his speech of 23 January 2013, firmly rejected the 
EEA option. See 5.5. 
181 See Norwegian EEA Review Committee (2012). 
114  THINK STRATEGY: ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR LIECHTENSTEIN 
obligation to implement the internal market acquis anyway – is acceptable 
too. But the UK (perhaps without Scotland) is unlikely to see it that way. 
Reasons might include the mere size of the country (easier to engineer a 
blocking minority or prompt changes in draft directives/regulations), 40 
years of experience in the EU with decision-making, and the exit provision 
in the EU Treaty182 referring to ‘negotiations’ between the EU and the 
exiting country, say, on retaining market access under a new arrangement. 
Such reasons strongly suggest the option of a bilateral agreement between 
the EU and the UK discussed in 5.7.  
Turkey, a candidate for EU membership since 1999, refuses to 
consider any ‘other’ arrangement than fully-fledged EU membership. Their 
logic is unassailable. How can one consider the EEA or any ‘privileged 
partnership’, a term sometimes used by politicians sceptical of Turkish EU 
membership but at best ill-defined, if one has officially been recognised as a 
candidate for the EU and receives all the treatment (and pre-accession 
funds) that comes with the candidature? From a strategic perspective, 
however, the Turkish position is less credible. As shown in detail in Böhler, 
Pelkmans & Selçuki (2012b), the Turks have made little progress on the 
adoption of the acquis as measured in the annual progress reports (and this 
after no less than 14 years), there is stagnation in the progress towards the 
political Copenhagen criteria and the Cyprus issue has remained blocked. 
Moreover, even if Turkey would accelerate the work and fulfil all tasks 
under pre-accession in the next few years, there is a serious risk that one or 
the other national referendum would reject Turkish membership. In that 
event, Turkey might eventually opt for the EEA. Böhler, Pelkmans & 
Selçuki show that this would not be a good idea because the 
implementation and enforcement demands of the EEA are very high 
indeed and it is doubtful whether Turkey would be ready soon enough to 
live up to these requirements. Moreover, the EEA has never been 
politicised, which is one of the reasons why this construct works so well. A 
big country like Turkey, soon with a larger population than any EU 
country, and expected to experience a range of adjustment problems to the 
proper application of the internal market acquis, would be tempted time 
and again to turn sensitive issues into negotiations during the decision-
shaping or later, in the EFTA Standing and the EEA Joint Committee, about 
delays, exceptions or other aspects. This would change the EEA into a less-
than-functional mechanism and its smoothness would be lost. The current 
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EU objections183 about the backlog of the EEA-3 and the irritation about the 
tactical (mis)use of procedural twists for reasons of domestic political 
sensitivity would probably be greatly magnified once politicisation by 
Turkey would become a perennial EEA problem. Such a prospect would 
seem to be unacceptable to the EEA-3, too. It is much to be preferred to 
conclude a bilateral agreement with Turkey (5.7).  
As to the other countries mentioned above, only one AMS country 
has expressed a clear willingness to join the EU (San Marino), whereas both 
San Marino and Andorra have expressed an interest in joining the EEA. 
The Commission’s options paper184 considers joining the EEA as a ‘viable’ 
option. However, the paper takes for granted that the AMS would have to 
become an EFTA member and that the EU “would need to discuss with 
existing members … [and] ... Switzerland the possibility of enlarging EFTA 
to small-sized countries”. To give Switzerland such a strong position in 
finding a good market integration arrangement for the AMS in the EEA (of 
which the Swiss are not even a member) is remarkable, to say the least. The 
Commission’s EEA review of only three weeks later, however, speaks 
openly about amending the EEA Agreement and allowing non-EFTA 
countries into the EEA. For Liechtenstein, having itself gone through a 
rapid adjustment and quick acquis adoption at the time, the critical issue 
with an AMS country coming into the EEA is likely to be that the good 
functioning of the EEA Agreement is guaranteed. This would be important 
irrespective of whether one speaks about the substance of the acquis 
adopted, the smooth incorporation of new EU legal acts or proper 
enforcement. On monitoring and enforcement, the favourable experience of 
the EEA EFTA bodies ESA and the EFTA Court should be helpful in this 
respect. It is noteworthy that the options paper nowhere emphasises that 
there is an issue of administrative capacity and appreciable administrative 
costs of the internal market-minus that AMS would incur. Altogether, one 
can reasonably expect that accession to the EEA would take some time in 
order to ensure that the EEA remains as solid as it is today.  
Neighbourhood countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova all 
express long-run visions about EU membership but the authors are not 
aware of any position on their possible membership of the EEA.  
                                                   
183 See the Commission’s EEA Review (European Commission, 2012a). 
184 See COM (2012) 680, European Commission (2012c p. 17). 
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When speaking about capacity, rather than willingness, of 
‘prospective’ EEA members to implement and properly enforce the acquis, 
there is no doubt about Switzerland. But this conviction is less certain for 
AMS countries. To begin with, the current status of acquis adoption in the 
AMS is incomparably less ambitious than for the EEA-3 and, moreover, 
they have no experience with surveillance and EU (or EFTA Court’s) case 
law. These countries would first have to catch up for years on the existing 
internal market acquis, with some kind of ‘pre-accession’ reporting and 
assistance on jurisprudence (etc.), before they could enter the EEA. They 
would have to demonstrate sufficient administrative capacity to deal with 
the steady stream of new acquis (not to speak of the adoption of existing 
acquis). All three are relatively rich countries and this might help. 
Nevertheless, their economic structures are somewhat one-sided, in 
different ways (see Table 1 in 4.6) and this might hinder the absorption of 
the acquis in selective areas. Therefore, quite apart from willingness, there 
are issues about capacity that require time to adjust and ‘learn’, assuming a 
determination to reach the performance now accomplished by the EEA-3. 
Capacity issues are probably more serious in countries such as Turkey 
(although this aspect is seemingly improving), and nothing less than 
profoundly problematic for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. In the medium 
run, it is thus not possible for the latter three countries to join the EEA, 
irrespective of their willingness and irrespective of the problem of prior 
EFTA membership.  
Finally, a prospective enlargement of the EEA (beyond Switzerland) 
is hard to envisage without a revision of the EEA Agreement. As section 4.3 
already suggested, this might open a Pandora’s box and it will be essential 
to contain this tendency by a strict and limited mandate for treaty revision 
allowing enlargement without going through EFTA. The problem for the 
EU strategy will then be whether the EU wants to be saddled with 
(perhaps) a series of EEA look-alikes (5.5) or propose an amendment of the 
treaty. Of course, an amendment of the EEA Agreement with respect to 
enlargement does not automatically imply that candidates other than 
Switzerland would end up in the EEA: they might still prefer an EEA look-
alike tailored for them and the EU choice is whether this is, on balance, the 
least-unattractive solution.  
5.5 EEA-bis and EEA look-alikes 
For ‘prospective’ EEA candidates like the AMS countries (or, at least, some 
of them), Switzerland and in future perhaps Turkey and/or some 
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neighbourhood countries, an alternative with slight differentiation amongst 
them are new EEA look-alikes, sometimes called EEA-bis (e.g. AMS), EEA-
tris (e.g. Switzerland) and so on. An even more speculative note might 
suggest some special EEA-like arrangement for the UK to stay in the 
internal market, if the country were to leave the EU. A hesitant beginning 
of the debate in the UK has been intensified by the UK government’s 
commitment to engage in a cost/benefit review of UK EU membership 
which is underway.185 The Government’s review will “... be comprehensive, 
evidence-based and analytical” (Ibid.). Even though the widespread 
perception in and outside Britain is that the Review, analytical or not, has 
to be seen against the background of a highly political, often deeply 
misinformed debate in the country, the initiative was welcomed as an 
attempt to shed more light, provide facts and proper analysis on the 
question of Britain’s EU membership. All this changed radically with Prime 
Minister Cameron’s speech on 23 January 2013 promising an ‘in/out 
referendum’ in 2017 if the Conservatives win the next elections. In that 
speech, the Prime Minister pledged to campaign in the ‘yes’ camp. 
Interestingly, he denounced the EEA option, held as an alternative option 
for Britain by some radical eurosceptics. Nevertheless, from now on, any 
reflection on possible changes of Liechtenstein’s strategic environment can 
no longer dismiss the possibility that the UK might exit the EU and 
consider an EEA look-alike, or perhaps even the EEA itself. A perceptive, 
though quite speculative reflection on the UK’s options upon exit, in 
particular the EEA, has been published by David Buchan (2012) who goes 
as far as to ponder about a new “single market club with the UK, Norway 
and Switzerland” (conveniently ignoring Liechtenstein in both his analysis 
                                                   
185 Although it is widely appreciated that this review is instigated by the political 
turmoil in the UK on EU membership, the official title is: “Government review of 
the balance of competences between the UK and the EU”. The UK Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) (in charge of the Internal Market part of the 
review) writes: “[the] review will provide an analysis of what the UK’s 
membership of the EU means for the UK national interest. It will not be tasked 
with producing specific recommendations, and will not prejudge future policy or 
look at alternative models for Britain’s overall relationship with the EU. It aims to 
deepen public and Parliamentary understanding of the nature of our EU 
membership and provide a constructive and serious contribution to the national 
and wider European debate about modernizing, reforming and improving the EU 
in the face of collective challenges.” (Source: Dept of BIS Call for Evidence, 
November 2012.) 
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and conclusions) outside the EU. However, Buchan clearly sees how 
difficult it will be to opt for a ‘static’ agreement, without either becoming 
dynamic in substance (which the EEA is) or eventually breaking down, 
given that ambitions may grow too far apart.  
The two-fold essence of EEA look-alikes is likely to be found in a) the 
four conditions specified for Switzerland in December 2010 (see 4.4) and b) 
a very far-reaching adoption of the initial Internal Market acquis. In both (a) 
and (b) one could envisage some (probably few) limitations. Once these 
conditions would be fulfilled, one can ask the question why not accede to 
the EEA (see 5.4)? If the sticking point would be the lack of political 
legitimacy of ‘decision-shaping’, it scarcely explains the insistence on 
separate arrangements because any EEA-bis, or EEA-tris, etc., would have 
no more influence than the present EEA-3 members. If the sticking point is 
found, rather, in special deals yielding a more selective adoption of the 
internal market, one arrives at the problem of Switzerland’s bilaterals with 
the EU. On the sectoral or ‘salami-type’ approach, the EU has clearly 
crossed the Rubicon of declaring this as too much à-la-carte. True, in the 
Swiss case, the four conditions in (a) are not fulfilled; if they were, the EU 
would accept some (though rather modest) degree of à-la-carte given the 
historical legacy of the bilaterals with the Swiss. In practice, however, 
Switzerland is much closer in internal market substance and application of 
the relevant EU acquis inside Switzerland to the EEA than is often realised. 
However, it is doubtful whether the EU would accept, in any new EEA 
look-alike, more than a few and marginal limitations. Thus, one should 
expect new negotiations on EEA look-alikes to fail if countries would seek 
to tinker with all three conditions. Such a failure would imply a starker 
political choice for the EU’s negotiating partners between a genuine EEA-
bis, with all that it takes, or accession to the EEA (5.4) or, a more à-la-carte 
bilateral that, presumably, does not give full access to the EU Internal 
Market (see 5.7).  
One should also not forget that EEA look-alikes have very different 
implications depending on what countries one focuses. For AMS countries 
and Turkey, an EEA-bis would mean a massive adoption of Internal 
Market acquis, presumably largely before the agreement would come into 
force. Both the AMS and Turkey have customs unions with the EU 
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(Monaco with France), which may help,186 but the 21 chapters (out of 35 ; 
and not counting agriculture and fisheries) of any EU membership 
negotiation which cover the internal market are rich in regulatory acquis 
and entail many technical areas. Turkey is somewhat ahead, despite its 
failure, so far, to adopt many relevant acquis chapters, because the 1995 
Customs Union agreement contains annexes with a large technical 
harmonisation acquis and links to European standards where relevant for 
the new approach. Turkey has become a fully-fledged member of 
CEN/CENELEC (in 2010) writing these European standards.  
Switzerland, on the other hand, would be capable of having ‘its own’ 
EEA-bis in a few years time if it would be willing. The famous four 
institutional conditions (item a, above) would probably take some time (as 
well as institutional negotiations) and important gaps in the existing 
bilaterals – the most prominent is undoubtedly the EU acquis in banking 
and insurance – would have to be filled. However, this prospect cannot be 
discussed without wondering why Switzerland would not opt for the EEA 
itself (5.4).  
The UK would, however, find itself in yet another class. If the EEA-
bis for the UK would be reminiscent of the EEA, even though the overlap 
would be incomplete,187 the UK would drastically reduce the EU acquis it 
would apply. Apart from the non-internal market acquis (perhaps partially 
solvable via cooperation), agriculture and fisheries, it would ‘lose’ both the 
indirect (VAT, excise duties) and direct taxation acquis. Since the EEA-bis is 
likely to be a free trade area, it will also start facing tariffs which can be 
costly for the UK where peaks exist. If it would maintain a customs union 
with the EU, it would have to ensure sufficient negotiation power when the 
EU employs its trade policy bilaterally and multilaterally. The UK might 
attempt to retain some residual power in a few (single market) areas, 
although the EU is unlikely to grant the country much as it would 
undermine a sufficient degree of homogeneity, a condition to grant full 
access to the Internal Market. Also, the dynamic adoption of new EU 
                                                   
186 One reason why an EEA-bis might be preferred above the EEA is that the latter 
is a free trade area; combining this with customs unions might generate 
complications. 
187 As an example, eurosceptic Conservatives or the UKIP politicians often insist 
that, in their view, the environmental acquis and that of labour market regulation 
do not really ‘belong’ to the Internal Market, and should be ‘returned’ to Britain. 
This would apply to the EEA or EEA-bis as well.  
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Internal Market acquis into British domestic law might be subject to a kind 
of ‘nuclear option’ and it is possible that the Brits might obtain more 
discretion here. Nevertheless, this pretty daunting scenario clarifies how 
stark the choices are when the UK begins to reflect on EU exit and the 
follow-up (e.g. in an EEA-bis).  
The AMS countries have, realistically, only two options in the short to 
medium run: one is an EEA look-alike called a single ‘Framework 
Association Agreement’ (FAA)188 for the three and the other consists of 
participation in the EEA (see 5.4). The longer-run option of EU membership 
(discussed in 5.10) is not dismissed out of hand by the Commission. The 
FAA is a single framework; the Commission rejects separate bilateral 
agreements with each one of them, for reasons of complexity and 
unnecessary differentiation. This might lead to a problem because, at the 
moment, only San Marino clearly favours EU membership or, as a fall-back 
option, the EEA or an EEA look-alike. Monaco, given its profound 
integration with France, is only keen to solve a number of specific 
drawbacks of its current predicament. Andorra assumes an intermediate 
position but has not published a detailed strategy or position. It is therefore 
far from certain whether an FAA would be conceived for more than one 
country of the three. According to the Commission, the substance and 
institutional arrangements (e.g. decision-shaping and observers in EU 
programmes and agencies) of the FAA are analogous to, but not the same 
as in the EEA, given the small size of the countries. The conditions that 
Switzerland would have to fulfil are echoed in the options paper, with the 
proviso that monitoring and enforcement of the acquis might be assumed 
either by the Commission and the CJEU, or the EEA EFTA institutions 
(ESA, EFTA Court) or an ad-hoc supranational authority.  
5.6 Less EEA, reducing scope or membership 
A detached view of the EEA will have to recognise that, despite the praise 
from the EU, the EEA has never been popular. During the negotiations and 
in the short episode before the effective beginning of the EEA, most non-EU 
countries involved applied for EU membership: Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
Austria and Switzerland. A Swiss referendum on the EEA – pending the 
application for EU membership – demonstrated that the political legitimacy 
                                                   
188 By the Commission in its options paper on the AMS. See European Commission, 
2012c.  
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of the EEA for non-EU countries is problematic. In Norway, the initial 
acceptance of the EEA, after the ‘no’ vote in the 1994 referendum about 
joining the EU, has been eroding recently. In Austria, Sweden and Finland, 
the EEA was seen as a waiting room or perhaps as fallback option. In 
Iceland, the longstanding rationale of joining the EEA was a function of the 
sensitivity about the EU fisheries policy and to some extent agriculture, but 
these sensitivities would seem to run less deep today (given reforms in 
both these EU policies), resulting in renewed criticism about the lack of 
political legitimacy of the EEA. For all these reasons, it is sensible to reflect 
on the possibility of ‘less EEA’, whether in substance or in the number of 
(non-EU) members.  
The scope of the EEA agreement is based on the appreciation of the 
Internal Market as it stood at the beginning of the 1990s. This concept of 
Internal Market has considerably evolved and is still in flux today. As a 
consequence, the substantive content of the EEA is also evolving, keeping 
up with its foundation, the Internal Market. 
The more integrated the Internal Market becomes, the more it touches 
upon more sensitive issues of sovereignty and self-determination (network 
industries, taxation, judicial cooperation, European civil law, company law, 
financial services, banking supervision and resolution as well as the 
question of EU Agencies). The internal market as it stood in the early 1990s 
was already fairly ‘deep’ and ‘wide’ in scope. Still, a plethora of barriers 
and distortions could be found in a series of markets and much deepening 
and some widening of scope has since taken place. Over the last 15 years, 
the EU has undergone several constitutional changes, was hit by what has 
now become the ‘Great Recession’ (financial and banking crisis, sovereign 
debt, economic downturn), saw the introduction of the euro and is 
debating an ambitious new deepening of the eurozone and some aspects of 
the internal market in its wake. One can seriously wonder whether the 
Internal Market meanwhile accomplished, not to speak of the further 
rounds of deepening the EU is now preparing, is what the EFTA countries 
signed up to in Oporto in 1992. 
Could the EEA’s substance be limited or reduced and would this be a 
possible political stabiliser in countries like Norway and Iceland? On the 
basis of today’s EEA, founded on the idea of homogeneity and the full 
adoption of the cross-border free movement plus the right of establishment 
and all the EU regulation that goes with it, it is neither possible to limit or 
reduce its substance from the past, nor (more than marginally) the new 
acquis forthcoming in future. This homogeneity cannot be provided on a 
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voluntary basis as the Swiss example of ‘autonomer Nachvollzug’ shows. The 
EU is only willing to fully accept national legislation of a third country as 
compliant with EU law if the latter is under surveillance and judicial 
review by independent internal bodies. It could also not work easily via 
permanent derogations. Permanent and substantive derogations (the 
Liechtenstein special arrangement with regard to persons is technically not 
permanent) for single EEA countries are very rare and individual 
arrangements with regard to additional acquis for single EEA member 
states are not possible in the current EEA. Thus, if an EEA-3 country would 
want to ‘opt in’ with regard to a certain aspect of the Internal Market, it has 
to do so bilaterally (see section 5.7), unless an individual opt-in by certain 
EEA EFTA states would be agreed within the EEA. But a bilateral approach 
might have a drawback: the single EEA country would be exposed to the 
powerful EU leverage in bilateral negotiations, unlike in the EEA legal 
system, which excludes leverage on a diplomatic level and replaces it by a 
legal system equal for all. For the EU, a limitation or opt-outs of the internal 
market acquis under the EEA is thoroughly unattractive: it already finds the 
EEA heavy going and if this special arrangement would no longer deliver 
homogeneity, the EU might lose interest.  
What about fewer EEA members? The obvious example is of course 
the case of Iceland having applied for EU membership (see 4.5). This 
instance of ‘less EEA’ is presumably viable if institutional adaptations are 
agreed. The adjacent box provides a 
few suggestions of such adaptations. 
The box contains changes of critical 
positions or their nationality, a quest 
for simplification and exceptions to 
the single-voice principle which is 
compulsory for the EFTA side of the 
EEA. The first two alterations should 
not be too difficult, if parties are 
constructive. The third one can be 
interpreted as a protection for 
Liechtenstein against the (relative) 
dominance of Norway in EEA-2. 
One idea could be that, as a rule, the 
principle would be maintained, 
because otherwise the EU might as well go for bilaterals. However, if 
disagreement in the EEA-2 would linger too long, the EU could be 
consulted and if there are no major objections of substance, the EEA-2 
Possible technical adaptation for 
an EEA-2 
 A third ESA member, 
without EEA-2 nationality 
 The actual nomination of the 
third EFTA Court judge 
 Simplification of the EEA 
decision-making procedure 
in the light of just two 
contracting parties, e.g. 
committee structure 
 Softening of the ‘single-voice’ 
principle for the EEA-2 
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could ‘agree to disagree’ and support the one country willing to take over 
the relevant EU act. In effect, this would mean that the country agreeing 
with the EU would escape an Art. 102 procedure. As noted below, this is 
one remedy for coping with a likely Norwegian ‘hegemony’ in the EEA-2.  
Both the Norway EEA Review and the Commission’s EEA Review 
insist on ‘rebuilding’ the EFTA-EEA pillar once it would become clear that 
Iceland would join the EU. However, it is anything but certain whether or 
not Iceland will, in fact, leave the EEA-3 for the EU. In case Iceland would 
leave, the EEA can continue with two countries, with the re-arrangements 
as suggested. Nevertheless, for Liechtenstein, there is a tactical issue in an 
EEA for only two non-EU members. The EEA-2 would be dominated by 
Norway even more than the EEA-3 is today. This is potentially a source of 
occasional problems because the two countries not only differ radically in 
size, but also have rather divergent economic and business interests, based 
on distinct forms of economic specialisation and resources. We have 
already quoted a source from the EU circuit in Brussels recommending 
Liechtenstein “to find a new friend”, referring to the combination of diverse 
interests and vast difference in size as well as resources in an EEA-2, 
making it impossible to avoid conflicts forever. Norway has already earned 
a reputation of occasionally playing ‘big brother’ in the EEA-3.189 Moreover, 
there are also signals that – the good cooperation in the EEA-3 
notwithstanding – Liechtenstein is not much appreciated as a partner. Such 
signals are usually covert or given in closed circles. However, the Norway 
EEA Review (2012) is very frank about it: 
The alliance with Liechtenstein is quite simply bizarre – a small 
principality in the Alps with 35,000 inhabitants, close connections 
to Switzerland, a tradition of being a tax haven, and a political 
system of governance that has been criticised by the Council of 
Europe for not living up to modern democratic standards. This is a 
state that has other priorities and interests than Norway.” (p. 10, 
ch. 27) 
To the extent that this is suspected to be an issue of potential concern, 
the query is whether Liechtenstein has any alternative option. In the 
                                                   
189 The Norwegian EEA Review Committee (2012) puts it as follows: “This [the 
EEA ] is the only organisation in which Norway is a superpower, having a certain 
effect on Norway’s self-image, extending so far as Norway viewing this as a 
‘Norwegian’ model, and not always treating its two fellow EFTA partners as fully 
equal cohorts in a common endeavour” (ch. 27, p. 11). 
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extreme, the country could think of one or more new EEA members to 
ensure greater diversity and balance in the non-EU EEA. Exceptions to the 
‘single-voice’ principle are a modest remedy as well.  
5.7 Bilateral routes to the single market-minus 
The EEA is a integration agreement, built on the acquis of the Internal 
Market of the EU. The EEA is not open to special arrangements, negotiated 
exemptions and traditional commercial diplomacy negotiations that are so 
common under (bilateral or regional) trade agreements. Hence, all EEA 
countries have to adopt the same legislation, except in very rare cases. 
Specific requests or arrangements are not acceptable as a rule, whether they 
arise from ‘less EEA’ or ‘more EEA’. 
With the EU membership application of Iceland, the EEA-3 might 
shrink to the EEA-2. As noted, this is still viable on the condition of certain 
re-arrangements. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude that either Norway or 
Liechtenstein might eventually have second thoughts, even though this is 
not the case at the moment. Whenever this hesitation might emerge, the 
option of a bilateral rearrangement of the current Internal Market-minus 
acquis will have to be considered.  
Such a ‘bilateralisation’ of the EEA, however, is likely to have serious 
drawbacks, although there are also some positive aspects. 
First of all, as explained above, the EEA creates a legal order. This 
order provides for rights and obligations of each contracting party. 
Disputes are not settled on the negotiation table (e.g. as with Switzerland) 
but, in the last instance, before the EU or EFTA court. Political and 
economic leverage of the parties involved in a dispute are reduced to a 
minimum because the interpretation of the (EEA) treaty and EU case law 
does not depend on size or influence. In fact, there is no such thing as a 
‘dispute’ between countries: country A or B infringes EU-EEA law or not. A 
bilateral agreement for each one of the EEA-3 cannot provide for the same 
institutional and legal set-up as the EEA. It is crucial to appreciate that 
three bilateral agreements (one for each EEA-3 country with the EU) could 
not function with the current ESA and EFTA court system, as they would 
not create a single legal order, in which adjudication is feasible, but 
separate agreements with different approaches to interpretation and most 
probably somewhat different substantial content. If the EEA-3 would 
decide to switch from the regional approach to bilaterals, they would lose 
the protection of this legal system. 
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The point should be well understood. It is certainly not the case that 
leverage in negotiations is invariably used and that EEA parties often 
engage in confrontational negotiations. Quite the contrary, relations in the 
EEA-30 are cordial and negotiations frequently low key as well as 
functional. In functional approaches, a common legal system is still helpful 
but not essential. However, a legal order is precious and valuable, precisely 
when interests are sensitive and/or once frictions become politicised (say, 
in domestic politics). A telling example is the debate in 2004 about the EU-
Swiss Freedom of Movement agreement. The EU openly threatened to 
cancel all seven agreements (Bilateral I, see Annex VII) if Switzerland 
would not ratify the persons agreement. With regard to Liechtenstein, it is 
good to remember that the Principality was not allowed to participate in 
Schengen unless it would ratify an agreement on taxation of savings (based 
on a 2003 EU Directive but falling outside the EEA), a then sensitive issue 
in Liechtenstein domestic politics. Yet another example concerns 
Switzerland once again. When the EU introduced the ’24-hour rule’,190 the 
current Swiss-EU agreements did not provide for a Swiss exemption from 
this new measure. The consequences for trade between Switzerland and the 
EU would have been severe if every single lorry would have to lodge Entry 
Summary Declarations. A solution was found and the problem 
disappeared as fast as it surfaced. Curiously, there was little media 
coverage about the EU-Swiss road transport agreement, signed to solve a 
similar issue. The latter agreement implies automatic Swiss adoption of EU 
acquis in road transport whereas non-compliance may result in the 
suspension of the entire agreement. Knowing the Swiss resistance against 
automatic take-over of EU acquis, one begins to appreciate how much 
pressure was exerted on Switzerland to sign this agreement. 
A fourth example involving Iceland and Norway is their Schengen 
association of 1999. The Nordic Passport Union had provided for the free 
movement of persons amongst its members for decades. Swedish and 
                                                   
190 EU Regulation 1875/2006 requires, as a general principle, that all goods brought 
into the customs territory of the Community, regardless of their final destination, 
shall be covered by an Entry Summary Declaration (ENS), which should be lodged 
at the customs office of first entry, i.e. the first intended port of call within the 
customs territory of the Community. The ENS must be lodged at the customs office 
24 hours before the goods are brought into the customs territory of the 
Community; in the case of deep sea containerised traffic, the ENS is to be lodged 
before loading in the foreign load port. 
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Finnish EU Schengen (EU) membership however would have marked an 
end to this free movement, unless additional agreements with Norway and 
Iceland would be concluded. The final outcome was one association 
agreement, which, similar to the EU-Swiss road transport agreement of 
2008, provides for the automatic taking over of all (!) EU acquis in 
Schengen-type issues, without any decision-making power for Norway or 
Iceland. Again, the consequence of non-compliance is the 
suspension/termination of the entire agreement. 
The examples show the rule-setting power of the EU vis-à-vis smaller 
European countries. The Union behaves as a ‘regulatory hegemon’: you can 
benefit from the collective good we offer you, but solely under the same 
‘homogeneous’ regulatory regime. Whether this makes the EU a ‘benign’ 
hegemon or not hinges on one’s appreciation of the costs (no autonomy) 
and the benefits (e.g. full and guaranteed access to the Internal Market). 
The EU position is understandable, however. No third country is obliged to 
participate, but if it does, it is according to the rules of the EU. These rules 
are cemented into bilateral agreements, with clauses suspending entire 
agreements in case of non-compliance (e.g. Switzerland). 
In contrast, the EEA agreement offers equal legal protection for all 
countries involved, as it provides for a legal system dealing with questions 
of compliance in the form of infringement of the treaty, in a similar way as 
within the EU. The EU did not have to do this. One can perceive it as the 
result of a forthcoming attitude of the EU vis-à-vis close and trusted 
neighbours, with the economic and political features of EEA EFTA 
countries. One could even argue that the EEA was not intended to last. 
Norway tried to join the EU twice (1972 and 1994), Switzerland submitted 
its EU application at the same time it signed the EEA Agreement, Iceland 
applied in 2009 for full EU membership. Liechtenstein is the only EEA-3 
country with no historical aspiration, so far, to join the EU and there would 
seem to be no such intention to do so in the near future.191 Moreover, the 
EU has never offered a similar agreement to any third country. 
From this perspective, if the EEA-3 would decide to bilateralise the 
EEA, it would appear as if they were throwing away a gift. If such a move 
is well considered, it is likely to emerge from the electorate’s perception of 
the costs, in the form of a lack of autonomy. Liechtenstein would be well 
                                                   
191 Interview conducted by the authors with His Serene Highness Hereditary 
Prince Alois von und zu Liechtenstein in June 2012. 
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advised to reflect about its implications. Thus, a bilateralisation is only 
likely to occur as the consequence of strategic developments such as 
Icelandic (or perhaps even Norwegian, eventually) EU accession, and/or a 
Norwegian switch to bilateralisation based on pressures from its electorate. 
If each EEA-3 country were left on its own, it goes without saying that 
Norway’s negotiation position – given its relative size, resources and vital 
importance for Europe’s energy security – is incomparably stronger than 
that of Liechtenstein. One form of mitigation one may imagine is a prior 
consensus in the entire EEA-30 that any bilateralisation would be based on 
the premise to maintain the EEA acquis and to employ legal rather than 
diplomatic resolution of suspected ‘infringements’. This still begs the 
question how to deal with future acquis, the takeover of ‘post-signature’ 
acquis. Thus, one cannot deny that some residual risk remains inevitable in 
a bilateralisation.  
A positive side of bilateralisation would be a more flexible approach 
in EU relations of the EEA-3. Liechtenstein would for example have the 
possibility (if the EU agrees) to get a permanent exemption for the free 
movement of persons, rather than today’s at least formally temporary one 
under the EEA. Every single country could arrange for specific packages of 
acquis, fitting their individual means. This could include more energy 
policy for Norway while finding exceptions in environmental policy (seal 
hunting e.g.). Liechtenstein could negotiate a package of market access in 
services with a special focus on financial services, possibly also including 
the EU tax rules in the Internal Market acquis.192 The latter is, however, 
                                                   
192 This domain is complicated, even without its technicality, and it is not possible, 
given the nature of this study, to elaborate. We merely note three aspects. First, the 
EU Internal Market does not ‘enjoy’ more than a truncated tax acquis, especially in 
corporate taxation. As noted earlier, endless modifications and ingenious 
exemptions of the corporate tax base in many EU countries have led to a deeply 
distorted system of corporate taxation in the single market where transfer pricing 
can still be profitable despite some disciplines and where corporate seats, at times 
the location of subsidiaries and postbox firms are heavily influenced by 
(competitive) tax (base) rules and informal agreements with authorities. Adopting 
the tax acquis is therefore at best a mixed blessing. Second, in a more formal 
perspective, one can wonder whether ‘soft law’ such as the EU Code of Conduct on 
harmful taxation belongs to the Internal Market acquis. Incorporation in the EEA 
(which is not the case at the moment) would make it binding for the EEA-3, a 
rather odd consequence. Third, Liechtenstein might be interested in incorporating 
the tax acquis of the EU but it cannot do this in the EEA framework. At the outset of 
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unlikely to happen as not all EU member states might want another low-tax 
country in the EU market. Still, the constraints for bilateralisation are 
severe: too much heterogeneity will reduce and eventually terminate the 
EU’s willingness to act as a ‘benign’ regulatory hegemon.  
All in all, a bilateralisation would take away a unique property from 
the current EEA-3. It risks being a one-way street because going back to an 
integration agreement with a legal order is most unlikely, as the EU would 
never offer such a deal again. History never repeats itself literally. Today’s 
EU does not need to give away negotiation power anymore, and certainly 
not to a group of three countries which, even together, is rather small. One 
wonders what the EU would do in cases such as the UK (without 
Scotland?) and eventually, Turkey, if it is no longer a candidate. In the case 
of ‘Brexit’, one option for Britain is to negotiate a bilateral as Art. 50, EU 
suggests. There is no precedent, unless one would wish to regard the exit of 
Greenland in 1985 as such. It seems reasonable to expect that the UK 
(minus Scotland) would wish to maintain good access to the Internal 
Market. The UK minus Scotland is 11 times the size of the EEA-3 and it has 
a long history as an EU member. The problem is what EU countries would 
find acceptable. Judging by the reactions at the highest political level to 
David Cameron’s speech of 23 January 2013, EU countries will simply not 
allow the UK-minus to pick and choose from the overall EU acquis, single 
market or other domains. And this stance would apply to the current acquis 
as well as new acquis. The negotiations will therefore be far from easy. It is 
everybody’s guess today what might come out of them, but in any event 
one can be confident that a bilateral approach for Britain will be 
accomplished only at a high price. One can argue that Britain can choose 
between several options, a bilateral and the EEA (5.4), for instance. If the 
country would insist on its regulatory autonomy, a bilateral would be 
superior, yet the price will likely be significant differentiation and less 
smooth or plainly less access to the EU market, in particular with the 
dynamics of new acquis year after year.  
                                                                                                                                 
the EEA, it was decided that taxation was not ‘EEA-relevant’. One explanation of 
this curious interpretation is that unanimity in tax matters in the EU would lead 
the EU countries to have veto rights on each and every adaptation of already-
agreed EU tax rules, whereas the EEA-3 would simply have to accept them.  
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5.8 More EU, especially the single market 
The EU has demonstrated a remarkable ‘inner dynamics’ during the two 
decades since the EEA Agreement was signed. Recently, led by the 
eurozone and prompted by the deep and lingering budgetary and 
economic crisis, a further intensification of this ‘inner dynamics’ is taking 
place, in particular with respect to the ‘banking union’ proposals and 
possibly also the fiscal union ideas. Another area of slow but steady 
deepening is the internal market of network industries. In the following, it 
is assumed that the EU resolves the inevitable difficulties and sensitivities 
in the detailed regulatory regime and institutional arrangements of the EU 
banking union. It should be realised that the present study is a strategic 
study and not the place to enter into technicalities. Moreover, the detailed 
regulatory proposals by the Commission had not yet been published when 
the present study was finalised (late January 2013).  
More integrated banking regulation, culminating in a real EU 
banking union and the integration of fiscal policy at eurozone level are 
logical approaches to the present challenges of the EU and its member 
states.  
Introducing a banking union, with the ECB exercising fully-fledged 
supervision, gradually applicable to ever more banks in the EEA banking 
market over the next few years, is a very intrusive move with regard to 
national competences. Supervision can only be credibly and effectively 
exercised if the supervisory agency also has the power to regulate bank 
licences in case of a failure to live up to EU prudential and liquidity 
requirements, to recapitalise and/or restructure it and to seize control of a 
failing bank, if necessary for financial stability. The latter is called the ‘bank 
resolution function’: a seized bank will be fully taken over, including its 
management, it might be broken up in a ‘sound’ and a ‘bad’ bank, and the 
agency ought to have full access to funds to finance the temporary 
problems of the bad bank and/or liquidity for the entire bank. The idea is 
first to ensure that the EEA can trust its banks at all times. In addition, if 
banks have ‘systemic’ characteristics – perhaps “too big to fail” or highly 
networked with other financial institutions – it is critical to maintain trust 
and confidence in financial markets (fearing contagion towards other banks 
or financial institutions) by having the centralised power in the single 
market and the funds to credibly claim that financial stability will not be 
endangered. The banking union shifts these powers and the access to 
ample funds decisively from the national to the EU level, given the 
experience of the financial crisis since 2008 and the shortcomings of the 
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hopelessly fragmented and incomplete supervisory regime of the single 
banking market. The banking union therefore goes beyond the degree of 
centralisation in the previous reform of the EU’s supervision system, 
including the EBA. Since the EEA-3 already have serious problems 
incorporating the EBA regime, in particular because no EEA-3 
representation is (yet) foreseen in case EBA decisions would affect EEA-3 
banks, these problems are likely to be magnified in the case of the banking 
union.193 
A key point in the institutional structure of financial market 
regulation (and network industries) are EU agencies and their respective 
powers. The recent formation of a range of EU agencies is held back within 
the EU by the so-called ‘Meroni doctrine’. Because the degree of 
centralisation via EU agencies is contained, the EU Meroni doctrine also 
protects the EEA. The doctrine makes it constitutionally impossible for the 
EU legislator to create independent EU regulatory bodies, empowered to 
regulate certain economic sectors. The basic idea behind the Meroni 
doctrine194 is simple: the member states as founders of the European Union 
have delegated powers to the EU level by the EU and TFEU Treaties; the 
EU level cannot, in turn, delegate these powers to other (EU) bodies or 
organs without keeping sufficient control over final political or regulatory 
outcomes for which EU-level treaty institutions are responsible. In other 
words, if ‘independent regulatory agencies’ are found to be necessary at EU 
level, the Treaty has to be amended, with a ratification process. 
The European Council, in close coordination with the Commission 
and the ECB, has proposed an independent EU bank regulator/supervisor 
as the core of the ‘banking union’.195 This would plainly violate the Meroni 
doctrine, were it not that the proposal suggests locating the new EU 
supervisor in the ECB. The ECB is the only ‘independent EU agency’, 
thereby getting round the Meroni doctrine. This is only a sound solution if 
                                                   
193 When this study went to press (mid-February 2013), no negotiations between 
the EU and the EEA-3 had taken place on whether the EEA EFTA states could be 
given voting rights in case the event that decisions by the ECB supervisor would 
directly affect EEA-3 financial institutions. 
194 It should be noted that the doctrine is named after a rather peculiar 1956 ECSC 
court case. See Doutheille de la Rochere (2009) and Chamon (2012). It is the 
constitutional logic, and not so much the Meroni case itself, that really matters in 
the EU regulatory and governance debate. See also Griller & Orator (2010). 
195 See Van Rompuy (2012). 
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inside the ECB the monetary and the bank supervision functions are 
separated carefully, because there may be conflicts of interest. However, in 
doing so, it becomes next to impossible for the EEA-3 (and presumably, in 
any EEA-bis) to accept this for their banks in such a form. In fact, the 
current intra-EU debate is already controversial between the ‘ins’ and the 
‘outs’, and even within the eurozone. However, if central supervision and 
bank resolution would not apply to EU banks from some countries and 
indeed not to EEA-3 banks, the internal market for banking services risks 
being victimized as no longer ‘homogeneous’ in terms of strict and similar 
supervision. An important caveat to note is that, during the ongoing 
negotiations, a threshold of €30 billion balance sheet total, or (bank) assets 
of more than 20% of GDP, seems to have been agreed. This would concern 
some 200-300 banks. In any event, for each EU member state, the three 
largest banks always fall under ECB supervision, in addition to any bank 
receiving direct ESM support.196 
For Liechtenstein, it would mean that its banks would presumably 
not have to be part of the ECB supervisory system, at least not directly. 
Below this threshold, supervision would remain national, of course still 
based on EU rules, and, in future, on a common EU rule book. However, in 
case smaller banks evidence fragility, the ECB can still intervene and take 
over (national) supervision, but this has to be justified due to (say) weak 
solvability, etc. For Liechtenstein, this would mean that the current EBA 
arrangement (not yet agreed by the EEA-3, but in force in the EU) would be 
retained, except if a crisis situation would occur. However, the new rules 
have not yet been formally proposed by the Commission to the EU 
legislator (so, they might still be changed) and there are also suggestions 
that all banks in the EU would eventually fall under it, but at a later stage. 
With a non-homogeneous regime, the problems would only become visible 
once banks would get into difficulties.197 Without the new bank resolution 
                                                   
196 Although the ESM is originally meant for eurozone countries, as long as the 
common EU deposit insurance system has not been set up, it has been agreed that 
the ESM can also be used for bank resolution finance.  
197 This assumes that the ratings of banks by credit rating agencies (CRAs) would 
not differ solely due to SSM (the single supervisory mechanism of the ECB); much 
hinges on what strictness of supervision will be practiced by non-SSM countries, 
whether EU or EEA-3. 
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rules and EU funds,198 a near-failing (systemic) bank not under the ECB 
supervision and resolution regime will generate instability and possibly 
contagion and is likely to prompt the third-best solution of recourse to 
national state aids. For EEA countries to accept the single supervisory 
mechanism constitutionally, some ingenious form of proper representation 
and consultation will be required, at least whenever EEA-3 banks are 
directly or indirectly involved (see below). 
The EEA-3, participating fully within the EU market on financial 
services, are following these developments with anxiety. For the EEA 
Agreement does not transfer legislative powers to an international body 
and just transfers modest decision competences to ESA. Such an 
arrangement is necessary to protect the constitutional requirements of the 
EEA-3. For Iceland and Norway, it is very hard to imagine that they could 
accept an independent EU regulator with intrusive surveillance and 
resolution powers, regulating the internal financial market and especially 
every bank within it, or even only larger banks, including the EEA-3 
market. In the case of Liechtenstein, the political problem might be similar 
but at least the constitution would seem not to be in the way as long as 
some satisfactory form of participation and representation can be agreed. 
Non-participation in the ‘banking union’ scheme forces the countries 
concerned to ensure having pro-active and tough regulators, short of 
incurring a negative reputation effect. On the other side, participation 
would require most probably changes in the national constitutions of 
Norway and Iceland, followed by referenda, about whether a ‘third-
country’ body (the ECB) is allowed to exercise ultimate supervision and 
resolution powers over (some) national banks in the EEA-3. 
                                                   
198 Such bank rescue funds will eventually be built up by a new EU common 
deposit insurance system over time, and these funds should serve as the ultimate 
‘fiscal capacity’ for the regulator/supervisor in the ECB. However, proposals for a 
new EU common deposit insurance system should not be expected soon due to 
opposition e.g. from Germany. German cooperative and saving banks already have 
built up shared funds for calamities via their own deposit insurance system and 
are opposed in view of a perceived risk that their funds will eventually be 
mutualised at EU level. Absent common EU funds from a common deposit 
insurance scheme, at least for a while, it means that the ESM will have to back up 
any bank resolution for the time being. For a workable proposal on a European 
deposit insurance and resolution fund, see Schoenmaker & Gros (2012). 
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Perhaps this intrusiveness could be swallowed if representatives of 
the EEA-3 were allowed to sit on the board of the future regulator and vote. 
This however is not the case. In Opinion 1/92 the CJEU clearly prohibits 
the inclusion of third-country representatives with voting rights on EU 
matters within EU institutions, based on the protection of the independence 
of the EU legal order. This question requires careful reading, however. One 
needs to distinguish a) EU matters versus EEA-3 matters (or effects), and b) 
legislative versus administrative decisions. On (a), what is at stake for the 
EEA-3 are solely those decisions that affect mainly or entirely EEA-3 banks, 
not in the least decisions affecting mainly or entirely EU banks. In 
principle, that would seem compatible with the CJEU opinion. On (b), it 
goes without saying that the EEA-3 should never be involved in any way in 
EU legislative functions. But whenever administrative decisions directed to 
individual undertakings (say, an EEA-3 bank) or to specific national 
authorities are at stake, which clearly are ‘EEA-relevant’, it would seem to 
be compatible with the CJEU opinion; moreover, it is exceedingly hard to 
argue convincingly that a refusal of the EU to grant such ‘participation’ in 
the banking union (an essential part of the internal financial market acquis 
in future) is compatible with the purpose and spirit of the EEA Agreement 
and its functioning up until today. 
This challenge is a fundamental one for the EEA. It seems like an 
unsolvable dilemma: how to accommodate the apparent paradox of not 
being able to accept an independent EU regulator on national constitutional 
grounds without full participation, and yet not being able to fully 
participate in such a regulator due to EU constitutional law (if too narrowly 
interpreted, as is the case today). A possible way out is suggested by what 
has happened under Schengen. In the case of the EU agency for external 
border controls Frontex, ‘associated states’ (and the EEA-3 are associated) 
can vote on matters that primarily or only concern them rather than EU 
countries. Mutatis mutandis, this could be applied in the banking union for 
matters which concern mainly or solely EEA-3 countries or their financial 
enterprises.  
Even in the unlikely scenario that single EEA-3 countries would find 
innovative solutions to circumvent national constitutional requirements – 
for Liechtenstein, the constitution is not necessarily in the way – a global 
solution for all EEA countries is still necessary to guarantee a homogeneous 
application of (EU) EEA law in the entire Internal Market. 
When looking for a solution within the current framework of the 
EEA, one might consider the ESA. The EEA-3 expressly conferred 
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authoritative powers to the ESA, especially in the field of competition law. 
ESA’s powers here pierce the national constitutional shell and the EFTA 
court provides for the necessary legal protection of the individual against 
such decision powers vested in ESA. The example of ESA shows that such 
powers are known within the EEA and that (intrusive) market regulation 
could be accommodated for instance within the realm of an enlarged ESA 
competence. 
What would such a solution look like, given the rather limited 
innovative possibilities under the current framework. An amendment to 
the Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA) could allow the creation of an 
independent daughter institution of ESA, in charge of financial supervision 
of EEA-3 banks. The EFTA court could provide legal protection against the 
latter’s decisions in the same way at it currently does with regard to ESA. 
Ensuring the greatest possible homogeneity of financial market regulation, 
this newly created EEA financial regulatory body could be given observer 
status in the deliberations of the EU regulatory body, be it the ECB or the 
EBA.  
To provide for a solution for diverging or irreconcilable decisions 
between the two regulators, an appeal mechanism could be established that 
would allow one or the other regulator to file a case with the CJEU. The 
technical details of such a framework may be challenging, but the EEA 
itself and also the history of the EU show that innovative solutions might 
well overcome apparently insurmountable obstacles. 
An additional question in the context of such a solution concerns the 
human resources necessary to guarantee sound and effective EEA-3 
financial market surveillance. In the current set-up, the ESA cannot provide 
the expertise and additional administrators necessary to cope with such a 
task. A solution could be an additional agreement, by simple Joint 
Committee Decision of the EEA, with the EU regulator to include the EEA-
3 market in its regulatory tasks, short of decision rights. ESA could be 
entrusted with formally adopting decisions based on an opinion by the 
ECB supervisor. One might even go further and ask the question whether 
an individual ‘opt-in’ for Liechtenstein could be agreed. It goes without 
saying that tasking the ECB also with the technical work on the EEA-3 
banks would require a financial contribution of the EEA-3 to the EU 
regulator’s budget and possibly provide for seconded national experts of 
the EEA-3 within the EU regulator.  
‘More EU’ in the single market can also refer to some network 
industries, in particular those with large physical infrastructures i.e. 
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electronic communications (telecoms, internet, broadcasting), electricity, 
gas and rail. In all four, the Internal Market suffers from the absence of a 
genuine and independent EU regulator. This can be attributed to political 
resistance by member states, or, more subtly, of their national regulators, or 
once again the Meroni doctrine. Given this taboo, the EU attempts to cope 
with extremely complex network approaches of national regulators (not 
unlike the ones employed in financial markets, up until the crisis) and, 
more recently, selected and weak EU agencies.199 It is true that awareness of 
the costly fragmentation of the single market in these sectors is slowly 
growing. Also, ACER and BEREC are currently engaged in addressing 
more seriously a number of lingering problems of the (not so) single market 
in, respectively, gas/electricity and eComms. Moreover, the Commission 
has announced that, in rail, it intends to request in 2014 a thorough 
investigation of the merits of an EU agency, presumably concerned with 
infrastructure users fees and slot allocation questions – issues that cannot 
be taken up by the European Rail Agency (assigned safety and 
interoperability). Although it is difficult to predict in the light of legal 
doctrine and political resistance, one cannot exclude that stronger EU 
agencies will eventually emerge in such markets. That is why the 
suggestion of the Commission of a “horizontal approach”,200 pre-empting 
lengthy and difficult negotiations, is so important. However, no reference is 
made to a new horizontal approach inside the EU itself. On 13 June 2012, 
the European Parliament, Council and the European Commission agreed 
on a “common approach” to EU agencies. Most is on ‘governance’, such as 
similar performance and management requirements as well as financial 
control. Nowhere is there any reference to EEA-3 representation, not even 
under “relations with stakeholders”. Also in the Roadmap of 18 December 
2012, which is a follow-up of the 13 June accord, the EEA-3 is nowhere 
referred to.201 
                                                   
199 These complexities are explained in detail in e.g. Lavrijsen & Hancher (2008).  
200 In its EEA Review, COM (2012) 425 (European Commission, 2012a, p. 10). 
201 The hyperlink from the Commission is not easy to trace: 
http//:ec.europa.eu/agencies/documents/2012-12-
18_roadmap_on_the_follow_up_to_the_common_approach_on_eu_decentralized_
agencies.pdf 
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5.9 Less EU, substance or membership 
Nowadays, it can no longer be taken for granted that all EU countries are 
whole-heartedly favouring the long-run creeping tendencies of ever-deeper 
integration, with a greater scope and more and more EU member countries. 
In times of a profound and lingering economic crisis, rising EU scepticism 
in several EU member states and resurfacing proposals of a multi-speed 
Europe, it appears more and more likely that certain EU member states do 
not want to shoulder more integration and opt for maintenance of the 
status quo. The status quo can refer to ‘deepening’, the widening of the 
scope of domains with some or major EU competences, and enlargement of 
the club. Whereas enlargement is a truly common decision via ratification, 
there is a risk that deepening and greater scope may generate negative 
feedback, culminating in a multi-speed EU or an EU of inner and outer 
circles. ‘Less EU’ may then result. The avant-garde or ‘core’ will move 
ahead of others,202 whether due to a lack of capability (i.e. joining the 
eurozone but not yet ‘ready’ to fulfil the entry conditions) or willingness 
(e.g. a lingering resistance in the UK, yet not in Scotland). ‘Less EU’ does 
not mean, here, that the EU would suffer from lower ambitions or 
diminishing the Internal Market acquis, but rather a somewhat divided 
Union, with two ambitions. The eurozone is formally open to the ‘outs’, but 
the deeper EMU becomes, the greater the risk is for the ‘outs’ that a 
division might nevertheless emerge. The ‘banking union’ – an Internal 
Market affair but one clearly led by the eurozone – might cause such a 
division as well. An eventual increase in the powers of network agencies 
(say in telecoms or energy) might also take place in the future. The free 
movement of persons, or workers, and the rigour of Schengen repeatedly 
cause frictions between different country coalitions.  
Since the beginning of the new millennium, one can discern a subtle 
renaissance in Europe of a popular notion of sovereignty. The current study 
is not the place to discuss this notion. It is enough to mention that the 
distribution of legislative powers within the EU is not always welcome to 
all EU member states. The EEA Treaty does not formally confer legislative 
                                                   
202 As shown recently, this may happen on the basis of “enhanced cooperation” 
(EU patent; financial transactions tax) or separate intergovernmental treaties, based 
on EU law as much as possible and explicitly meant to be incorporated into EU law 
later on. As noted, the eurozone itself might also contribute in actual practice to a 
widening between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’.  
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powers upon international institutions, but rather preserves the 
sovereignty of its contracting parties. Such an approach might eventually 
be more attractive for some EU member states, especially those with 
‘eurosceptic’ electorates. From this perspective it cannot be dismissed 
entirely that national eurosceptic politicians will attempt to rally a national 
electorate behind a pragmatic curtailment of market integration and 
political integration. Would it go too far to eventually expect the creation of 
a new international organisation, not fully similar to the EEA due to 
selected limitations and opt-outs, strongly interwoven with the core EU 
framework but solely for market integration? 
Apart from the considerable difficulty of separating matters of 
market integration from what might be seen as the unwanted ‘too much 
Europe’, such a development would bring back a division within Europe 
between two blocs of economic integration. 
Interestingly, the loudest EU member state – the UK – was also the 
leading sponsor of the creation of EFTA in the 1960s. Norway might also be 
inclined to return to its old (EFTA) club. Switzerland, too, might see its 
national objections to the implications of its eventual EU membership 
better accommodated in a circle of former EFTAns, now wedded to deeper 
economic integration than before, but distinctly less than recent trends 
inside the Union. Iceland would historically also tend more towards such 
an approach, if its EU application is not followed by accession. Although 
perhaps far-fetched, a newly formed influential bloc could develop itself 
into a lighter alternative of the much further-reaching EU market 
integration. Matters like Schengen and Dublin could still be dealt with on 
the basis of the current association agreements.  
Such a new division in market integration in Europe will not happen 
so easily. The advantages of today’s EU internal market are simply too 
great and diversified. Moreover, the old EFTA club would also be split, 
with Austria, Finland and Sweden firmly in the EU.  
Liechtenstein, although still an EFTA country, might not regard such 
(admittedly speculative) a scenario as positive. The Principality is not 
against deep EU market regulation. Even when it comes to questions such 
as participation in EU agencies, it takes a pragmatic approach, aware of the 
fact that a market with 500 million people has for sure more expertise and 
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resources to create a sound regulatory framework in financial services than 
a country with 36,000 people.203 
In addition, Liechtenstein’s renewed transparency policy, embedded 
most clearly in the “Vaduz Declaration of 2009”, renders Liechtenstein 
more willing to even accept the EU tax acquis and to cooperate fully with 
tax administrations of other EU member states, thereby being a partner in a 
most sensitive issue in a number of EU countries. 
5.10 Joining the EU 
In a strategic reflection on options and scenarios related to European 
integration and the positioning of Liechtenstein, the possibility of 
Liechtenstein joining the EU cannot be ignored. At the moment, the 
Principality gives low priority to EU membership. The present combination 
of i) membership of the EEA, ii) the customs union, monetary union and 
other close (e.g. regulatory) cooperation with Switzerland, iii) additional 
cooperation with the EU and with its member states in selected areas and 
iv) the membership of EFTA (with its free trade agreements), the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE and the WTO, suits Liechtenstein well. Moreover, as we 
shall discuss below, even if there were a slight preference for political 
reasons to pursue EU membership, it would entail considerable costs to 
Liechtenstein and require solutions in the EU hitherto not foreseen or 
practiced. In such a case, the benefits would have to exceed the costs by a 
considerable margin. The benefits of EU membership, over and above what 
Liechtenstein already enjoys, are not just a function of the deeper 
integration, with a wider scope of policy domains that the EU brings. 
Certainly for small-sized Liechtenstein, the net benefits might also consist 
of greater certainty of avoiding possible adverse developments, which 
would render the alternative options for the Principality less attractive or 
too disruptive. From the eight previous scenarios in this chapter, one 
adverse development might be ‘less EEA’ (whether in scope or involving 
only two EFTA countries rather than three) or a drastic shift to bilateral 
solutions. Nor can one exclude that, one day, Switzerland might join the 
EU, which would immediately prompt considerations about Liechtenstein 
joining the EU in tandem with its close neighbour. It might consider a joint 
application for accession to the EU far less risky because Liechtenstein has 
long feared, and perhaps still fears, that such a small-sized state would not 
                                                   
203 Interview conducted by the authors with an expert, Brussels in June 2012. 
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easily be accepted. Once some kind of new formulae for small-sized 
countries would be found, Liechtenstein would be free to decide EU 
membership on the merits. Joining together with Switzerland would do 
away with the complexities that currently arise such as trilateralisation and 
the unique combination of a free trade area (EEA) with a customs union 
with Switzerland. Given the close legal and economic ties between both 
countries, an EU membership of one of the two alone would inevitably 
have far-reaching and complicating consequences for Liechtenstein’s 
relationship with Switzerland. 
The additional economic benefits of EU membership would probably 
be rather marginal. Liechtenstein’s agricultural activities are modest and it 
has no interest in fisheries, the two areas excluded from the EEA. In any 
event, assessing the benefits of today’s common agricultural policy (with 
selective high tariffs, very few price interventions and direct farm 
payments, at its core) compared to Liechtenstein’s prevailing agricultural 
regime cannot be our task in the present study. Beyond the internal market, 
and what the EEA calls ‘flanking policies’ (already part of the EEA acquis), 
there is first of all the EMU. As a new EU member state, Liechtenstein 
would be expected to eventually join the euro. If properly designed and 
operated, the eurozone entails benefits. However, it so happens that 
today’s currency in Liechtenstein is rock solid (the Swiss franc) and, apart 
from appreciation of that currency vis-à-vis the euro, which hinders 
Liechtenstein’s export competitiveness, there is little incentive to swap 
currencies before the eurozone has stabilised with firm and better 
governance. However, Liechtenstein could wait quite a while, as 
experience of other new EU countries has shown. 
Another change to be mentioned is the switch to the EU customs 
union. This is technically complex, but, as Andorra and San Marino have 
already enjoyed a customs union with the EU for a long time, it must be 
feasible without great difficulties, but it would have the political 
consequence of putting an end to the current customs unions with 
Switzerland unless the latter were to join the EU as well. A third area of 
interest is taxation since Liechtenstein’s taxation acquis from bilateral 
agreements with the EU is partial. This area is technically complex, but, 
even more importantly, a comparison with today’s regimes (that is, 
Liechtenstein’s and that of the EU) is also complicated by the 
incompleteness of the taxation acquis of the Union itself. The semi-taboo ( a 
‘red line’ for some) on taxation for certain EU member states has allowed 
the perpetuation of highly distortive exceptions and tax break policies with 
respect to the tax base of national corporate taxes, to some degree 
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compensated by different tax rates. Whereas distortions in the internal 
market tend to be addressed sooner or later by means of new EU regulation 
and/or CJEU case law in many domains and submarkets, unanimity in 
Council and the ‘red line’ politics by some governments have caused a 
stalemate, if not a costly denial of the problem in taxation. Unlike the EU, 
the US has a well-defined federal tax base pre-empting such distortive ‘tax 
competition’ in its single market. It is therefore far from easy to identify the 
benefits of joining the EU tax acquis as it stands today.  
The benefits of joining the EU might have more to do with 
institutional and political questions, perhaps even with a sense of security 
for some countries. Liechtenstein perceives few immediate benefits from 
the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies although its tradition points 
to non-involvement. Indeed, the strategic environment might suffer from 
adverse developments, which might justify a reversal of this stance, 
although at the moment it would seem far-fetched considering that 
Liechtenstein does not have any armed forces. It might also benefit from a 
spectrum of softer but not necessarily uninteresting EU policies (often more 
cooperative than integrative) such as education and culture, TENs, science 
and research, although most of these areas are already covered by the EEA 
Agreement. In other areas, Liechtenstein already enjoys cooperative 
agreements with the EU and/or its member states. The country would also 
take part, fully, in EU agencies, which matter more and more as several 
agencies begin to assume (restricted but real) executive, risk assessment 
and regulatory functions.  
Insofar as there is or has been debate in Liechtenstein on EU 
membership, the emphasis inevitably turns around the derogations, costs 
of adjustment, the contribution to the EU budget, the permanent 
administrative and representation burdens and the consequences for the 
future relationship with its close neighbour Switzerland. Furthermore, one 
perceives a significant degree of unpredictability on the part of the EU 
about the factual and legal solutions of an eventual membership for the 
Principality due to the ‘size factor’. Derogations and certainly permanent 
derogations are normally refused in accession negotiations. Clearly, 
Liechtenstein would seek a quasi-permanent derogation on the free 
movement (and establishment) of persons as it now enjoys in the EEA. 
Even though no small-sized country with either a considerably smaller 
territorial dimension and/or population base than current small EU 
member states has ever applied for membership, it is not impossible that 
this request might be granted, but it will not be easy or happen without a 
price. 
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The costs of adjustment would be relatively large although 
temporary, of course, and probably still tolerable. Although the (large) EEA 
acquis helps Liechtenstein avoid much of the problems EU candidate 
countries have when preparing for membership, there are still considerable 
efforts to be undertaken before or upon entry. Acquis in domains such as 
agriculture, justice, freedom and security (beyond Schengen & Dublin), 
trade policy (and hundreds of trade agreements) and financial control 
would be far from trivial. The contribution to the EU budget might easily 
amount to €28 million or more, annually.204 The administrative burden 
would be higher than today in the EEA given a number of tasks member 
states have to fulfil in the EU system (including courts) and given the 
additional acquis. It is of course conceivable that some such tasks are 
delegated to other EU countries (as Liechtenstein already does with Austria 
in some instances) or are considered as not applicable (e.g. fisheries; air 
transport, etc.) or irrelevant. What would seem to be more difficult still is 
the representation burden. EU countries send their officials to hundreds of 
Council committees, in addition to hundreds of comitology committees for 
executive refinements of specific EU legislation. The EU bodies are crucial 
in the EU system: besides the core three (Commission, Council and 
European Parliament), there are the Committee of the Regions, the 
European Economic and Social Committee, the EU Court of Auditors, the 
EU Court of Justice (in fact, two courts), the European Investment Bank and 
the European Central Bank (knowing that Liechtenstein has no central bank 
of its own). What about the ± 35 EU agencies and a range of executive or 
other quasi-agencies? 
Moreover, the ‘size factor’ matters not only for the capacity to ensure 
representation in agencies and committees, it also requires solutions to 
Liechtenstein’s role and representation in the Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament. It is here that the unpredictability about the 
positioning of the EU is great. Suggestions if not speculations about the 
extent to which Liechtenstein could enjoy a ‘virtual’ membership in terms 
                                                   
204 Calculating the (theoretical) budget contribution of Liechtenstein would require 
a separate exercise. The figure in the text is an approximation, arrived at as follows: 
Luxembourg is also a prosperous country and pays around €280 million, with a 
population ten times that of Liechtenstein. Thus, Liechtenstein would pay some 
€28 million a year as a first approximation. However, it would no longer pay the 
funds under the EEA to poor EU countries as these would be under Cohesion & 
Structural Funds spending inside the EU itself. 
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of representation have no basis whatsoever in law or prior experiences. 
Luxembourg and Malta are small, too, but their populations are still 10 
times or more that of Liechtenstein; when constraints are so severe, 10 
times makes a great deal of difference. Recently, the European Commission 
has, for the first time (as far as is known to the authors), made a timid move 
to begin addressing the problem. In an options paper on the three small-
sized AMS countries,205 it says that EU membership “… remains a long-
term possibility but is not retained here”. This creates an opening for 
considering EU membership of Liechtenstein, which, legally, is anyway 
unlikely to be prevented, given existing accession criteria.206 The paper 
identifies two major difficulties. First, the EU institutions “… are currently 
not adapted to the accession of these three small-sized countries [and] … 
such changes … would require important negotiations within the EU”. 
Second, the administrative capacity “… to fulfil all obligations as EU 
Member States” is called “limited”, without any elaboration. 
Liechtenstein’s record in the EEA is excellent, suggesting that the “ability to 
implement the EU acquis” would not seem to be a problem. It follows, by 
implication, that the genuine issue is representation, presence in debates 
and preparation of decisions and burden-sharing.  
                                                   
205 COM (2012) 680 of 20 November 2012, EU relations with Andorra, Monaco and 
San Marino: Options for closer integration with the EU (European Commission, 
2012c, p. 18). 
206 For a detailed legal study, see Breuss (2011). 
 143 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
uropean market integration has become central to the prosperity of 
Liechtenstein. Some 25 years ago, the Principality started to realise 
that what was then the European Economic Community had 
assumed leadership in Western Europe. A civil Community, it mainly 
focused on deepening and widening the scope of market integration. Soon 
after Liechtenstein had joined the negotiations of the EEA Agreement, 
communism as well as the Soviet Union collapsed. At the same time, the 
EEC negotiated the Maastricht Treaty strengthening market integration and 
adding EMU to its ambitions. In this entirely new strategic environment, 
now stretching all over the European continent, the EU emerged as a civil 
European hegemon driving ever-deeper market integration (and later, 
monetary integration) for a quickly increasing number of EU countries. The 
EEA grew out of an EEC offer to its closest trading partners, although three 
of them eventually joined the EU and Switzerland – the most important one 
for Liechtenstein – did not participate in the EEA. Several waves of 
extending market integration (or, indeed, full integration with the EU) over 
the continent, like a domino or ‘me-too’ process, took place: first the 
Visegrad countries requesting the fullest possible market access, followed 
by other central European countries and, still later, by Turkey. With three 
enlargements (in 1995, 2004 and 2007), the EU has de facto become the 
European civil hegemon with an attractive market of 500 million mostly 
high-income consumers. Today, several small countries from former 
Yugoslavia might join the EU, with Croatia first in line and almost certain 
to obtain accession, and Iceland might perhaps follow. The Turkish 
candidacy looks a good deal less firm.  
Although nowadays the EU experiences some internal tensions due 
to divergent views on how far the EU market and EMU integration ought 
to go, these might well be a natural reaction to decades of steady deepening 
and widening as well as enlargement. Not long ago, the combination of 
these three processes was seen as impossible as it would tax domestic 
politics and political legitimacy in member states too much and/or it 
would run into a wall of resistance at high political level. A better reading 
of these trends seems to be that the EU successfully pursued this unique 
E
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combination but paid too little attention to grassroots politics and political 
legitimacy. Repairing these mistakes is difficult as it has bred mistrust and 
cheap Brussels bashing, which has had the effect of eroding the very 
‘permissive consensus’ among voters that enabled deep integration. The 
crisis and the fault lines it revealed made matters worse. Even if the 
deepening and widening of scope of market integration, and to some extent 
of the Economic Union and its governance as well, would stop, or slightly 
and selectively be pushed back, it is nevertheless most unlikely that this 
will affect greatly the accomplishments of both market and EMU 
integration of the EU. There are still countries eager to join the EU and, 
now that the EMU crisis is slowly receding, there are also EU countries 
applying to join the eurozone (e.g. Latvia). Several neighbourhood 
countries are also beginning to climb the ladder of deepening market 
integration with the EU and adopting the relevant market regulation acquis 
for this purpose.  
The EU is therefore going to remain the economic hegemon in Europe 
for the foreseeable future and the fullest possible access to its internal 
market is and will remain critical. It is exceedingly hard to envisage 
another scenario, even with some degree of boldness. As the Norway EEA 
Review put it: there is simply no alternative. For Liechtenstein, it simply 
means that it has made the right choice of opting for the greatest possible 
market integration – the EEA – with the (ever-larger) EU. Moreover, it has 
done so whilst maintaining a very high degree of economic integration 
with non-EU and non-EEA Switzerland by means of a customs union and a 
common currency. As the 2010 Liechtenstein assessment of 15 years of EEA 
membership showed, the Principality has done very well in the EEA. 
Although hard to substantiate with rigorous economic analysis, 
Liechtenstein’s prosperity is due, in no small measure, to this unique 
combination of two-sided economic integration with the EU and with 
Switzerland. Our study sets out in considerable detail (in chapter 3 and 
Annexes) how deep and wide Liechtenstein’s market integration and other 
cooperation with the EU and its member states have become today.  
The present study first provides no less than eight expected or 
possible changes in the Principality’s strategic environment (in chapter 4) 
and subsequently sketches no less than nine scenarios or options (and some 
sub-options as well, all in chapter 5) in an attempt to stimulate strategic 
reflection amongst the leadership and public opinion in Liechtenstein. The 
present chapter is purposefully kept short – it is not meant to do justice to 
the subtleties of each and every option, but rather to draw broad 
conclusions. It is hoped that this strategic thinking might also be of use for 
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 145 
the current debates in Brussels and national capitals leading up to the EEA 
Review of the EU or indeed the entire EEA-30.  
With so many scenarios, one might lose track of the hard-core 
interests of the Principality. At the moment, these interests are best served 
by its two-sided economic integration, i.e. the status quo. Improvements 
are conceivable, indeed desirable, and the ‘status quo-plus’ option for the 
EEA attempts to weigh what might be possible and what is risky about it. 
This option may comprise the intricate questions about ‘EEA relevance’ of 
EU legal acts, coming to a more cooperative approach based on explicit 
criteria; some problems causing the EEA-3 backlog to get out of hand (and 
absorbing the announced EU ‘response strategy’, including recourse to Art. 
102); the participation in EU agencies based on what the Commission calls 
a horizontal approach and some minor issues around the ESA. A border 
case is the desire to include judicial cooperation (terrorism, serious crime, 
police cooperation) in the EEA Agreement: can it be included into annexes 
– probably – or would one favour a carefully limited amendment of the 
Agreement? However, vital as these considerations are, a singular focus on 
the status quo(-plus) cannot suffice for Liechtenstein for the simple reason 
that Liechtenstein has at best marginal, and more probably no, influence on 
its strategic environment. The strategic environment can change in many 
ways and it is not merely prudent but essential that Liechtenstein 
understands such changes and, if it considers them important and likely 
enough, prepares for timely responses.  
The option of ‘more EEA’ via amendments of the Agreement is 
feasible but most if not all of the issues can be resolved via the status quo-
plus option, given the incredible flexibility of the Agreement and the 
practices developed in the EEA over time. Now that the EU is beginning to 
seriously look at the EEA again – which it has not done since 1994 – the 
EEA-3 would seem wise to accommodate most of the improvements in the 
existing treaty framework except more open enlargement clauses, which do 
require amendment of the Agreement. The EU has surely become more 
critical on specific aspects (like the backlog and strategic behaviour by e.g. 
Norway and, a few times, Iceland – whilst still praising the EEA as working 
well overall – but all such aspects would seem to be manageable within 
current arrangements. Enlarging the EEA has never been on the agenda for 
two decades, but now this can no longer be excluded. In fact, the European 
Commission has broken a taboo by explicitly bringing up the possibility of 
amending the Agreement and opening the EEA, in principle, to non-EFTA 
European countries. 
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Of course, this does not mean that there is a queue of countries eager 
to join: the only countries that might consider membership are Switzerland 
(under the existing treaty; but at the moment, it is most unlikely), San 
Marino and Andorra. More speculatively, it might be an option for Turkey, 
if it would give up its aspirations as an EU candidate country (and this 
might happen) or, in more extreme scenario, Britain (without Scotland) if a 
referendum in 2017 would turn out to be negative. In the long run, the EEA 
might open up to neighbourhood countries, too. In fact, the AMS (Andorra, 
Monaco, San Marino) countries have recently been handed two ‘viable’ 
options by the Commission: EEA membership or an EEA look-alike. 
For Liechtenstein, it is critical that the quality of today’s EEA does not 
suffer in the process and, if prospects of EEA enlargement become more 
firm, insist with the EU and its EEA-3 partners that the EEA should not be 
used for political convenience. However, if the Swiss would join – hence, 
reverse their attitude on the EEA – it would be most positive for the 
Principality, because the complexities of two-sided integration would 
reduce greatly and the benefits are only too obvious. It is quite probable 
that, once large countries (e.g. the UK or Turkey) would consider the EEA 
as a serious option, they might wish to negotiate their ‘own’ EEA or EEA 
look-alike. Such negotiations would not be easy if the expectations of these 
countries amount to fully-fledged market access. This is equally the case for 
Switzerland, now locked in a series of market access bilaterals with the EU. 
The EU has sharpened its conditionality since 2010 in no uncertain terms 
and the upshot would ideally be an EEA look-alike (or the EEA as such). 
The famous four conditions cannot be compromised to a large extent (even 
though that seems to be what Switzerland is trying to do), which means 
that the Swiss see their options reduced considerably. This is crucial for 
Liechtenstein given its deep economic integration with its closest 
neighbour: an EEA look-alike for the Swiss is probably convenient for 
Liechtenstein too. 
Other options directly linked to the EEA could be ‘less EEA’ (in 
substance or fewer members) and the conclusion of bilateral market access 
treaties. Reduction of the scope of the EEA is sometimes suggested in 
Norway but the government has firmly supported the status quo in its 
recent White Paper (except for open diplomatic phrases “to develop the 
internal market” and to “develop the EEA Agreement”, which can only 
mean ‘more EEA’, not less). This (‘less EEA’) could be one reason why the 
UK, if it would leave the EU, might wish to negotiate its ‘own’ EEA look-
alike and argue that the flanking policies should be negotiable to some 
extent. This line of thinking is not entirely excluded, given the legalistic 
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rather than economic concept of the internal market in the EEA Agreement. 
Less EEA in membership will happen if Iceland joins the EU. We suggest 
some simple institutional adjustments to re-arrange the EEA-2. The real 
problem of an EEA-2 is whether Norway and Liechtenstein, with diverse 
interests and traditions and given the huge relative size difference, would 
continue to work together as before, also in cases where Norway would be 
faced with political or other constraints. Partners agreeing bilateral with the 
EU will not easily be granted fully-fledged market access. The Swiss 
experience is the deepest bilateral so far and the EU has learnt lessons: the 
choice will be either an EEA look-alike or less-than-full market access. We 
perceive no reason why this would be different for the UK (despite their 
longstanding EU membership) and the very critical reactions to Cameron’s 
speech of 23 January 2013 by political leaders all over the EU (no à-la-carte 
EU) are consistent with this. The same would go for Turkey.  
Two scenarios can be envisaged about the EU itself: ‘more EU’ (via 
deepening) and ‘less (or differentiated, hence, looser) EU’. Both are 
inspected in some depth. The harder one for the EEA-3 at the moment is 
undoubtedly ‘more EU’, especially in the ‘banking union’ and, in future, 
possibly with some of the EU agencies in network industries. The banking 
union can only be accommodated by EEA-3 countries if the EU is willing to 
adopt an ingenious construction via the ESA and an assignment to the ECB 
supervisor to analyse and advise on the relevant EEA-3 banks. This seems 
compatible with the CJEU case law as long as this close cooperation only or 
mainly matters for EEA-3 banks, and not for the EU as a whole. Given the 
current frictions about the EBA, this would require a different attitude on 
the EU side. ‘Less’ (or a more divided) EU can be an issue for Liechtenstein 
(or the EEA-3) if some degree of (re)fragmentation of the internal market 
might occur. Less EU may also mean that one or more EU countries exit the 
Union. This need not be immediately worrying for Liechtenstein, 
depending on what market access arrangement succeeds membership.  
Finally, when Liechtenstein considers options and future strategy, it 
has so far always taken for granted that the EU would be very reticent if 
not negative about Liechtenstein EU membership. Moreover, the extra costs 
of EU membership for the Principality are considerable and the benefits 
(beyond market integration) not many and not impressive. The first 
assumption is no longer valid: the AMS options paper from the 
Commission provides a prudent opening in the longer run. This could be a 
reason for Liechtenstein to reflect on a modus, or several, for the EU to 
render it practical and acceptable. The second assumption is not wrong (as 
we briefly sketch) but deserves to be studied much more seriously. It also 
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matters what Switzerland will do in the medium-term. It stands to reason 
that, if the Swiss were to apply for EU membership one day, Liechtenstein 
should seriously consider submitting a joint application.  
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Annex I. Protocols to the EEA Agreement 
Protocol 1 “On Horizontal Adaptions”: 
Adaptions on how EU-specific content of EU legal 
acts (notification procedures, date of entry into 
force, committees etc.) is to be applied in the 
context of the EEA 
Protocol 26 “On the 
powers and 
functions of 
the EFTA 
Surveillance 
Authority in 
the field of 
State Aid” 
Protocol 2 “On products excluded from the scope of the 
Agreement in accordance with Article 8(3)(a)” 
The free movement of goods provisions of the 
EEA only apply to products falling within 
Chapter 27 to 97 of the HS (Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System), 
excluding the products listed in this protocol. 
These are Albumins, albuminates and other 
albumin derivates and Industrial monocarboxylic 
fatty acids; acid oils from refining; industrial fatty 
alcohols. 
(Protocol was replaced by Annex I to Decision No 
140/2001 (OJ No L 22, 24.1.2002) 
Protocol 27 “On co-
operation in 
the field of 
State Aid” 
Protocol 3 “Concerning products referred to in Article 
8(3)(b) of the Agreement” 
The same as with Protocol 2 but relating to 
processed agricultural and certain other products. 
(Protocol was replaced by Annex I to Decision No 
140/2001 (OJ No L 22, 24.1.2002) 
Protocol 28 “On 
intellectual 
property” 
Protocol 4 “On rules of origin” 
This protocol puts down the rules of origin for the 
products originating in the EEA. 
Protocol 29 “On 
vocational 
training” 
Protocol 5 “On customs duties of a fiscal nature 
(Liechtenstein)” 
Liechtenstein may retain customs duties of a 
fiscal nature for products listed in this protocol. 
With regard to some only temporally with regard 
to others until it starts an own production of alike 
products. 
Protocol 30 “On specific 
provisions 
on the 
organisation 
of 
cooperation 
in the field 
of statistics” 
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Protocol 6 “On the building 
up of compulsory 
reserves by 
Liechtenstein” 
Liechtenstein may 
build up reserves 
of indispensable 
products necessary 
for the survival of 
its population in 
times of shortage 
subject to a non-
discriminatory 
scheme. 
Protocol 31 “On cooperation in specific fields outside 
the four freedoms” 
This Protocol regulates the participation 
of EEA EFTA countries in EU policies 
outside the four freedoms (environment, 
social policy, consumer protection, 
transport, culture etc.). For a full list see 
Art 78 EEA. 
Protocol 7 “On quantitative 
restrictions which 
Iceland may retain” 
Brooms, 
toothbrushes, non 
mechanical floor 
sweepers, etc. 
Protocol 32 “On financial modalities for 
implementation of Article 82” 
Financial contribution for the 
participation in EU policies as provided 
for by Art 78 EEA (see Protocol 31). 
Protocol 8 “On state 
monopolies” 
Protocol 33 “On arbitration procedures” 
Such proceedings could arise in the 
context of safeguard measures. 
Protocol 9 “On trade in fish 
and other marine 
products” 
Protocol 34 “The possibility for courts and tribunals 
of EFTA States to request the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities to 
decide on the interpretation of EEA rules 
corresponding to EC rules” 
Protocol 10 “On simplification 
of inspections and 
formalities in 
respect of carriage 
of goods” 
Protocol 35 “On the implementation of EEA rules” 
This protocol stipulates the duty of EEA 
EFTA countries to introduce, if 
necessary, a statutory provision which 
provides for supremacy of EEA law in 
case of collision with national law. 
Protocol 11 “On mutual 
assistance in 
customs matters” 
Protocol 36 “On the Statute of the EFTA Joint 
Parliamentary Committee” 
Protocol 12 “On conformity 
assessment 
agreements with 
third countries” 
Protocol 37 “Containing the list provided for in 
Article 101” 
This protocol contains a list of EU 
committee to which EEA EFTA experts 
are associated against the backdrop of 
the good functioning of the EEA. 
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Protocol 13 “On the non-application of anti-
dumping and countervailing 
measures” 
Protocol 38 “On the financial 
mechanism” 
The EEA financial 
mechanism shall 
provide financial 
assistance to the 
development and 
structural adjustment 
of Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. 
Protocol 14 “On trade in coal and steel products” Protocol 38a “On the EEA 
financial 
mechanism” 
Protocol 15 “On transitional periods on the free 
movement of persons” 
This protocol allows Liechtenstein to 
transitionally derogate from certain 
aspects of the free movement of 
workers provision due to its special 
geographic and demographic features. 
The transitional period initially 
expired in 1998. However, it was 
extended until 2006 (EEA JC Decision 
No. 191/1999) and subsequently made 
subject to a review recurring every 5 
years (2004 OJ L130/59). 
Protocol 38b “On the EEA 
financial 
mechanism” 
Protocol 16 “On measures in the field of social 
security related to transitional periods 
on the free movement of persons” 
This Protocol deals with the 
application of Regulation 
1408/71/EEC social security schemes 
on workers and self employed people. 
This protocol must be read combined 
with Protocol 15. 
Protocol 39 “On the ECU” 
Outdated 
Protocol 17 “Concerning Article 34” 
Art 34 EEA provides for the non-
discrimination of companies 
established under the law of an EEA 
contracting party. This protocol states 
that EEA countries are free to regulate 
on third country access to their 
market. 
Protocol 40 “On Svalbard” 
Kingdom of Norway 
has the right to 
exempt the territory 
of Svalbard from the 
application of the 
EEA. 
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Protocol 18 “On internal procedure 
for the implementation 
of Article 43”  
This protocol 
establishes a procedure 
regulating the free 
movement of capital 
between the EEA 
EFTA countries and 
third countries. 
Protocol 41 “On existing agreements” 
Outdated 
Protocol 19 “On maritime 
transport” 
Protocol 42 “On bilateral arrangements 
concerning specific agricultural 
products” 
Protocol 20 “On access to inland 
waterways” 
Protocol 43 “On the Agreement between the EC 
and the Austrian Republic on the 
transit of goods by road and rail” 
out-dated 
Protocol 21 “On the 
implementation of 
competition rules 
applicable to 
undertakings” 
Protocol 44 “On Safeguard mechanisms pursuant 
to the enlargements of the EEA” 
Enlargement refers to the EU 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007 which 
also enlarged the EEA. 
Protocol 22 “Concerning the 
definition of 
"undertaking" and 
"turnover" 
Protocol 45 “On transitional periods concerning 
Spain and Portugal” 
Outdated 
Protocol 23 “Concerning the 
cooperation between 
the surveillance 
authorities” 
This protocol concerns 
the cooperation 
between the European 
Commission and the 
EFTA Surveillance 
Authority. 
Protocol 46 “On the development of 
cooperation” 
Cooperation in the fisheries sector 
between the EEA EFTA countries 
and the EU. 
Protocol 24 “On cooperation in the 
field of concentrations” 
Protocol 47 “On the abolition of technical barriers 
to trade in wine” 
Protocol 25 “On competition 
regarding coal and 
steel” 
Protocol 48 “Concerning Articles 105 and 111” 
This protocol states that in case of 
diverging interpretations of EU acts 
respectively EEA acts between the 
CJEU and the EFTA Court, the EEA 
JC decision settling this divergence 
does not affect the independence of 
either legal order. 
  Protocol 49 “On Ceuta and Melilla” 
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Annex II. Excerpt of Annex X – Services in General 
29.9.2012  EEA AGREEMENT  ANNEX X – p.1 
 
ANNEX X 
 
SERVICES IN GENERAL{1} 
 
List provided for in Article 36(2) 
INTRODUCTION  
 
When the acts referred to in this Annex contain notions or refer to procedures which are specific to 
the Community legal order, such as 
 
- preambles;  
- the addressees of the Community acts;  
- references to territories or languages of the EC;  
- references to rights and obligations of EC Member States, their public entities, undertakings or 
individuals in relation to each other; and  
- references to information and notification procedures;  
 
Protocol 1 on horizontal adaptations shall apply, unless otherwise provided for in this Annex. 
 
ACTS REFERRED TO  
 
1. 32006 L 0123: Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36). 
 
The provisions of the Directive shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be read with the following 
adaptations: 
 
(a) In Article 3(3), “rules of the Treaty” shall read “rules of the EEA Agreement”; 
 
(b) In Article 4(1), “Article 50 of the Treaty” shall read “Article 37 of the EEA Agreement”; 
 
(c) In Articles 4(2) and 4(3), “Article 48 of the Treaty” shall read “Article 34 of the EEA 
Agreement”; 
 
(d) In Article 4(5), “Article 43 of the Treaty” shall read “Article 31 of the EEA Agreement”; 
 
(e) Article 4(8) shall read: 
“overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ means, without prejudice to Article 6 of the EEA 
Agreement, reasons recognised as such in the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Community, including the following grounds: public policy; public security; public safety; public 
health; preserving the financial 1equilibrium of the social security system; the protection of 
consumers; recipients of services and workers; fairness of trade transactions; combating fraud; the 
protection of the environment and the urban environment; the health of animals; intellectual property; 
the conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage; social policy objectives and cultural 
policy objectives;”; 
 
{1} Title, introduction text and point inserted by Decision No 45/2009 ( OJ No L 162, 25.6.2009, p. 23 and EEA Supplement 
No 33, 25.6.2009, p. 8), e.i.f 1.5.2010. 
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Annex III. The Annexes to the EEA Agreement 
Annex Title Chapter 
Annex 1 Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary 
Matters 
I. Veterinary Issues 
II. Feeding Stuffs 
III. Phytosanitary Matters 
Annex 2 Technical 
Regulations, 
Standards, Testing 
and Certification - 
Part I 
I. Motor Vehicles 
II. Agricultural and Forestry Tractors 
III. Lifting and Mechanical Handling Appliances 
IV. Household Appliances 
V. Gas Appliances 
VI. Construction Plant and Equipment 
VII. Other Machines 
VIII. Pressure Vessels 
IX. Measuring Instruments 
X. Electrical Material 
XI. Textiles 
XII. Foodstuffs 
Annex 2 Technical 
Regulations, 
Standards, Testing 
and Certification - 
Part II 
XIII. Medicinal Products 
XIV. Fertilizers 
XV. Dangerous Substances 
XVI. Cosmetics 
XVII. Environment Protection 
XVIII. Information Technology, Telecommunication 
and Data Processing 
XIX. General Provisions in the Technical Barriers to 
Trade 
XX. Free Movement of Goods - General 
XXI. Construction Products 
XXII. Personal Protective Equipement 
XXIII. Toys 
XXIV. Machinery 
XXV. Tobacco 
XXVI. Energy 
XXVII. Spirit Drinks 
XXVIII. Cultural Goods 
XXIX. Explosives for Civil Use 
XXX. Medical Devices 
XXXI. Recreation Craft 
XXXII. Marine Equipement 
Appendixes 
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Annex 3 Product Liability  
Annex 4 Energy  
Annex 5 Free Movement of 
Workers 
 
Annex 6 Social Security  
Annex 7 Recognition of 
Professional 
Qualifications 
A. General system, recognition of professional 
experience and automatic recognition 
B. Legal professions 
C. Commerce and intermediaries 
Acts of which the Contracting Parties Shall Take 
Note 
Annex 8 Right of 
Establishment 
 
Annex 9 Financial Services I. Insurance 
II. Banks and other credit institutions 
III. Stock exchange and securities 
IV. Occupational Retirement Provisions 
V. Provisions applying to all kinds of financial 
services 
Acts of which the Contracting Parties Shall Take 
Note 
Annex 10 Services in general  
Annex 11 Electronic 
Communication, 
Audiovisual 
Services and 
Information Society 
Telecommunication services 
Postal services 
Data Protection 
Information Society Services 
Audiovisual services 
Acts of which the Contracting Parties Shall Take 
Note 
Annex 12 Free Movement of 
Capital 
 
Annex 13 Transport Part I I. Inland Transport 
II. Road Transport 
III. Transport by Rail 
IV. Transport by Inland Waterway 
V. Maritime Transport 
VI. Civil Aviation 
Annex 13 Transport Part II VII. Other 
Acts of which the Contracting Parties Shall Take 
Note 
Appendix 1 
Annex 13 Transport Part III Appendix 2 
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Annex 14 Competition A. Merger Control 
B. Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices 
C. Technology Transfer Agreements 
D. Specialisation and Research Development 
Agreements 
E. and F. (deleted) 
G. Transport 
H. Information and Communication Technologies 
I. Coal and Steel 
J. Insurance Sector 
Acts of which the EC Commission and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority Shall Take Due Account 
Annex 15 State Aid Public Undertakings 
Aid to the steel industry 
Aid to shipbuilding 
De minimis aid 
Services of general economic interest 
Aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, 
research, development, innovation, environmental 
protection, regional investments, female 
entrepreneurship, employment and training 
Acts of which the EC Commission and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority Shall Take Due Account 
Appendix 
Annex 16 Procurement  
Annex 17 Intellectual 
Property 
 
Annex 18 Health and Safety 
at Work, Labour 
Law and Equal 
Treatment for Men 
and Women 
Health and safety at work 
Equal treatment for men and women 
Labour law 
Annex 19 Consumer 
Protection 
 
Annex 20 Environment I. General 
II. Water 
III. Air 
IV. Chemicals, Industrial Risk and Biotechnology 
V. Waste 
VI. Noise 
Acts of which the Contracting Parties Shall Take 
Note 
Appendix 
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Annex 21 Statistics Part I Business Statistics 
Transport and Tourism Statistics 
Foreign Trade Statistics 
Statistical Principles and Confidentiality 
Demographical and Social Statistics 
Economic Statistics 
Nomenclatures 
Agricultural Statistics 
Fishery Statistics 
Energy Statistics 
Environmental Statistics 
Information Society Statistics 
Statistics on Science and Technology 
Annex 21 Statistics Part II Appendix 1 
Annex 21 Statistics Part III Appendix 2 
Annex 22 Company Law  
 
  
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 163 
Annex IV. Liechtenstein’s Special Arrangement with regard 
to the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of 
Establishment 
 
The following special arrangements apply to Liechtenstein with regard to the 
free movement of workers and the right of establishment under the EEA 
Agreement. They are covered in Protocol 15 to the EEA Agreement as well as 
by sectoral adaptations inserted into Annex V to the EEA Agreement regarding 
the freedom of movement of workers and Annex VIII to the EEA Agreement 
regarding the right of establishment. 
 
Protocol 15 on transitional periods on the free movement of persons 
(Switzerland and Liechtenstein)207 
Article 1 
The provisions of the Agreement and its Annexes relating to the free 
movement of persons between the EC Member States and EFTA States shall 
apply subject to the transitional provisions laid down in this Protocol. 
Article 2 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, Switzerland, on the one hand, 
and EC Member States and other EFTA States, on the other hand, may 
maintain in force until 1 January 1998 with regard to nationals from EC 
Member States and other EFTA States and to nationals of Switzerland, 
respectively, national provisions submitting to prior authorisation entry, 
residence and employment. 
2. Switzerland may maintain in force until 1 January 1998 with regard to 
nationals of EC Member States and other EFTA States quantitative limitations 
for new residents and seasonal workers. These quantitative limitations will be 
gradually reduced until the end of the transitional period. 
Article 3 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3, Switzerland may maintain 
in force until 1 January 1998 national provisions limiting professional and 
geographical mobility of seasonal workers, including the obligation for such 
workers to leave the territory of Switzerland at the expiry of their seasonal 
permit for at least three months. As from 1 January 1993, seasonal permits will 
                                                   
207 OJL. L 1, 03.01.1994, S. 176. 
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be automatically renewed for seasonal workers holding a seasonal work 
contract on their return to the territory of Switzerland. 
2. Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 as listed in point 2 of 
Annex V to the Agreement shall apply in Switzerland with regard to seasonal 
workers as from 1 January 1997. 
3. As from 1 January 1993 and notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2 of 
this Protocol, the provisions of Article 28 of the Agreement and of Annex V to 
the Agreement shall apply to seasonal workers in Switzerland provided that 
such workers have completed 30 months of seasonal employment in the 
territory of Switzerland within a preceding reference period of four 
consecutive years. 
Article 4 
Switzerland may maintain in force until: 
- 1 January 1996 national provisions requiring a worker who, while having his 
residence in a territory other than that of Switzerland, is employed in the 
territory of Switzerland (frontier worker) to return each day to the territory of 
his residence; 
- 1 January 1998 national provisions requiring a worker who, while having his 
residence in a territory other than that of Switzerland, is employed in the 
territory of Switzerland (frontier worker) to return each week to the territory of 
his residence; 
- 1 January 1997 national provisions concerning the limitation of employment 
of frontier workers within defined frontier zones; 
- 1 January 1995 national provisions submitting to prior authorisation 
employment undertaken by frontier workers in Switzerland. 
Article 5 
1. Liechtenstein, on the one hand, and EC Member States and other EFTA 
States, on the other hand, may maintain in force until 1 January 1998 with 
regard to nationals from EC Member States and other EFTA States and to 
nationals of Liechtenstein, respectively, national provisions submitting to prior 
authorisation entry, residence and employment. 
2. Liechtenstein may maintain in force until 1 January 1998 with regard to 
nationals of EC Member States and other EFTA States quantitative limitations 
for new residents, seasonal workers and frontier workers. These quantitative 
limitations will be gradually reduced. 
  
THE EEA REVIEW AND LIECHTENSTEIN’S INTEGRATION STRATEGY 165 
Article 6 
1. Liechtenstein may maintain in force until 1 January 1998 national provisions 
limiting professional mobility of seasonal workers, including the obligation of 
such workers to leave the territory of Liechtenstein at the expiry of their 
seasonal permit for at least three months. As from 1 January 1993, seasonal 
permits will be automatically renewed for seasonal workers holding a seasonal 
work contract on their return to the territory of Liechtenstein. 
2. Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 as listed in point 2 of 
Annex V to the Agreement shall apply in Liechtenstein with regard to 
residents as from 1 January 1995 and with regard to seasonal workers as from 1 
January 1997. 
3. The arrangements provided for in paragraph 2 shall also apply to members 
of the family of a self-employed person in the territory of Liechtenstein. 
Article 7 
Liechtenstein may maintain in force until: 
- 1 January 1998 national provisions requiring a worker who, while having his 
residence in a territory other than that of Liechtenstein, is employed in the 
territory of Liechtenstein (frontier worker) to return each day to the territory of 
his residence; 
- 1 January 1998 national provisions on restrictions on professional mobility 
and access to professions for all categories of workers; 
- 1 January 1995 national provisions on restrictions on access to professional 
activities with regard to self-employed persons having their residence in the 
territory of Liechtenstein. Such restrictions may be upheld until 1 January 1997 
with regard to self-employed persons having their residence in a territory other 
than that of Liechtenstein. 
Article 8 
1. Other than the limitations set out in Articles 2 to 7, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein shall not introduce any new restrictive measures concerning 
entry, employment and residence of workers and self-employed persons as of 
the date of signature of the Agreement. 
2. Switzerland and Liechtenstein shall take all necessary measures so that 
during the transitional periods nationals of EC Member States and of other 
EFTA States may take up available employment in the territory of Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein with the same priority as nationals of Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein, respectively. 
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Article 9 
1. As from 1 January 1996 the Contracting Parties shall examine the results of 
the application of the transitional periods as set out in Articles 2 to 4. On 
completion of this examination the Contracting Parties may, on the basis of 
new data and with a view to a possible shortening of the transition period, 
propose provisions intended to adjust the transitional periods. 
2. At the end of the transitional period for Liechtenstein the transitional 
measures shall be jointly reviewed by the Contracting Parties, duly taking into 
account the specific geographic situation of Liechtenstein. 
Article 10 
During transitional periods, existing bilateral arrangements will continue to 
apply unless provisions which are more favourable in their effect to citizens of 
the EC Member States and EFTA States result from the Agreement. 
Article 11 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the terms 'seasonal worker` and 'frontier 
worker` contained therein shall have the meaning as defined by the national 
legislation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, respectively, at the time of 
signature of the Agreement. 
 
 
Declaration by the Government of Liechtenstein 
on the specific situation of the country208 
 
The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein, Referring to paragraph 18 
of the Joint Declaration of 14 May 1991 from the Ministerial meeting between 
the European Community, its Member States and the Countries of the 
European Free Trade Association; 
Reaffirming the duty to ensure compliance with all provisions of the EEA 
Agreement and to apply them in good faith; 
Expects that due regard will be paid under the EEA Agreement to the specific 
geographical situation of Liechtenstein; 
Considers that a situation justifying the taking of the measures referred to in 
Article 112 of the EEA Agreement shall in particular be considered to exist if 
capital inflows from another Contracting Party are liable to endanger the 
access of the resident population to real estate, or in the case of an 
extraordinary increase in the number of nationals from the EC Member States 
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or the other EFTA States, or in the total number of jobs in the economy, both in 
comparison with the number of the resident population. 
 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 191/1999 
(sectoral adaptations to Annex VIII)209 
 
Article 1 
The following text shall be added to the SECTORAL ADAPTATIONS of Annex 
VIII to the Agreement: 
"The following adaptations shall apply to Liechtenstein until 31 December 
2006. Before that date, the Joint Committee shall undertake a review on the 
basis of which it may, duly taking into account the specific geographical 
situation of Liechtenstein and to the extent strictly necessary, decide to 
maintain such measures that may be deemed appropriate. 
I 
Nationals of Iceland, Norway and the EU Member States may take 
up residence in Liechtenstein only after having received a permit 
from the Liechtenstein authorities. They have the right to obtain 
this permit, subject only to the restrictions specified below. No 
such residence permit shall be necessary for a period less than 
three months per year, provided no employment or other 
permanent economic activity is taken up, nor for persons 
providing cross-border services in Liechtenstein. 
The conditions concerning nationals of Iceland, Norway and the 
EU Member States cannot be more restrictive than those which 
apply to third country nationals. 
II 
1. The number of residence permits available annually for 
nationals of Iceland, Norway or an EU Member State 
exercising an economic activity in Liechtenstein shall be 
determined in such a way that the yearly net increase from the 
previous year in the number of economically active nationals 
of those countries resident in Liechtenstein is not less than 
1,75% of their number on 1 January 1998. Residence permits to 
persons naturalised in the course of a year shall be deducted 
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from the basis on which the increase for the next year is 
calculated. Residence permits granted in excess of the 
minimum number shall not be counted against the increase 
due the following year. 
2. The Liechtenstein authorities shall grant residence permits in a 
way that is not discriminatory and does not distort 
competition. Half of the net increase in the permits available 
shall be granted in accordance with a procedure that gives an 
equal chance to all applicants. 
3. Residents who have a short-term permit and who exercise an 
economic activity shall be included in the quota. Such persons 
may remain in Liechtenstein under the conditions defined in 
the Agreement after the expiry of the permit, within the quota 
under which they entered the country. The permit under the 
quota shall be re-attributed when the person to whom it was 
attributed changes his residence to another country. The 
number of short-term permits available for the purposes of 
exercising an economic activity shall not deviate by more than 
10 % from what it was in 1997. 
III 
Family members of nationals of Iceland, Norway and EU Member 
States residing lawfully in Liechtenstein shall have the right to 
obtain a permit of the same validity as that of the person on whom 
they depend. They shall have the right to take up an economic 
activity, in which case they will be included in the number of 
permits granted to economically active persons. However, the 
conditions in point II may not be invoked to refuse them a permit 
in the event that the annual number of permits available to 
economically active persons is filled. 
Persons giving up their economic activity may remain in 
Liechtenstein under conditions defined in Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1251/70 of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to 
remain in the territory of a Member State after having been 
employed in that State210 and in Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 
17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a Member 
State to remain in the territory of another Member State after 
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having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity211: 
they will no longer be counted in the number of permits available 
to economically active persons nor will they be included in the 
quota defined in point IV. 
IV 
A supplementary annual quota of 0,5% of the basis referred to in 
point II shall be available for persons who wish to take up 
residence on the basis of rights defined in Council Directive 
90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence212, Council 
Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
employees, and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity213 and Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 
October 1993 on the right of residence for students214. 
Point II shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
V 
1. Liechtenstein may maintain in force for 5 years national 
provisions obliging seasonal workers and members of their 
family to leave the territory of Liechtenstein for at least three 
months at the expiry of their seasonal permit. Such persons 
may not be subject to any further restrictions. The seasonal 
permits shall be automatically renewed for seasonal workers 
holding a work contract on their return to Liechtenstein. The 
number of permits available to seasonal workers having the 
nationality of Iceland, Norway or an EU Member State shall 
not be less than the number of permits granted in 1997 less the 
number of permits for persons benefiting from the 
liberalisation in accordance with the following paragraph. 
2. The number of persons exempted from the obligation to leave 
the territory of Liechtenstein annually shall be determined as 
the number of outstanding permits divided by the number of 
years remaining until the end of the transitional period for 
seasonal workers. The order of persons to benefit from the 
liberalisation shall be determined by the number of 
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212 OJL. L 180, 13.07.1990, p. 26. 
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consecutive renewals of seasonal permits and by the date of 
issue of the first such permit within this sequence. 
3. Persons who have benefited from the liberalisation in 
accordance with the preceding paragraph shall not occupy a 
place under the quotas in accordance with points II and IV. 
Such persons will however be counted in the case of family 
members taking up economic activity in accordance with point 
III. 
VI 
Applicants for a residence permit shall receive a written reply by 
the end of the third month from the date of application. Rejected 
applicants shall have the right to a reasoned refusal in writing. 
They shall have the same legal remedies as Liechtenstein citizens 
as regards administrative decisions. 
VII 
A person employed in but whose residence is not in Liechtenstein 
(a frontier worker) shall return daily to his country of residence. 
VIII 
Liechtenstein shall provide the other Contracting Parties and to the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority all such information as may be 
necessary to control compliance with this Annex." 
Article 2 
The following text shall be added to the SECTORAL ADAPTATIONS of Annex 
V to the Agreement: 
"The provisions in the SECTORAL ADAPTATIONS in Annex VIII concerning 
Liechtenstein shall apply, as appropriate, to this Annex." 
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EEA Enlargement 2004215 
Annex V (Free movement of workers)216 
1. In point 3 (Council Directive 68/360/EEC), adaptation (e)(ii) shall be 
replaced by the following: 
‘(ii) the footnote shall be replaced by the following: 
“Belgian, Czech, Danish, German, Estonian, Greek, Icelandic, Spanish, French, 
Irish, Italian, Cypriot, Latvian, Liechtenstein, Lithuanian, Luxembourg, 
Hungarian, Maltese, Netherlands, Norwegian, Austrian, Polish, Portuguese, 
Slovenian, Slovakian, Finnish, Swedish and British according to the country 
issuing the permit.”;' 
2. In point 7 (Commission Decision 93/569/EEC), the words ‘Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden' shall be replaced with the words ‘Iceland and 
Norway'; 
Annex VIII (Right of establishment)217 
1. The following shall be inserted before the heading ‘ACTS REFERRED TO': 
‘TRANSITION PERIOD 
The transitional arrangements set out in the Annexes to the Act of Accession of 
16 April 2003 for the Czech Republic (Annex V, Chapter 1), Estonia (Annex VI, 
Chapter 1), Latvia (Annex VIII, Chapter 1), Lithuania (Annex IX, Chapter 2), 
Hungary (Annex X, Chapter 1), Malta (Annex XI, Chapter 2), Poland (Annex 
XII, Chapter 2), Slovenia (Annex XIII, Chapter 2) and the Slovak Republic 
(Annex XIV, Chapter 1) shall apply. 
With regard to the safeguard mechanisms contained in the transitional 
arrangements referred to in the previous paragraph, with the exception of the 
arrangements for Malta, PROTOCOL 44 ON SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS 
CONTAINED IN THE ACT OF ACCESSION OF 16 APRIL 2003 shall apply.'; 
2. Under the heading ‘SECTORAL ADAPTATIONS', the introductory 
paragraph of the adaptation regarding Liechtenstein, introduced by Decision 
of the EEA Joint Committee No 191/1999 of 17 December 1999, shall be 
replaced with the following: 
                                                   
215 Agreement on the participation of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic 
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic in the European Economic Area (OJL. L 130, 
29. 04.2004). 
216 OJL. L 130, 29. 04.2004, p. 33. 
217 OJL. L 130, 29. 04.2004, p. 59. 
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‘The following shall apply to Liechtenstein. Duly taking into account the 
specific geographic situation of Liechtenstein, this arrangement shall be 
reviewed every five years, for the first time before May 2009.'. 
Joint Declaration by the EFTA States on free movement of workers218 
The EFTA States stress the strong elements of differentiation and flexibility in 
the arrangements for the free movement of workers. They shall endeavour to 
grant increased labour market access to nationals of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia under 
national law, with a view to speeding up the approximation to the acquis. As a 
consequence, the employment opportunities in the EFTA States for nationals of 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia should improve substantially upon these States' accession. Moreover, 
the EFTA States will make best use of the proposed arrangements to move as 
quickly as possible to the full application of the acquis in the area of free 
movement of workers. For Liechtenstein, this will be done in accordance with 
the specific arrangements as foreseen in the Sectoral Adaptations to Annex V 
(Free movement of workers) and Annex VIII (Right of establishment) to the 
EEA Agreement. 
 
EEA Enlargement 2007219 
Annex V (Free movement of workers)220 
the text of the second paragraph under the heading ‘Transition Period’ shall be 
replaced by the following: 
‘The transitional arrangements set out in the Annexes to the Act of Accession 
of 25 April 2005 or, as the case may be, to the Protocol of Accession of 25 April 
2005 for Bulgaria (Annex VI, Chapter 1) and Romania (Annex VII, Chapter 1), 
shall apply. 
With regard to the safeguard mechanisms contained in the transitional 
arrangements referred to in the previous paragraphs, with the exception of the 
arrangements for Malta, PROTOCOL 44 ON SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS 
PURSUANT TO ENLARGEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 
shall apply.’ 
                                                   
218 ABl. Nr. L 130 vom 29.04.2004, S. 78. 
219 Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania in the 
European Economic Area (OJL. L 221, 25.08.2007). 
220 OJL. L 221, 25.08.2007, p. 28. 
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Annex VIII (Right of establishment)221 
the text of the second paragraph under the heading ‘Transition Period’ shall be 
replaced by the following: 
‘The transitional arrangements set out in the Annexes to the Act of Accession 
of 25 April 2005 or, as the case may be, to the Protocol of Accession of 25 April 
2005 for Bulgaria (Annex VI, Chapter 1) and Romania (Annex VII, Chapter 1), 
shall apply. 
With regard to the safeguard mechanisms contained in the transitional 
arrangements referred to in the previous paragraphs, with the exception of the 
arrangements for Malta, PROTOCOL 44 ON SAFEGUARD MECHANISMS 
PURSUANT TO ENLARGEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 
shall apply.’ 
Joint Declaration by the EFTA States on free movement of workers222 
The EFTA States stress the strong elements of differentiation and flexibility in 
the arrangements for the free movement of workers. They shall endeavour to 
grant increased labour market access to nationals of the Republic of Bulgaria 
and Romania under national law, with a view to speeding up the 
approximation to the acquis. As a consequence, the employment opportunities 
in the EFTA States for nationals of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania 
should improve substantially upon these States’ accession. Moreover, the 
EFTA States will make best use of the proposed arrangements to move as 
quickly as possible to the full application of the acquis in the area of free 
movement of workers. For Liechtenstein, this will be done in accordance with 
the specific arrangements as foreseen in the Sectoral Adaptations to Annex V 
(Free movement of workers) and Annex VIII (Right of establishment) to the 
EEA Agreement. 
  
                                                   
221 OJL. L 221, 25.08.2007, p. 28. 
222 OJL. L 221, 25.08.2007, p. 45. 
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Annex V. EEA EFTA Countries’ Participation in EU agencies 
EU agency EEA Joint 
Committee Decision 
EEA participation 
from 
European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work (EU-
OSHA) 
No. 160/2009 01.01.2010 
European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) 
No. 179/2004 01.06.2005 
European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) 
No. 23/2005 01.01.2005 
European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) 
No. 25/2008 05.06.2008 
European Environment 
Agency (EEA) 
No. 11/1994 01.01.1995 
European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) 
No. 134/2007 01.05.2010 
European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority (GSA) 
No. 180/2004 01.01.2009 
European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) 
No. 81/2003 01.01.2004 
European Medicine Agency 
(EMA) 
No. 74/1999 01.01.2000 
European Network and 
Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) 
No. 103/2005 01.02.2006 
European Railway Agency 
(ERA) 
No. 82/2005 01.02.2006 
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Annex VI. EU Programmes with EEA Participation 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)  
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP)  
Daphne - Combating Violence  
Consumer Programme 2007-2013  
Culture 2007  
Safer Internet Plus 2005-2008  
Marco Polo – Transport  
The Civil Protection Financial Mechanism 2007-2013   
Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP)  
Employment and Social Solidarity – PROGRESS  
Health 2008-2013  
Youth in Action  
MEDIA 2007  
Data Interchange – IDABC  
European Employment Services (EURES)  
Erasmus Mundus  
176  ANNEXES 
Annex VII. The EU-Swiss Bilateral Agreements – The Main Agreements 
Bilateral Agreements of 1999 (Bilaterals I) 
Category Agreement and content In force since 
Integration Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport223 
01.06.2002 
This agreement provides on the basis of reciprocity for access to the EU’s civil aviation market. In 
principle this agreement puts Switzerland in the same position as if it had joined the EU with respect to 
civil aviation. 
Cooperation Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the European Communities and the 
Swiss Confederation224 
The agreement concerned Swiss participation in the 5th EU Framework Programme for Research and 
development including the corresponding Euratom programme. 
Liberalisation 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons225 
This agreement provides EU nationals and Swiss nationals for the rights to entry, residence and access to 
work as employed persons and the right of establishment on a self-employed basis. Furthermore it 
facilitates the provisions of services, liberalising the provision of services of brief duration (up to 90 days 
per calendar year). 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Carriage of Goods 
and Passengers by Rail and Road226 
                                                   
223 OJ L 114 of 30/04/2002, p. 73. 
224 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 468. 
225 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 6. 
226 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 91. 
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This agreement aims to coordinate the overland transport policy of Switzerland and the EU and 
especially to liberalise access to transport markets for the carriage of goods and passenger by road and 
rail. 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural 
products227 
This agreement’s objective is to foster free trade between the EU and Switzerland by facilitating market 
access of agricultural products to the market. The agreement consists of two parts, one relating to tariff 
concessions and the other to the reduction of technical barriers to trade. 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in 
relation to conformity assessment228 
This agreement introduces for most industrial products the reciprocal recognition of conformity ratings. 
Accordingly products can be certified by Swiss conformity assessment bodies and then be sold in the 
Internal Market and vice versa. 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of 
government procurement229 
The agreement aims at harmonising the rules of the government procurement markets of the EU and 
Switzerland. 
‘Guillotine 
Clauses’ 
All single agreements of the Bilateral I package are interconnected by a clause stipulating that all 
agreements share the same legal faith. If one agreement is cancelled or not renewed the same will hold 
true for the other agreements (e.g. Art 25 (4) Free movement of Persons Agreement and Art 36 (4) Air 
Transport Agreement) 
 
                                                   
227 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 132. 
228 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 369. 
229 OJ L114 of 30/04/2002, p. 430. 
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Bilateral Agreements of 2004 (Bilaterals II) 
Category Agreement and content In force since 
Integration 
Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on 
the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the 
Schengen acquis230 
Operational 
participation 
since 12.012.2008 
This agreement establishes the full association of Switzerland with the Schengen acquis. The agreement 
is based on the model used to associate Iceland and Norway to the Schengen are in 1999.231 The 
agreement provides Switzerland with the right to participate in the decision-making process for the 
development of the acquis without a voting right. This entails Swiss participation in the working 
groups of the Council and the Committees assisting the Commission as well as the Council of ministers 
in the respective field. The agreement also envisages the future development of the Schengen acquis, 
however, Switzerland is granted a two years period in which it can decide to take over new acquis or 
not by its legislature. The non-implementation of new acquis can lead to the suspension and finally 
termination or cancellation of the agreement. 
 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the criteria 
and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a 
Member State or in Switzerland232 
Operational 
participation 
since 12.012.2008 
This agreement establishes the full association of Switzerland with the Schengen acquis. The agreement 
is based on the model used to associate Iceland and Norway to the Schengen area in 1999.233 The 
agreement provides Switzerland with the right to participate in the decision-making process for the 
 
                                                   
230 OJ L53 of 27/02/2008, p. 52. 
231 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s 
Association with the Implementation, Application and Development of Schengen acquis, OJ L176 of 18.05.1999, p. 36. 
232 OJ L53 of 27/02/2008, p. 3. 
233 Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter’s 
Association with the Implementation, Application and Development of Schengen acquis, OJ L176 of 18.05.1999, p. 36. 
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Bilateral Agreements of 2004 (Bilaterals II) 
Category Agreement and content In force since 
development of the acquis without a voting right. This entails Swiss participation in the working 
groups of the Council and the Committees assisting the Commission as well as the Council of ministers 
in the respective field. The agreement also envisages the future development of the Dublin acquis, 
however, Switzerland is granted a two years period in which it can decide to take over new acquis or 
not by its legislature. The non-implementation of new acquis can lead to the suspension and finally 
termination or cancellation of the agreement. 
Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the 
Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement 
between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss 
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis 
19.12.2011 
This agreement allows the Principality of Liechtenstein to fully participate in the Schengen acquis via a 
protocol to the EU-Swiss Schengen agreement. 
 
Cooperation 
Agreement in the form of exchange of letters between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation on the date of implementation of the agreement between the European Community and 
the Swiss Confederation envisaging measures equivalent to those provided for in Council Directive 
2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of the incomes of the saving in the form of payments of 
interests234 
01.06.2005 
This agreement permits cross-border taxation of the savings of individuals liable to taxation in the EU. 
Switzerland introduced taxation at the source with an incremental increase of the tax rate to 35% (July 
2011). The revenues are share between the EU and Switzerland in a ratio of 75% to 25%. Furthermore 
taxation on dividends or license-fee payments between associated companies is abolished. The 
agreement also contains voluntary exchange of information or on request in cases of tax fraud. 
 
                                                   
234 OJ L385 of 29/12/2004, p. 51. 
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Bilateral Agreements of 2004 (Bilaterals II) 
Category Agreement and content In force since 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the 
detriment of their financial interests235 
Pending236 
This agreement provides for cooperation in the fight against smuggling and other offences relating to 
indirect taxes. This agreement has not entered into force. Ratification of Austria and Luxembourg is 
pending. 
 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on cooperation in the field 
of statistics237 
01.01.2007 
This agreement adjusts Switzerland’s standards of statistical data collection to those of Eurostat and 
provides for Swiss access to Eurostat data. 
 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the 
participation of Switzerland in the European Environment Agency and the European Environment 
Information and Observation Network238 
01.04.2006 
This agreement provides for Swiss participation in the European Environmental Agency.  
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation in the audiovisual field, 
establishing the terms and conditions for the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
Community programmes MEDIA Plus and MEDIA Training239 
01.04.2006240 
                                                   
235 Not yet ratified by all EU members states, OJ L46 of 17/02/2009, p. 8. 
236 Ratification by Austria and Luxembourg pending; implementation by Switzerland as of 08.04.2009; provisional application with respect to EU 
Member States, which ratified. 
237 OJ L90 of 28/03/2006, p.1. 
238 OJ L90 of 28/03/2006, p. 36. 
239 OJ L90 of 28/03/2006, p. 23. 
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Bilateral Agreements of 2004 (Bilaterals II) 
Category Agreement and content In force since 
This agreement allows Swiss filmmakers to participate in the EU’s MEDIA programmes.  
Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation establishing the terms and 
conditions for the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the ‘Youth in Action’ programme and in 
the action programme in the field of lifelong learning (2007-2013)241 
01.03.2011242 
This agreement provides for Swiss participation in the EU’s educational programmes (e.g. Lifelong 
Learning, Youth in Action) 
 
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Commission of the European Communities 
with a view to avoiding the double taxation of retired officials of the institutions and agencies of the 
European Communities resident in Switzerland243 
31.05.2005 
This agreement abolishes double taxation of former EU official residing in Switzerland. It applies 
currently to 50 individuals. 
 
Liberalisation 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation amending the agreement 
between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 concerning 
the provisions applicable to the processed agricultural products244 
30.03.2005 
This agreement amended the provision relating to processed agricultural products of the Free Trade 
Agreement 1972, further liberalising trade in this products between Switzerland and the EU. It 
provides for duty-free export of Swiss food industry products. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
240 Renewed agreement in force since 01.08.2010. 
241 OJ L87 of 07/04/2010, p. 9. 
242 Provisional application since 01.09.2007). 
243 Not published in the OJ. 
244 OJ L23 of 26/01/2005, p. 17. 
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Custom Facilitation and Security 1990 (completely revised in 2009) 
Category Agreement Entry into force 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation relating to the 
facilitation of controls and of the formalities at the time of the transport of goods245 
01.07.1991 
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the simplification of 
inspections and formalities in respect of the carriage of goods and on customs security measures246 
01.01.2011 
These agreements facilitate the controls and formalities for goods transport at the border between the 
EU and Switzerland. The second agreement excludes Switzerland from “24-hour notification rule” for 
import into the EU. 
 
 
Insurance Agreement (excluding life insurance) 1989 
Category Agreement Entry into force 
Cooperation  Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning 
direct insurance other than the life insurance 
-Protocol No. 1: the solvency margin  
-Protocol No. 2: the work programme  
-Protocol No. 3: relation between the ECU and the Swiss franc  
-Protocol No. 4: agencies and branches falling within the competence of companies the registered office 
of which is located out of the territories to which this agreement is applicable247 
01.01.1993 
 This agreement provides for the freedom of establishment of insurance companies (not life insurance) 
between the EU and Switzerland. 
 
 
                                                   
245 OJ L 116 of 08/05/1990, p. 18. 
246 OJ L199 of 31/07/2009, p. 24. 
247 OJ L 205 of 27/07/1991, p. 3. 
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EEC – Swiss Free Trade Agreement 1972 
Category Agreement Entry into force 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation 
-Protocol No. 1 on the arrangement applicable to certain products 
-Protocol No. 2 on the products subject to a special treatment to take account of the differences in cost 
of the integrated agricultural products  
-Protocol on No. 3 relating to the definition of the “original product” concept and to the administrative 
cooperation methods 
-Protocol No. 4 aiming at certain special provisions concerning Ireland  
- Protocol No. 5 on the applicable arrangement by Switzerland on imports of certain products subject 
to the arrangement aiming at the constitution of obligatory reserves248 
01.01.1973 
This agreement establishes an EU-Swiss free trade area for industrial products, prohibiting any form of 
custom duties or quotas between the two parties. 
 
Additional agreement on validity for the principality of Liechtenstein of the agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 
01.01.1973 
This agreement provides for the application to the Principality of Liechtenstein of the EU-Swiss Free 
Trade agreement 1972. 
 
                                                   
248 OJ L300 of 31/12/1972, p. 189. 
184  ANNEXES 
Annex VIII. EEA Joint Committee Decision 
 
